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Abstract
This thesis presents three empirical studies related to the economics of health
interventions. All of them use data from England and are related to preventive
care.
The first study estimates the potential impact of early diagnosis programmes
on medication, subjective health and lifestyle. By taking advantage of the survey
design of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), a regression discontinu-
ity design based on the blood pressure of the respondents allows for estimates free
of selection bias due to screening. There is evidence of a temporal increase in the
use of medication as a treatment for the condition, and induced lifestyle changes.
The second study proposes a structural dynamic life-cycle model for studying
the economic value of the adoption of medical innovations. It allows for both
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness calculations, by considering long-run gains on
productivity and on welfare derived from adjusting savings and labour supply
throughout life. In particular, the case of a medication that reduces the odds
of developing cardiovascular diseases, namely statins, is considered. Using data
from ELSA, it is possible to calculate the value of such treatment, and to consider
counterfactual policy scenarios.
The last study proposes an empirical test for determining whether rewarded
tasks are cost complements or substitutes in a pay for performance scheme with
kinks on linear task-specific reward functions. The test is based on the insensitivity
of effort exerted on a particular task to variations in the price of competing tasks
for agents who are bunched near the kink. As a case study, we consider the case
of the Quality and Outcomes Framework, which is a pay for performance scheme for
family doctors in the UK. We found no evidence of effort-diversion as a result of
the changes introduced in 2011.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Authors like Becker (2007) and Murphy and Topel (2010) argue that the health
revolution of the 20th century has been among its more important developments,
if not the most significant. Not only has life expectancy doubled, but quality
of health has also improved sharply. Behind this revolution has been a notori-
ous advance of medical science as well as the introduction of public policies that
have allowed for the adoption of crucial innovations. Such improvements have
consequences for economic behaviour which are also discussed by Becker (2007).
Following Grossman (1972), health can be interpreted as a form of human capital,
meaning that individuals invest in preserving it not only due to its commodity
value but also because it determines their total time available for either labour or
leisure. This motivates economists to understand how current quantity (mortality)
and quality (morbidity) greatly affect all individuals’ current and future choices,
and how governments can shape such decisions via policies. This thesis is based
on these general questions.
This thesis is organised in three main chapters following this introduction.
While there are common elements across them, like the general background of
interventions, datasets and bibliography, each chapter is self-contained. Each one
has its own introduction, dataset section, results, conclusions and appendix, with
few references between them. They explore policies related to health from dif-
ferent perspectives and use very disparate methodological approaches. The first
measures the impact of a policy in terms of individuals’ response to it. The second
goes beyond the impact, and is about calculating the value of health technologies
in order to allow a policy maker to decide whether to implement them or not.
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And finally, the last one is a general empirical test designed to understand the
functioning of pay-for-performance schemes, a standard approach for adopting
health technologies.
The first study is devoted to the role of information treatments in health in-
vestments. Regular health checks are commonly proposed as a means of slowing
the progress of several non-transmittable diseases; specifically, they allow for the
early diagnosis of conditions that increase the odds of serious health complica-
tions. This is the case for high blood pressure or hypertension, which has no
evident symptoms but increases the odds of developing a cardiovascular event
such as a heart attack or a stroke. Early diagnosis means that patients can receive
early treatment. However, the identification of the potential impact of receiving
health information is challenging as individuals’ demand for preventive care is
likely to be related to other health investments and with their beliefs about their
morbidity progression. Chapter 2 estimates the potential impact of early diag-
nosis programmes on medication, objective and subjective health measures and
lifestyle.
In order to deal with potential selection bias due to screening, I employ a
feature of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) that motivates a regres-
sion discontinuity design based on the blood pressure of respondents. ELSA was
designed following the Health Survey for England, which has a strict protocol for
assessing objective measures of health approximately every four years, starting in
2004. The survey, which includes information such as blood pressure or choles-
terol levels, is collected from respondents by nurses. One of the key elements of
the protocol is the standardised feedback that is given to respondents about such
biomarkers. For the specific case of blood pressure, respondents above the NHS
high blood pressure thresholds are told about the potential risk of being hyper-
tense. It is also suggested to them that they visit their GP in order to get a proper
assessment, as the survey measure does not follow diagnosis protocols. This sur-
vey design allows for identification of the effect of information on health beliefs
and behaviour based on a regression discontinuity design.
As a result of the exercise, there is evidence of a temporal increase in the
probability of being prescribed medication for blood pressure (4.41 pp) as a treat-
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ment for the condition, which has almost doubled the proportion of people on
medication for these levels of blood pressure. At the same time, there has been
a permanent reduction in alcohol intake frequency of 8.4 pp and an increase in
fruit consumption. However, there is also evidence of higher smoking intensity
(5 cigarettes per week) and a higher probability of being obese (11 pp) for those
above the threshold. Moreover, no clear effects on either objective or subjective
health were found after four years of the intervention. These results suggest that
this type of information-based interventions might have a strong impact on the de-
mand for preventive care treatments, with permanent positive effects on behaviour
at the same time.
While chapter 2 considers one potential preventive intervention, chapter 3 is
about how to value these policies. In general terms it contributes to the literature
that estimates the value improvements on life quantity and quality. There is plenty
of literature on the topics of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. There are
established tools like the quality adjust life years (QALY), which is used for assess-
ing the medical value of an intervention. It gives a fixed weight to potential health
estates, based on the subjective measure of quality of life, in order to compute the
gains of a treatment. Nevertheless, this does not take into account other potential
benefits (or losses) derived from a given intervention. For instance, by how much
would average labour income change if we managed to gain 1 QALY? These types
of effects arise as a reduction in the number of people who suffer from work dis-
abilities might increase labour participation. However, reducing the prospects of
suffering such a type of disability might also decrease incentives for extra savings
before retirement. An alternative to QALYs and cost-effectiveness analysis is to
consider how much of their wealth are individuals willing to give up in order
to enjoy the treatment. Willingness-to-pay calculation is the basis of cost-benefit
analysis. This requires a counterfactual scenario that considers not only health
but also financial variables. In Chapter 3, I contribute to this literature by in-
troducing a structural dynamic life-cycle model for studying the economic value
of the adoption of medical innovations. It allows for both cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness calculations, by considering long-run gains on QALYs, productivity,
and welfare derived from adjusting savings and labour supply throughout life.
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Such a tool considers how realised and expected health shocks modify trade-offs
in the life-cycle, and its parameters are estimated using a rich longitudinal dataset
that involves both health and financial information.
With this model, I consider the case of a medication, namely statins, which
reduces the odds of developing cardiovascular diseases. Using data from ELSA
between 2002/03 to 2012/13, the calculated value of this use of the drug is £79 bil-
lion. This is nearly 12% higher than considering the value derived from assuming
a willingness-to-pay of £23.000 per QALY, a more standard valuation strategy. I
also explore how the value depends on the effectiveness of the drug and of policies
directed to its diffusion in the primary care system, as well as non-health related
elements such as retirement age. It is also shown that one of the main drivers
of the results is the implied willingness-to-pay for extending longevity. This con-
cept, related to the value of a statistical life, is governed by the bequest motive
formulation.
The prescription of statins is done at primary care level, and it is incentivised
under the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). This is a pay for performance
scheme that rewards family doctors for accomplishing several goals. For instance,
doctors are paid more for every increase in the percentage of diabetic patients
who have their cholesterol controlled until this figure reaches 70%. This system
of payment motivates Chapter 4. In this third and last project, a joint effort with
Marcos Vera-Hernández, we develop a test for assessing a central property of
this type of reward system: whether effort is diverted from one task into another
after changing the reward of one the tasks. This is a central question as overall
quality of care might be affected by modifying the incentives of some of the tasks.
Such a type of response occurs when exerting effort in a particular task might
result in an increase (substitutes) or decrease (complements) in the marginal cost of
alternative efforts. While the empirical implications of these changes in a contract
are straightforward, in practice it is difficult to isolate optimal responses from
other concurrent unobserved shocks. This is a common challenge that arises due
to the lack of adequate control groups, as incentive systems are typically rolled-out
at the same time for an entire target group.
We contribute to the analysis of multitasking by using as a control group ob-
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servations close to the presence of kinks in the reward function. In other words,
agents who decided to exert effort just above the point in which there is a drastic
change on the marginal benefit of effort. The relevance of such kinks in agents’
choices can be assessed by their impact on the density function: it produces bunch-
ing near the kink point. This is because agents who would have decided to exert a
higher effort without the kink, because of it choose to be exactly (or slightly above)
at the kink point. Our test proceeds in two steps. First, we test whether or not the
kink has affect on agents’ choices, In other words, if there is bunching. Second, if
that is the case, we test whether or not the response on effort to a change in the
rewards between agents whose decisions are affected by the kink. We show that
as agents at the kink are less likely to react to such a change in conditions, these
individuals constitute a control group.
In terms of the QOF analysis, we show that changes introduced in 2010/11
revealed that tasks for which there was no price variation are not substitutes of
those tasks. In fact, several indicators are complements.

Chapter 2
Early diagnosis of chronic conditions and
lifestyle modification
2.1 Introduction
The rise in public expenditure due to an ageing population is partly due to dis-
eases that could be prevented or delayed by modifying the habits of patients. One
of the potential solutions is a preventive strategy based on the early treatment of
individuals who are at risk of potential complications. This idea motives the strat-
egy of periodical health checks on the population. Massive programmes such as
NHS Health Checks in the UK, or some preventive care components of the Afford-
able Care Act in the US, point in that direction. For instance, the former invites
people aged between 35 and 74 to routine check-ups for detecting signs of chronic
conditions such as cardiovascular diseases. However, some authors like MacAuley
(2012) consider that the impact of such policies might be even negative due to the
misallocation of resources, over-diagnosis of certain conditions and to behavioural
effects.
A first question about these programs is about their potential for inducing
changes on demand for health care. A review by Krogsbøll et al. (2012) found that
in general this type of programmes increased the number of individuals using
anti-hypertensive drugs, but without conclusive effect on health benefits. In the
specific case of the UK, there is no evidence so far on the benefits of the NHS
Health Checks programme. Some studies like Artac et al. (2013) or Cochrane
et al. (2012) provide descriptive evidence of the potential problems and benefits of
the intervention in small areas of the country. Robson et al. (2016) suggests that
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NHS Health Checks is related to an increase on the attendance to GP practices of
individuals in risk of developing cardiovascular diseases (CVD). They have also
observe increased prescription of medication for controlling high blood pressure
(HBP) as well as for lowering cholesterol.
Second, there is an special concern of the effects of periodical health checks
on risky behaviours. There is evidence that individuals might be sensible in terms
of information related to their own health, consistent with the idea of rational
addiction (Arcidiacono et al., 2007). Moreover, smokers’ tend to be optimistic
about their own mortality (Khwaja et al., 2007), and are updated with the on-
set of diagnosis of smoking-related diseases (Smith et al., 2001). However, treat-
ment for mild conditions detected with the checks might induce risk compensa-
tion/offsetting behaviours. In other words, individuals could potentially increase
their risky behaviour in response to improved prospects of future health due to
medical treatment, or due to reassurance when they receive ‘good news’. This is
a common concern on areas like unsafe sexual activity and HIV treatment (Cas-
sell et al., 2006). In order to understand this potential side-effect, it is required
to analyse whether medical treatment and health behaviours are complements or
substitutes in the context of a competing risks model. In principle, theory sug-
gests complementarities between health investments as reducing one of the risks
increases the marginal benefit of reducing the others (Becker, 2007; Dow et al.,
1999). However, if lifestyle gains in reducing a disease-specific risk are offset by
medical treatment, substitution effect might dominate (Kaestner et al., 2014). So
far Kahn (1999) found that diabetics lifestyle improved over time without signs
of medication, Fichera and Sutton (2011) suggests that statins were associated for
lowering cholesterol with reductions on smoking in England. On the other hand,
Kaestner et al. (2014) found an increase in obesity in response to the use of statins
and no effect on smoking.
This chapter contributes to both the understanding of health advice effects
and the analysis of complementarity or substitution between medical treatment
and health behaviours. First, I am able to identify the medium and long run
impact of informing individuals about the odds of being hypertensive, a condition
that might increase the likelihood of developing cardiovascular diseases (CVDs).
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Second, given this evidence, I am able to test if individuals modify their lifestyle
and beliefs about their current and future health status in response to medical
intervention.
My identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of receiving medical
advice relies on the protocols of the English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA)
and the Health Survey of England (HSE). During the progress of the survey, a nurse
takes the blood pressure of interviewees. In ELSA, those with a systolic/diastolic
reading higher than 149/85 mmHg, are encouraged to visit their family doctor in
order to have a proper screening test to confirm the findings. A similar procedure
is in place in HSE with a 160/95 threshold for men aged 50 and over. As a result,
we can compare individuals aged above fifty, not previously diagnosed with HBP,
who are very similar in their health status but who differ only in having being
advised or not to visit primary care services. This motivates a Regression Dis-
continuity Design (RDD) that identifies the impact for individuals who are close
to the advice thresholds but who had not previously been diagnosed with any
cardiovascular conditions.
A significant increase of 4.41 pp in the use of BP-lowering medication was
found around to years after the intervention for those with a systolic BP slightly
above the advice threshold compared to those below it. It almost doubles the
proportion of individuals who are under such medication at this level of blood
pressure. After 2 waves (approximately 4 years), the difference on prescription
drops to 1 pp. and it is not statistically different form zero. This is in line with
previous findings in the health checks literature that found an increase on medica-
tion use. Additionally, the advice caused a permanent decrease on alcohol intake
of 8.4 pp and a positive impact on fruit portions per day. However, it also caused
an increase on self-reported smoking intensity of 5 cigarettes per week, and of 11
pp on the probability to the obese (BMI>30). These findings suggest that improve-
ments on fruits consumption and heavy drinking corresponds to a direct response
to the threat of worse future health. Under Kaestner et al. (2014) framework, re-
sults for smoking and obesity indicate substitution between medical treatment and
lifestyle. However, there is no evidence that such extra risky behaviour is in direct
response to BP medication induced by the advice.
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Results suggest that this type of information-based interventions might have
strong impacts on demand for preventive care treatments, with permanent positive
effects on behaviour at the same time. Moreover, impacts are stronger on men and
on individuals will low risk of developing CVDs, showing that the policy might
be effective for targeting this specific population.
This chapter is organized as follows. The introduction was the first part of
this chapter. Section 2.2 presents the main details of the dataset and the sample
employed and explains the health advice procedure by the survey nurses. Section
2.3 discusses the empirical strategy and Section 2.4 the main findings. Finally,
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
I use the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (Marmot et al., 2013) for the years
2002-2012. It is a longitudinal study with a representative sample of those aged
50 and over in England. Its baseline was constructed using the Health Survey
for England (NatCen and UCL, 2010) and it contains high-quality subjective and
objective health information and detailed socio-economic information.1
Figure 2.1: Survey timing
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Notes: The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) is based on the original sample from the
Health Survey for England (HSE)
Additionally to the core interview, I use the biomarkers data collected in
waves 0, 2, 4 and 6 (see Figure 2.1). All core individuals2 who had a interview
in person were eligible for the blood pressure measurements (BP), and depending
on their health, to other measures.3 After completing the questionnaire, respon-
dents were asked for their approval to be visited by a nurse4 in the following
weeks. If they agreed, an appointment was made for between 2 to 4 weeks after
1More details can be found on the survey website:http://www.ifs.org.uk/ELSA/about
2ELSA collected information about partners, even if they were not part of the original HSE
sample. These ‘new’ partners were not eligible for biomarkers measurements.
3For example, for blood samples eligibility depended on non-suffering a condition or being under
a medication that implies that the test might compromise respondent’s health.
4They are professional nurses trained by the researchers to take the measures following a strict
protocol.
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the interview. Diastolic and systolic blood pressure was derived by taking into
account the last two of three measurements,5 using an automated monitor under
standardized conditions.6
As cooperation is a choice, the observed sample might be affected by selec-
tion. In particular, there is evidence which suggests that respondents are usually
more likely to be more worried about their health and to engage in practices for
preserving it (Heidi Guyer, 2010).
2.2.1 Descriptive information
For this exercise we consider only individuals for whom there are at least three
valid BP measurements in at least one of the waves. Table 2.1 presents the de-
scriptive information of this sample for each wave. In general, from Panel A, our
sample is getting older during the observed time despite the refreshment samples
that have been added since wave 3.7 Though younger cohorts are more educated,
the levels of education are represented in similar proportions across time as other
characteristics as well as ethnicity, gender and marital status.
Panel B presents the evolution of self-reported health conditions. As our sam-
ple gets older, the prevalence of most diseases increases. The opposite occurs for
lifestyle as observed in Panel C. There is a declining trend in the prevalences of
smoking8 (both in the extensive and intense margins) and alcohol intake.9 Such
a trend is not clear for the case of physical activity.10 Two final measures on veg-
5The protocol discards the first measurement in order to minimize the white coat syndrome. Es-
sentially, anxiety and stress produced by clinical settings temporally increases blood pressure but
without being associated with cardiovascular risk (Pickering, 1996).
6People were asked to sit quietly 5 minutes before the measurement. Nurses were also instructed
to delay the start of the measurements until at least half an hour after their arrival. Other conditions
that might be relevant, such as ambient air temperature, was recorded. If the respondent had eaten,
drunk, smoked or exercised in the last half an hour, his answers would be invalid.
7HSE 2002 to 2006 data is not used in some of the specifications due to the lack of information
on hypertensive status.
8In ELSA, individuals are asked about smoking as part of the health module. If they report to
be currently smoking, they are asked whether they use cigarettes and/or roll-ups. In both cases,
they are ask about their consumption on weekdays and weekends separately: number of cigarettes
and/or grams/ounces of tobacco. Around 23% of the smokers report to be roll-up consumers only,
and I assumed 1 gram to be equivalent to 1 cigarette, and 1 ounce to be 28.35 cigarettes. The top 1%
of these measures are excluded as they seem to be outliers. One important concern is variation on
prices: Leicester and Levell (2012) and Czubek et al. (2010) have a good description on the evolution
of real prices and consumption trends during the period. Relevant actions were in 1998 where the
NHS quit was implemented and in 2007, when bans on smoking in public spaces were implemented.
9ELSA questions on alcohol intake is part of a self-completion module, and they vary from
wave to wave. The present classification tries to capture the available information in a way that is
comparable across waves.
10A recoded version of the level of physical activity derived by NatCen. These questions are part
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etable and fruit intake are included in the ELSA, and as shown in the table, there
is a substantial difference on how they were measured after wave five.11 Such dis-
crepancies are not problematic for the estimation of the sign of the impacts, as this
compares variations within waves. However, the interpretation of the magnitudes
is difficult as the estimates mixes both type of measures.
Panel D and E present subjective and objective measures of health. Evolu-
tion of objective health measures is not homogeneous. Some of them deteriorate
on time: individuals are getting fatter (BMI and obesity), with higher levels of
cholesterol; but their blood pressure is decreasing as the same time. First, binary
variables for reporting to be in good and bad health are derived from standard
likert scale type of question for self-rated health. ELSA also involves subjective
probabilities on the chances to survive age 75; and the chances of suffering an
event that limits ability to work. The former question is asked to individuals aged
60 and younger, and the later only to those who are currently working. Inter-
esting, despite the an increasing proportion of individuals being diagnosed with
hypertension or diabetes, all subjective health measures are on average increasing
on time.
Finally, Panel F presents information on financial variables derived by the
Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS). Measures of income, savings and wealth, as well
as labour supply, are included. Values in the top 1% of these variables are excluded
as these values can be considered atypical for the rest of the distribution.
As this study aims to understand the effect of receiving advise about potential
undiagnosed hypertension, the objective population has to be those who are in
risk of such condition and are less likely to be tested for it. Falaschetti et al. (2014)
documents that both systolic and diastolic BP increase with age until age 60 where
the diastolic measure start to decrease systematically. The also show that by 2011,
prevalence of hypertension was 28% for the age group 40-49, 40% for 50-59, and
60% for 60-69. Nevertheless, the authors documented an increase in awareness and
management of the condition between 1994 (46%) and 2011 (71%). This is related
of the health module and involve both leisure and labour activities.
11These questions are part of the self-completion questionnaire. For waves 3 and 4, individuals
have to record the total number of fruits/vegetables per item in a list, and then the number was
added up in order to construct the measure. In contrast, waves 5 and 6 ask directly for the number
of portions consumed per day.
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Table 2.1: Sample Means by Wave
Variables Wave
0
Wave
1
Wave
2
Wave
3
Wave
4
Wave
5
Wave
6
Panel A. Socio-demographic Characteristics
Age 60.6 63.5 65.8 67.9 66.3 67.3 69.0
Male 43.9% 43.9% 43.9% 44.5% 44.8% 44.8% 44.9%
Educ: No qualifications mentioned 38.9% 38.9% 36.6% 32.2% 30.8% 27.0% 27.8%
Educ: Some medium qualif. 36.3% 36.3% 36.9% 38.7% 39.2% 40.1% 39.8%
Educ: Some high level or above qualif. 24.9% 24.9% 26.5% 29.1% 30.0% 32.9% 32.5%
Non white ethnicity 29.0% 2.6% 8.1% 2.9% 6.3% 2.5% 4.6%
Married 71.2% 71.1% 63.4% 65.1% 61.0% 66.8% 61.3%
Panel B. Health Conditions
Diagnosed HBP ever 15.3% 23.8% 47.1% 48.7% 48.8% 46.4% 52.6%
High Cholesterol, wave 2 onwards 18.8% 34.6% 35.7% 42.2% 46.6%
Diagnosed Diabetes ever 2.4% 5.9% 8.4% 10.4% 11.2% 11.4% 13.2%
Takes BP medication 11.4% 17.6% 32.0% 36.0% 32.8% 34.9% 35.7%
Takes Lipid-lowering medication 21.4% 22.6% 25.9% 28.0%
Diagnosed Major Cardiovascular Event ever 6.4% 13.2% 18.2% 18.0% 17.4% 15.2% 18.3%
Panel C. Lifestyle
Current smoker 17.5% 16.3% 13.8% 10.1% 11.6% 10.4% 9.3%
Cigarettes per week (0 for non-smokers, includes
rollups) 0.0 13.7 10.8 7.7 9.0 7.8 6.9
Alcohol twice a week or more 64.5% 59.3% 43.8% 42.7% 41.0% 40.9% 38.3%
Sedentary or low physical activity 29.9% 30.0% 30.1% 29.2% 29.1% 30.7%
Portions of vegetables per day 5.3 5.7 2.8 2.9
Portions of fruits per day 5.5 5.2 2.2 2.2
Panel D. Health Perceptions
Self-reported good health 70.5% 71.7% 73.5% 68.8% 75.0% 75.8% 73.2%
Self-reported bad health 7.3% 24.2% 26.5% 31.2% 25.0% 24.2% 26.8%
SSP: Chances to live to age 75 65.5 65.4 67.1 67.8 68.9 68.0
What are the chances that your health will limit
your ability to work before you 37.8 35.4 33.3 32.8 32.3 29.9
Panel E. Health Measures
BMI: Body Mass Index (kg/m2) 27.4 27.9 28.3 28.2
Waist-to-height ratio (WHtR) 0.6 0.6 0.6
Overweight or above: BMI 25+ 68.7% 72.6% 73.5% 72.8%
Obesity level 1 or above: BMI 30+ 23.2% 28.7% 31.2% 30.5%
Blood HDL level (mmol/l) 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7
Blood total cholesterol level (mmol/l) 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.5
Blood glucose level (mmol/L) - fasting samples
only 5.0 4.9 5.4
(D) Valid Mean Systolic BP 138.3 135.1 132.6 132.5
(D) Valid Mean Diastolic BP 76.2 75.0 74.3 73.1
Panel F. Economic activity
BU total weekly income (£ of May2005) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
BU total savings (1000£ of May2005) 22.7 27.4 32.5 37.6 36.5 36.8
BU total net (non-pension) wealth (1000£ of
May2005) 232.8 277.8 307.7 310.6 302.6 307.0
Hours of work all jobs (employed or self em-
ployed) 35.9 34.7 32.8 33.8 33.2 32.1
Working 41.0% 35.1% 30.7% 36.0% 32.7% 27.3%
Individuals 6572 6572 8538 5627 9059 7056 7308
Year 98-00 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: own calculations using HSE 1998,99,00 for wave 0 and ELSA waves 1-6.
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to the proportion of individuals who regularly had blood pressure tests. Between
1998 and 2008, data from the British Household Panel Survey (ISER, 2010) shows
that there was an increase from 61% to 80% on the proportion of individuals aged
45 to 60 report having had their BP tested in the last two years (see Figure 2.2).
The proportion is larger for the older group, going from 73% to 86%. As a result,
despite improvements over time, while prevalence is higher in older individuals,
testing is lower in the middle-age group. Hence, it is expected that this type of
intervention would be useful for younger individuals.
Figure 2.2: Demand for BP screening tests
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Another element of discussion is the relationship between lifestyle and di-
agnosis of hypertension. Figure 2.3 presents the correlation between habits and
self-reported HBP that arises from the ELSA. It shows that, in general, individuals
who report having been told by a doctor about being hypertense are less likely
to smoke or to consume alcohol more than once a week, but at the same time are
more likely to have a sedentary life.
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Figure 2.3: HBP and lifestyle
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2.2.2 Health Advice Intervention
There is a particular characteristic of the ELSA that makes it ideal for our pur-
poses. As previously indicated, nurses hired by ELSA visit the survey respon-
dents two weeks after the survey interview and take their BP. According to the
ELSA protocol, the nurses advise respondents to visit their family doctor (general
practitioner, GP) if their BP measure is above a certain threshold (see below). This
message might induce some individuals to visit their family doctor and get an
adequate screening to stablish whether they suffer from hypertension.
Essentially, the advice varies with the last 2 out of 3 measurements of respon-
dents’ systolic/diastolic BP. In the ELSA, the thresholds are 140/85 mmHg for
mildly raised blood pressure, 160/100 mmHg for moderately raised and 180/115
mmHg for considerably raised. Below 140/85 mmHg, the blood pressure was
considered normal. In the HSE, the values were the same for women and men un-
der 50, but changed for men aged 50 or over.12 A respondent with mildly raised
blood pressure was instructed to visit their GP in the next 3 months, for moder-
ately raised it was 3 weeks, and for considerably raised, 5 days. These thresholds
are similar to the official recommendation for systolic BP used by the NHS, where
12160/95, 170/105 and 180/115 mmHg respectively
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Figure 2.4: Systolic Blood Pressure Distribution and Nurses’ Advice
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hypertension is diagnosed with 140/90 mmHg (NICE, 2011). For diastolic BP
the recommendation is quite conservative and we will see this reflected in the re-
sults. Figure 2.4 presents the strategy that will be followed in this chapter: the BP
measures are standardized around the relevant mildly raised cut-off according to
respondents’ age, gender and year of the survey. For this analysis, an individual
is treated if such a measure is greater or equal to 0, and is a control otherwise.
Nurses were clearly instructed to provide only the survey interpretation. Re-
spondents were allowed to avoid feedback from the readings, or to allow the re-
sults to be sent to their GP.13 That information could be left written in a “mea-
surement record card” along with other biomarkers.14 The suggestion given by
the nurses was homogeneous as stated by the survey protocol. For instance, in the
case of moderately raised blood pressure, they will tell the respondent:
Blood pressure can vary from day to day and throughout the day so that
one high reading does not necessarily mean that you suffer from high blood
pressure. You are advised to visit your GP within 2-3 weeks to have a further
blood pressure reading to see whether this is a once-off finding or not.
13Unfortunately,public available data does not report these choices.
14There were not any other comments or suggestions based on the biomarkers of the survey.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
The previously described nurse protocol motivates a Sharp Regression Discon-
tinuity Design (RDD). The idea is to compare the value of the outcomes in the
waves following the measurement, for those individuals that were just below and
just above the threshold. By doing this, we are assuming that having the maxi-
mum standardised BP measurement slightly above or below the advice cut-off is
essentially random once we take into account the trend. Formally, following Im-
bens and Lemieux (2008), the impact of nurse advice at wave t, W = 1, on outcome
Yt+s at wave t + s (s ∈ {1,2}) is identified by the discontinuity in the conditional
expectation of such outcome at the advice cut-off BP = 0:
δ0 = E[Yi,t+s(W = 1)−Yi,t+s(W = 0)|BPi,t = 0] (2.1)
= lim
BP↓c
E[Yi,t+s|BPi,t = 0]− lim
BP↑0
E[Yi,t+s|BPi,t = 0]
This strategy identifies the impact of the policy on the outcomes of a particular
group of individuals. First, it tell us how individuals who might be considered to
have mildly raised blood pressure would react to the diagnosis of such a condition.
Second, it measures how people who comply with the advice react: that is, those
who visit their GP as the nurse told them to, and who would not do so in the
absence of the nurse advice.
Main results are presented based on the estimated parameter δ from Equa-
tion 2.2, which identifies δ0 in Equation 2.1. Essentially, within a bandwidth of
1 standard deviation (h = 1SD) of the cut-off, a second order polynomial is fit
at both sides of the cut-off in order to capture the observed relationship between
prescriptions and blood pressure (see Figure 2.5, described in detail in the results
section).
Yi,t+s = δWit + α0 + fl(αl , BPi,t|Wit = 0) + fr(αr, BPi,t|Wit = 1) , s ∈ {1,2} (2.2)
fx(αx, BPi,t|Wit = 0) = αx,1BPi,t + αx,2BP2i,t , x ∈ {l,r}
∀BPi,t ∈ [−h, h] , h = 1
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Given that δ0 can be estimated under different bandwidths h and functions
f (·), it is essential to test alternative specifications. Main tables will present results
based on local linear regressions with rectangular and triangular weights.15
Balancing tests are carried out in order to test the validity of the main as-
sumption. These test consist on running Equation 2.3 with s = 0. Such regression
analysis assess if the discontinuities were in place before the nurse advice took
place. Also, it is possible to determine if the effect is related to other pre-existing
elements in the data. This is done by setting socio-demographic characteristics as
left-hand side elements in the regression.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main Results
The intervention does increase the likelihood of being treated with medication
for BP among those who report not being diagnosed with HBP at the moment of
the nurse visit, around two years after they received the advice from the nurse.16
Those who were above the systolic BP advice threshold were around 4.41 pp more
likely to report that they were taking medication. This figure is significant at the
90% level and also large, as around 2% of the population with such BP levels take
medication. For the diastolic BP the estimate is 0.05 pp, which is not significant at
90% level.
Figure 2.5 presents a graphic version of the RDD analysis. In both graphs, the
horizontal axis shows the standardized BP measurement where 0 is the relevant
cut-off. A smoothed average, using the triangular linear kernel, is represented
by the dashed lines at both sides of the threshold. The goal of the strategy is to
measure the jump between the dashed lines. The value reported in the graph cor-
responds to Equation 2.2, and which will be called the Local Quadratic Rectangular
estimator in Tables below.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the main results for one and two waves after the
15For further details see Appendix 2.B.
16The sample is selected in that way in order to avoid confounding factors. First, in general
individuals above the threshold are more likely to report being diagnosed with HBP even before the
nurses visited them. This is expected as the advice cut-off is equivalent to the common diagnosis
threshold. Second, individuals in their fifties will benefit the most from the health checks, as they
are less likely to demand primary health care in the first place as shown in Figure 2.2. Age is
explored with more detail in Section 2.4.3. For more details see Appendix 2.A.
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Figure 2.5: Nurse Advice and BP lowering medication at the following-wave
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Sample: Individuals aged 60 or younger who reported not to be diagnosed with HBP or diabetes from the
HSE-ELSA data.
Notes: Calculations using a quadratic function within 1 standard deviation of the cutoff. A 90% CI is presented.
Significance level: *90%, ** 95%, *** 99%
nurse visit. In both of them, the rows present the outcome variables. Panel A
shows the jump estimator for health conditions and medications; Panel B does so
for lifestyle indicators; Panel C for health perceptions; and Panel D, only in Table
2.3, covers objective health measures. The first column is the mean of each depen-
dent variable for those observations one standard deviation below the threshold.
The other columns present different specifications for the trend between the out-
come and systolic blood pressure. Last column, number 4, corresponds to the
estimate of δ according to Equation 2.2. In the rows, standard errors are presented
as well as the number of observations included. They differ according to output
variable and method.17 As a comparison between variables, the reader can check
the common bandwidth of one standard deviation (h = 1). This sample size is
used for the main results in Column 4.18 Notice that some variables have fewer
observations as they were not collected in every wave (ex. fruits and vegetables),
or because they are conditional on some characteristic (ex. cigarettes per week for
those who reported to be smokers at the wave of the nurse advice).
17See Appendix 2.B for more details on the optimal bandwidth for local linear regressions esti-
mates presented in Columns 2 and 3.
18One standard deviation of systolic blood pressure is between 19 and 20 mmHg. Appendix 2.C
shows that the BP medication estimates are robust to the bandwidth selection.
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Before presenting results, tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the differential attrition
below and above the threshold. One standard deviation below the threshold,
average attrition is around 15% approximately two years after the measurement.
This figure is nearly 25% after four years. Nevertheless, there is no observed
systematic difference above and below the cut-off.
Table 2.2: RDD next wave (apx. 2 years) outcomes
RDD on systolic BP standarized around the nurse advice cut-off.
Yi,t+1 = δ(BPci,t ≥ 0) + α0 + fl(αl , BPci,t|BPi < 0) + fr(αr , BPci,t|BPi ≥ 0) + ui,t+1|Agei,t <= 64
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t + 1
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Missing this wave 15.17% 0.02 −1.24
N: 4000 (h∗1 = 0.91), (h
∗
2 =) , 4476 (h = 1) (2.47) (3.22)
Panel A. Health Conditions
Diagnosed HBP ever 5.74% 2.57 5.52∗ 2.72
N: 3188 (h∗1 = 0.87), 2038 (h
∗
2 = 0.53) , 3772 (h = 1) (2.32) (2.95) (2.95)
High Cholesterol, wave 2 onwards 24.43% −1.41 −1.57 0.22
N: 2475 (h∗1 = 1.41), 1224 (h
∗
2 = 0.66) , 1888 (h = 1) (3.93) (5.93) (6.08)
Diagnosed Diabetes ever 0.86% −0.12 0.34 −0.21
N: 3585 (h∗1 = 0.97), 2828 (h
∗
2 = 0.77) , 3772 (h = 1) (0.88) (0.96) (1.14)
Takes BP medication 1.94% 2.98∗ 4.69∗∗∗ 4.41∗∗
N: 3373 (h∗1 = 0.90), 2252 (h
∗
2 = 0.62) , 3772 (h = 1) (1.54) (1.81) (2.00)
Takes Lipid-lowering medication 9.32% 3.79 3.81 6.47
N: 1888 (h∗1 = 1.01), 1409 (h
∗
2 = 0.74) , 1888 (h = 1) (3.14) (3.94) (4.17)
Diagnosed Major Cardiovascular Event ever
(Stroke, Heart Failure, Infarction, An
2.46% 1.43 3.03∗∗ 1.29
N: 3017 (h∗1 = 0.82), 2829 (h
∗
2 = 0.75) , 3774 (h = 1) (1.44) (1.46) (1.77)
Panel B. Lifestyle
Current smoker 16.48% 3.49 4.14 2.47
N: 4775 (h∗1 = 1.37), 2817 (h
∗
2 = 0.77) , 3761 (h = 1) (2.49) (3.32) (3.79)
Current smoker if smoker at t 83.30% −1.60 −3.40 −2.22
N: 596 (h∗1 = 0.85), 423 (h
∗
2 = 0.62) , 697 (h = 1) (5.81) (6.82) (7.57)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers) 10.87 4.38 5.68∗ 2.69
N: 3874 (h∗1 = 1.12), 3003 (h
∗
2 = 0.87) , 3557 (h = 1) (2.66) (3.19) (3.68)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers,
includes rollups)
13.04 5.32∗ 6.17∗ 5.12
N: 4156 (h∗1 = 1.15), 3287 (h
∗
2 = 0.90) , 3682 (h = 1) (2.99) (3.47) (4.13)
Alcohol twice a week or more 55.39% −7.19∗ −10.57∗∗ −8.41∗
N: 3050 (h∗1 = 0.87), 2358 (h
∗
2 = 0.62) , 3621 (h = 1) (3.97) (4.62) (5.09)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t + 1
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Sedentary or low physical activity 17.47% 0.78 1.40 3.72
N: 3909 (h∗1 = 1.05), 3734 (h
∗
2 = 1.00) , 3734 (h = 1) (2.68) (2.80) (3.75)
Portions of vegtables per day 3.94 0.02 0.26 −0.09
N: 1192 (h∗1 = 0.69), 1466 (h
∗
2 = 0.86) , 1734 (h = 1) (0.46) (0.47) (0.56)
Portions of fruits per day 3.20 0.70∗∗ 0.51∗ 0.76∗
N: 1646 (h∗1 = 0.94), 2146 (h
∗
2 = 1.32) , 1732 (h = 1) (0.34) (0.31) (0.43)
Panel C. Health Perceptions
Self-reported GOOD health 83.86% 0.29 −0.43 1.13
N: 2632 (h∗1 = 0.72), 2455 (h
∗
2 = 0.62) , 3755 (h = 1) (3.30) (3.50) (3.83)
Self-reported bad health 14.64% −0.12 1.31 −1.15
N: 3568 (h∗1 = 0.94), 3173 (h
∗
2 = 0.85) , 3755 (h = 1) (2.73) (2.84) (3.63)
SSP: Chances to live to age 75 68.80 −0.57 −0.33 0.33
N: 2779 (h∗1 = 0.73), 1810 (h
∗
2 = 0.52) , 3707 (h = 1) (1.79) (2.24) (2.10)
What are the chances that your health will limit
your ability to work before you
34.88 0.97 −1.24 0.43
N: 2596 (h∗1 = 0.99), 1547 (h
∗
2 = 0.62) , 2596 (h = 1) (2.41) (2.95) (3.27)
Sample: Respondents aged 60 and younger at the moment of the nurse advice, who were not diagnosed
with HBP or being taking medication for lowering BP.
Notes: Column (1) presents the mean of each dependent variable for those observations one standard devi-
ation below the threshold. Columns (2) to (4) present different specifications for the trend (function f (·) )
between the outcome and systolic blood pressure. Robust SE are presented in parenthesis. Significance: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2.4.1.1 Health Conditions
The impact of advice on objective and subjective measures of health is presented
in Panel A of Tables 2.2 and 2.3. First, self-reported diagnosis of HBP, diabetes,
high cholesterol and other cardiovascular conditions or events.19 Second, prescrip-
tion of blood pressure medication and lipid-lowering medication20 are analysed.
It includes the main result: there is an increase on prescription of medication for
lowering blood pressure of 4.41 pp approximately 2 years after the nurse advice
(Table 2.2). Such estimate is based on the quadratic specification, but a slightly
more conservative figure is presented by the local lineal average using triangular
19Diabetes, stroke, angina, heart attack - including myocardial infraction or coronary thrombosis
-, congestive heart failure, a heart murmur, an abnormal heart rhythm, or any other heart trouble.
20Medication for lowering cholesterol use for prevention of cardiovascular diseases, mostly statins
in the UK.
38 Chapter 2. Early diagnosis of chronic conditions and lifestyle modification
weights:21 3 pp significant at the 90% level. Apart from this result, there is no
evidence of an increase on the odds of being diagnosed with high blood pres-
sure, or diabetes. While in one of the specifications a positive impact is found
for diagnosis of high blood pressure and of other cardiovascular diseases, such
impacts are not robust to the specification. A notorious increase on medication for
cholesterol is also reported: 6 pp relative to a prescription rate of 9.32% below the
cut-off. Nevertheless, standard errors are large. One possible explanation is the
reduced sample size: it is based on 1888 observations rather than the 3772 of other
outcomes.
Approximately two years later (four after the nurse advice), below the cut-
offs prevalence of detected hypertension increased from 6% to 11% (Table 2.3).
Prescription of BP medication doubled from 2% to 4%. On the other hand, the dif-
ference at the cutoff decreased to 1 pp., and such figure is not statistically different
from 0. In all other diagnosed conditions results are similar: there is no difference
below and above the threshold after four years.
Apart from medication, family doctors normally give advice on lifestyle.
Panel B of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 covers smoking, alcohol intake, physical activity
and nutrition variables.
2.4.1.2 Lifestyle
As described before, ELSA covers carefully smoking on both the extensive and
intensive margins. Two years after the nurse advice, 16% of the sample below the
cut-off reports to be smoking (Table 2.2). However, there is a decreasing trend:
20% of former smokers have drop this behaviour. While the decrease seems to be
larger above the cut-off by 2 pp, we cannot reject that such figure is different from
0. On the intensive margin, there is a difference of 5 cigarettes per week between
those below and above the threshold. This estimate is similar if we consider a
measure that includes both cigarette and roll-up smokers.22 However, it cannot
be rejected to be 0 under the second order polynomial specification.23 Four years
21See Appendix 2.B for more details about this specification.
22Roll-ups are measured in tobacco ounces or grams, which is translated into ‘cigarettes’ in order
to obtain a measure that avoids substitution between both types of smoking. While not including
roll-ups avoids this measurement restrictions, it underestimates total smoking intensity.
23If we condition these intensity measures on being an smoker at the moment of the nurse advice,
the impact on the roll-ups inclusive measure is estimated to be of 23 cigarettes, significant at 90%.
It drops to 14 cigarettes if we do not consider roll-ups.
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after the advice, 75% of the original smokers are still smoking (Table 2.3). The
difference on intensity below and above the cut-off is estimated between 0.67 to
6.48 cigarettes, according to the measure definition and specification. Just as with
the two-years estimate, the effect is not statistically different from zero for the
quadratic specification.
With respect to alcohol intake, there is a clear reduction of 8.4 pp on the
probability to report to be drinking at least two days a week. The impact is the
same both two and four years after the nurse advice. This is a large impact on a
very common lifestyle: more than half of the respondents below the cutoff have
such alcohol intake frequency, a figure that drops to 4 in 10 two years later.
Finally, there are no effects on physical activity or vegetables consumption.
There is evidence of a positive effect on fruit’s intake, statistically different from
zero two years after the nurse advice (Table 2.2). However, as explained in the
data section, the exact amount of portions per day cannot be determined as the
measure involves two different elicitation methods.
2.4.1.3 Health measures
Given that there is evidence that supports an effect on medication prescription and
lifestyle choices, it is possible to expect an effect on both objective and subjective
health.
With respect to perceived health, there is no evidence of an impact on report-
ing either good or bad health, subjective survival probabilities. Moreover, there is
no effect on the reported chances to suffer a problem that limits ability to work,
for those who were working at the time of the survey.24
With respect to objective health measures, there is evidence of an increase on
the odds of being obese (BMI above 30) of 11 pp, relative to a prevalence below the
cut-off of 27%. This impact is around 8 pp if we consider alternative specifications,
and is not significant in all of them. This result is related to a positive but not
robust to the specification effect on average BMI and waist-to-height ratio; both of
them related with increased CVD-risk. On the other hand, there is no perceived
difference on biomarkers as blood pressure or cholesterol despite the increase on
medication.
24In Table 2.3, a significant difference of 4.3 pp was found for this outcome. However, the estimate
becomes negative under the second order polynomial specification.
40 Chapter 2. Early diagnosis of chronic conditions and lifestyle modification
Table 2.3: RDD 2 waves (apx. 4 years) later
RDD on systolic BP standarized around the nurse advice cut-off.
Yi,t+2 = δ(BPci,t ≥ 0) + α0 + fl(αl , BPci,t|BPi < 0) + fr(αr , BPci,t|BPi ≥ 0) + ui,t+2|Agei,t <= 64
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t + 2
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Missing this wave 25.28% 3.52 3.13 3.78
N: 3778 (h∗1 = 0.85), 2943 (h
∗
2 = 0.67) , 4476 (h = 1) (3.21) (3.33) (4.05)
Panel A. Health Conditions
Diagnosed HBP ever 11.60% 2.15 3.40 −1.73
N: 4386 (h∗1 = 1.42), 3657 (h
∗
2 = 1.11) , 3355 (h = 1) (2.69) (2.73) (4.19)
High Cholesterol, wave 2 onwards 22.23% −2.68 −3.50 0.34
N: 3664 (h∗1 = 1.12), 2844 (h
∗
2 = 0.88) , 3363 (h = 1) (3.20) (3.29) (4.61)
Diagnosed Diabetes ever 2.33% 0.61 0.48 1.07
N: 3869 (h∗1 = 1.24), 3143 (h
∗
2 = 0.98) , 3309 (h = 1) (1.46) (1.43) (2.16)
Takes BP medication 4.36% 0.84 1.03 1.06
N: 4108 (h∗1 = 1.30), 3309 (h
∗
2 = 1.02) , 3309 (h = 1) (1.96) (2.02) (2.91)
Takes Lipid-lowering medication 11.91% 1.96 1.84 3.76
N: 2520 (h∗1 = 1.64), 2129 (h
∗
2 = 1.29) , 1759 (h = 1) (3.15) (3.11) (5.17)
Diagnosed Major Cardiovascular Event ever
(Stroke, Heart Failure, Infarction, An
3.54% 2.24 2.55 2.24
N: 2812 (h∗1 = 0.86), 2332 (h
∗
2 = 0.68) , 3333 (h = 1) (1.79) (1.74) (2.26)
Panel B. Lifestyle
Current smoker 14.05% 3.00 3.43 3.13
N: 3143 (h∗1 = 0.97), 2474 (h
∗
2 = 0.76) , 3309 (h = 1) (2.78) (2.90) (3.71)
Current smoker if smoker at t 75.93% 1.38 0.36 0.55
N: 525 (h∗1 = 0.92), 419 (h
∗
2 = 0.72) , 579 (h = 1) (8.46) (8.68) (11.21)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers) 8.01 4.83∗∗ 5.38∗∗ 0.67
N: 4300 (h∗1 = 1.52), 3655 (h
∗
2 = 1.20) , 3132 (h = 1) (2.19) (2.20) (3.35)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers,
includes rollups)
10.39 6.20∗∗ 6.48∗∗ 3.08
N: 4765 (h∗1 = 1.73), 4144 (h
∗
2 = 1.36) , 3236 (h = 1) (2.52) (2.54) (3.89)
Alcohol twice a week or more 42.82% −9.00∗∗ −9.42∗∗ −11.19∗∗
N: 2546 (h∗1 = 0.87), 2125 (h
∗
2 = 0.68) , 3028 (h = 1) (4.32) (4.39) (5.53)
Sedentary or low physical activity 17.71% 2.66 3.70 2.48
N: 3134 (h∗1 = 0.97), 2467 (h
∗
2 = 0.76) , 3299 (h = 1) (3.03) (3.15) (4.10)
Portions of vegtables per day 4.21 0.15 0.08 0.44
N: 2085 (h∗1 = 1.44), 1739 (h
∗
2 = 1.13) , 1590 (h = 1) (0.45) (0.48) (0.59)
Portions of fruits per day 3.27 0.65 0.70∗ 0.60
N: 1033 (h∗1 = 0.67), 870 (h
∗
2 = 0.52) , 1595 (h = 1) (0.41) (0.40) (0.45)
Continued on next page
2.4. Results 41
Table 2.3: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t + 2
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Panel C. Health Perceptions
Self-reported GOOD health 84.56% 2.42 3.17 3.58
N: 2299 (h∗1 = 0.69), 1771 (h
∗
2 = 0.54) , 3284 (h = 1) (3.76) (3.82) (4.24)
Self-reported bad health 15.44% −2.42 −3.17 −3.58
N: 2299 (h∗1 = 0.69), 1771 (h
∗
2 = 0.54) , 3284 (h = 1) (3.76) (3.82) (4.24)
SSP: Chances to live to age 75 68.48 0.88 1.26 1.69
N: 2549 (h∗1 = 0.80), 2083 (h
∗
2 = 0.63) , 3202 (h = 1) (1.90) (1.95) (2.34)
What are the chances that your health will limit
your ability to work before you
31.08 3.39 4.32∗∗ −0.73
N: 3046 (h∗1 = 1.84), 2629 (h
∗
2 = 1.44) , 2018 (h = 1) (2.13) (2.17) (3.58)
Panel D. Health Measures
BMI: Body Mass Index (kg/m2) 27.86 0.59 0.74 0.97∗
N: 2092 (h∗1 = 0.76), 1679 (h
∗
2 = 0.59) , 2782 (h = 1) (0.47) (0.49) (0.57)
Waist-to-height ratio (WHtR) 0.56 0.01 0.01 0.02∗
N: 1956 (h∗1 = 0.69), 1531 (h
∗
2 = 0.54) , 2778 (h = 1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Overweight or above: BMI 25+ 70.72% 1.62 0.18 5.04
N: 2505 (h∗1 = 0.91), 1958 (h
∗
2 = 0.72) , 2782 (h = 1) (3.80) (4.00) (5.03)
Obesity level 1 or above: BMI 30+ 27.60% 8.14∗ 7.67 11.20∗∗
N: 1958 (h∗1 = 0.70), 1532 (h
∗
2 = 0.55) , 2782 (h = 1) (4.85) (5.03) (5.56)
Blood HDL level (mmol/l) 1.63 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02
N: 2120 (h∗1 = 0.92), 1654 (h
∗
2 = 0.72) , 2365 (h = 1) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Blood total cholesterol level (mmol/l) 6.01 −0.09 −0.12 −0.09
N: 2008 (h∗1 = 0.88), 1655 (h
∗
2 = 0.69) , 2367 (h = 1) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)
Blood glucose level (mmol/L) - fasting samples
only
4.93 −0.04 −0.04 −0.02
N: 2420 (h∗1 = 1.88), 2149 (h
∗
2 = 1.47) , 1614 (h = 1) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
(D) Valid Mean Systolic BP 128.85 −1.79 −1.27 −2.34
N: 1824 (h∗1 = 0.72), 1424 (h
∗
2 = 0.57) , 2601 (h = 1) (1.61) (1.68) (1.86)
(D) Valid Mean Diastolic BP 76.22 −0.27 0.12 −0.32
N: 2722 (h∗1 = 1.05), 2086 (h
∗
2 = 0.82) , 2601 (h = 1) (0.83) (0.87) (1.16)
Sample: Respondents aged 60 and younger at the moment of the nurse advice, who were not diagnosed
with HBP or being taking medication for lowering BP.
Notes: Column (1) presents the mean of each dependent variable for those observations one standard devi-
ation below the threshold. Columns (2) to (4) present different specifications for the trend (function f (·) )
between the outcome and systolic blood pressure. Robust SE are presented in parenthesis. Significance: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Figure 2.6 presents a visual summary of the main results. Figure 2.5 style of
graph is used for a set of outcomes in different moments of time. The first row
presents BP prescriptions, the second smoking intensity, and the last one alcohol-
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intake. Columns refer to the moment of measurement of each of these outcomes.
The first one is contemporary to the measurement and the advice. This is done
in order to verify that the discontinuity occurs after the intervention. These are
balancing tests which are part of the robustness checks that are detailed in the next
section. The second and third columns of the graph correspond to the estimates
in column 2 of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 but with a fix bandwidth of 0.053.
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2.4.2 Complementarity of medication and health behaviours
Given that the advice caused an increase on medication use for reducing BP with-
out increasing detection rate of HBP, the advice might be interpreted as an exoge-
nous variation on medication use. Table 2.4 considers this exercise it in order to
examine if lifestyle are substitutes or complements of BP detection as in (Kaestner
et al., 2014). In particular, above we found higher rates of smoking and on obesity
incidence among those who were advised to visit their GP. Using a Wald estimate,
we can determine if such lifestyle change was a response to higher medication us-
age.25 There is no evidence of this effect for any of the lifestyle variables that were
reported to be affected by the policy. However, the large standard errors indicate
that the sample might not be large enough to detect this behavioural consequence.
Table 2.4: Wald estimates: BP medication and lifestyle
Wald estimates based on the impact of the nurse advice cut-off on the dependent variable (numerator) and
BP medication (denominator).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t + 1
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Panel A. Lifestyle after one wave (apx. two years)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers) 10.87 220.146 269.329 62.36
N: 3874 (h∗1 = 1.12), 3003 (h
∗
2 = 0.87) , 3557 (h = 1) (211.324) (262.487) (90.73)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers,
includes rollups)
13.04 238.746 241.117 114.49
N: 4156 (h∗1 = 1.15), 3287 (h
∗
2 = 0.90) , 3682 (h = 1) (205.058) (203.320) (106.68)
Alcohol twice a week or more 55.39% −261.691 −253.372 −208.94
N: 3050 (h∗1 = 0.87), 2358 (h
∗
2 = 0.62) , 3621 (h = 1) (204.906) (151.474) (160.85)
Portions of fruits per day 3.20 18.171 22.422 13.77
N: 1646 (h∗1 = 0.94), 2146 (h
∗
2 = 1.32) , 1732 (h = 1) (12.949) (25.566) (10.13)
Panel B. Lifestyle after two waves (apx. four years)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers) 8.01 4.832 5.378 17.74
N: 4300 (h∗1 = 1.52), 3655 (h
∗
2 = 1.20) , 3092 (h = 1) (2.193) (2.205) (87.84)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers,
includes rollups)
10.39 6.202 6.483 73.83
N: 4765 (h∗1 = 1.73), 4144 (h
∗
2 = 1.36) , 3192 (h = 1) (2.524) (2.540) (96.30)
Alcohol twice a week or more 42.82% −9.001 −9.425 −263.22
N: 2546 (h∗1 = 0.87), 2125 (h
∗
2 = 0.68) , 2996 (h = 1) (4.325) (4.393) (193.31)
Continued on next page
25The denominator is the impact on BP after one wave, even in the two waves lifestyle exercise.
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Table 2.4: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t + 1
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Portions of fruits per day 3.27 0.648 0.702 9.17
N: 1033 (h∗1 = 0.67), 870 (h
∗
2 = 0.52) , 1568 (h = 1) (0.410) (0.405) (9.14)
BMI: Body Mass Index (kg/m2) 27.86 0.587 0.743 20.47
N: 2092 (h∗1 = 0.76), 1679 (h
∗
2 = 0.59) , 2754 (h = 1) (0.471) (0.488) (14.48)
Waist-to-height ratio (WHtR) 0.56 0.012 0.012 0.34
N: 1956 (h∗1 = 0.69), 1531 (h
∗
2 = 0.54) , 2750 (h = 1) (0.007) (0.008) (0.22)
Obesity level 1 or above: BMI 30+ 27.60% 8.144 7.668 227.71
N: 1958 (h∗1 = 0.70), 1532 (h
∗
2 = 0.55) , 2754 (h = 1) (4.853) (5.027) (150.10)
Sample: Respondents aged 60 and younger at the moment of the nurse advice, who were not diagnosed
with HBP or being taking medication for lowering BP.
Notes: Column (1) presents the mean of each dependent variable for those observations one standard devi-
ation below the threshold. Columns (2) to (4) present different specifications for the trend (function f (·) )
between the outcome and systolic blood pressure. Robust SE are presented in parenthesis. Significance: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2.4.3 Heterogeneity on the impact
A relevant question is whether the impact is heterogeneous according to respon-
dents’ characteristics. First, the impact on BP prescription is declining with age.
Figure 2.7 shows that if older individuals are included in the sample, the estimate
of the discontinuity tends to 0. Second, the impact is concentrated on males with a
10-years CVD-risk above 8%.26 Table 2.5 presents the discontinuity local linear tri-
angular estimator for a selected group of variables. The difference with previous
sections results is that the sample was stratified according to gender and CVD-
risk. This reduces notoriously the sample size, resulting on larger standard errors.
Differences on HBP medication, alcohol intake and fruits consumption are larger
for men, all of them significant at least at 90% level. Finally, the estimates suggest
that the impact is restricted to those individuals with a 10-year risk of developing
a CVD of 8% or above.27 With respect to smoking intensity, the estimated effect is
26CVD risk calculating using the Framingham equation D’Agostino et al. (2008). This is a standard
risk calculator for individuals aged 30 to 74 without prior CVD. It involves age, gender, smoking
status, total and HDL cholesterol levels, systolic BP, diabetes. For this study, while there are more
accurate calculators for England population as QRISK (Hippisley-Cox et al., 2008), this method was
selected for its simplicity given the available information.
27This category was defined on the basis of sample size, rather than clinical standards. However,
a more standard 10% risk results on a similar point estimate but is not significant.
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non-significant in all exercises.
Figure 2.7: Impact on BP medication estimator by age
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These results suggest that the effect is zero on individuals with low over-
all risk of developing CVD. The fact that the effect is strong for men is likely to
be related to the higher thresholds for advising respondents in the HSE (ELSA
wave 0). In fact, NICE recommended drug therapy for those with a systolic BP
of 160 mmHg or above (NICE, 2006, 2011). With respect to age differences, it is
expected as older individuals have a higher demand for medical services, there-
fore the intervention should have no impact on them. Moreover, consequences of
hypertension are higher between ages 40 and 70 (Chobanian et al., 2003).
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Table 2.5: RDD by groups: general impact
Yi = δ(BPi ≥ 0) + f (BPi |BPi < 0) + f (BPi |BPi ≥ 0) + ui |Xi
RDD on systolic BP standarized around 140 mmHg. It is conditional on not been diagnosed before with
HBP or being taking medication for blood pressure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Restriction
Xi
HBP PILLS N CIGS ALCOHOL FRUITS
Base Result 2.98 4.28∗∗ 5.36 −7.93 0.77∗
N PILLS: 3717 (h = 1) (3.00) (2.02) (4.20) (5.12) (0.43)
Male
Yes 6.09 7.92∗∗ 4.21 −15.02∗ 1.41∗∗
N PILLS: 1478 (h = 1) (4.70) (3.18) (7.00) (8.06) (0.64)
No 0.70 1.74 5.92 −3.53 0.20
N PILLS: 2239 (h = 1) (3.86) (2.59) (5.21) (6.58) (0.57)
10 years CVD risk 8% and over
Yes 3.34 9.01∗∗ −12.13 −9.99 1.45∗∗
N PILLS: 1054 (h = 1) (6.14) (4.13) (8.18) (9.30) (0.65)
No −0.75 −0.38 4.69 0.25 −0.26
N PILLS: 1540 (h = 1) (5.05) (3.19) (4.27) (7.99) (0.55)
Notes: RDD on systolic BP standarized around 140 mmHg. Individuals aged 60 or younger who have not
been diagnosed before with high blood pressure or any other cardiovascular related conditions. Column
(1), HPB, presents estimates for the difference on the probability to be diagnosed with high blood pressure
two years after the advice is given. In Column (2), PILLs, the dependent variable is the probability to be
under medication for controlling blood pressure levels; in Column (3), NCIGS, it is the number of cigarettes
consumed during the last week; in Column (4), ALCOHOL, the probability to have an alcoholic drink twice
or more per week. Finally, Column (5) refers to the portions of fruit per day. Robust SE in parenthesis.
Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2.4.4 Specification tests
Several tests were carried out in order to determine the quality of the results. The
principal one was a balancing test, that is, if the ‘treatment’ can be considered
as randomly allocated across a wide set of covariates. Table 2.6 presents the re-
sults from applying the same methodology but using as dependent variables basic
demographic controls (panel A); and information on the main results’ section out-
comes but measured at the moment of the BP measurement (panels B, C and D).
In the entire table, the only difference that is not statistically zero is non-white
ethnicity and education level for some of the specifications. Nevertheless, there is
neither difference in any health measurement, nor risky behaviour.
Further checks on the underlying assumptions of the regression discontinuity
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are presented in Appendix 2.C.
Table 2.6: Balancing Test. RDD on covariates before receiving nurse advice
Xi = δ(BPi ≥ 0) + f (BPi |BPi < 0) + f (BPi |BPi ≥ 0) + ui
RDD on systolic BP standarized around the cut-off.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Panel A. Demographic Characteristics
Age 53.80 −0.20 −0.21 0.07
N: 3744 (h∗1 = 1.00), 2990 (h
∗
2 = 0.79) , 3744 (h = 1) (0.34) (0.34) (0.46)
Male 39.77% −0.72 −2.43 0.10
N: 3343 (h∗1 = 0.89), 2620 (h
∗
2 = 0.70) , 3744 (h = 1) (3.81) (3.89) (4.91)
Non white ethnicity 13.39% 4.84∗ 4.51∗ 4.66
N: 3304 (h∗1 = 0.93), 2767 (h
∗
2 = 0.73) , 3698 (h = 1) (2.74) (2.74) (3.59)
Educ: Some medium qualif. 42.67% 6.23 8.17∗ 6.86
N: 2982 (h∗1 = 0.78), 2221 (h
∗
2 = 0.61) , 3733 (h = 1) (4.12) (4.29) (4.99)
Educ: Some high level or above qualif. 34.61% −1.46 0.72 −2.63
N: 3543 (h∗1 = 0.95), 2795 (h
∗
2 = 0.74) , 3733 (h = 1) (3.53) (3.62) (4.70)
Married 76.74% 2.11 1.07 3.27
N: 4752 (h∗1 = 1.35), 3918 (h
∗
2 = 1.06) , 3744 (h = 1) (2.73) (2.76) (4.22)
Panel B. Health-related Variables
Diagnosed Major Cardiovascular Event ever
(Stroke, Heart Failure, Infarction, An
1.29% 0.55 0.74 −0.14
N: 4064 (h∗1 = 1.13), 3333 (h
∗
2 = 0.88) , 3731 (h = 1) (0.86) (0.85) (1.22)
Self-reported GOOD health 83.33% 1.10 1.50 1.82
N: 2990 (h∗1 = 0.78), 2224 (h
∗
2 = 0.62) , 3744 (h = 1) (3.13) (3.28) (3.81)
Self-reported bad health 8.89% −0.77 −0.21 −1.96
N: 4362 (h∗1 = 1.21), 3553 (h
∗
2 = 0.95) , 3744 (h = 1) (1.96) (1.97) (2.93)
SSP: Chances to live to age 75 69.18 −0.50 −0.73 0.92
N: 2445 (h∗1 = 1.40), 2031 (h
∗
2 = 1.10) , 1868 (h = 1) (1.83) (1.84) (2.78)
(D) Valid BMI - inc estimated>130kg 27.75 0.06 0.08 0.41
N: 3769 (h∗1 = 1.06), 3030 (h
∗
2 = 0.83) , 3603 (h = 1) (0.35) (0.35) (0.49)
Waist-to-height ratio (WHtR) 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00
N: 1191 (h∗1 = 0.64), 908 (h
∗
2 = 0.50) , 1835 (h = 1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Overweight or above 70.00% 2.37 3.01 5.22
N: 2686 (h∗1 = 0.78), 2130 (h
∗
2 = 0.61) , 3603 (h = 1) (3.79) (3.95) (4.59)
Obesity I or above 26.89% 4.46 4.12 6.72
N: 2686 (h∗1 = 0.74), 2130 (h
∗
2 = 0.58) , 3603 (h = 1) (4.02) (4.05) (4.71)
Blood HDL level (mmol/l) 1.56 −0.01 −0.00 0.01
N: 2353 (h∗1 = 0.93), 1973 (h
∗
2 = 0.73) , 2623 (h = 1) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.6: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t
Mean 1SD
Below
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Blood total cholesterol level (mmol/l) 5.95 0.01 −0.02 0.06
N: 2502 (h∗1 = 0.98), 1976 (h
∗
2 = 0.77) , 2627 (h = 1) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Panel C. Lifestyle
Current smoker 18.57% 4.05 3.44 2.19
N: 4356 (h∗1 = 1.21), 3547 (h
∗
2 = 0.95) , 3738 (h = 1) (2.70) (2.72) (3.94)
Cigaretes per week (0 for non-smokers, includes
rollups)
6.93 −1.75 −1.26 −1.76
N: 3125 (h∗1 = 0.95), 2454 (h
∗
2 = 0.75) , 3288 (h = 1) (3.21) (3.18) (4.24)
Alcohol twice a week or more 51.63% 0.03 −0.02 −2.01
N: 2064 (h∗1 = 0.87), 1696 (h
∗
2 = 0.69) , 2448 (h = 1) (4.87) (4.97) (6.20)
Sedentary or low physical activity 15.60% 2.60 4.72 4.50
N: 1400 (h∗1 = 0.75), 1100 (h
∗
2 = 0.59) , 1878 (h = 1) (4.37) (4.49) (5.15)
Portions of vegtables per day 6.04 0.83 0.99 1.24
N: 807 (h∗1 = 0.83), 613 (h
∗
2 = 0.66) , 959 (h = 1) (1.07) (1.07) (1.30)
Portions of fruits per day 4.83 0.39 0.38 0.34
N: 1009 (h∗1 = 1.07), 809 (h
∗
2 = 0.84) , 963 (h = 1) (0.55) (0.60) (0.71)
Panel D. Economic activity
BU total weekly income (£ of May2005) 0.54 −0.00 −0.01 −0.03
N: 1836 (h∗1 = 0.99), 1470 (h
∗
2 = 0.78) , 1836 (h = 1) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
BU total net (non-pension) wealth (1000£ of
May2005)
363.46 105.21 107.27 116.08
N: 1372 (h∗1 = 0.76), 1080 (h
∗
2 = 0.60) , 1836 (h = 1) (69.59) (78.32) (84.96)
Hours of work all jobs (employed or self employed) 36.65 −0.48 −0.92 −1.39
N: 970 (h∗1 = 0.69), 766 (h
∗
2 = 0.54) , 1414 (h = 1) (2.02) (2.07) (2.38)
Sample: Respondents aged 60 or younger at the moment of the nurse advice, who were not diagnosed with
HBP or being taking medication for lowering BP.
Notes: Column (1) presents the mean of each dependent variable for those observations one standard devi-
ation below the threshold. Columns (2) to (4) present different specifications for the trend (function f (·) )
between the outcome and systolic blood pressure. Robust SE are presented in parenthesis. Significance: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the impact of a health check that advices to visit a family
doctor for those individuals with blood pressure about certain threshold. Before
continuing with the analysis, it is important to be clear on the limitations of this
analysis. It is restricted for those individuals with mildly-raised blood pressure.
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This is relevant in terms of policy analysis as they are the most likely to be affected
by health checks for that specific condition. However, what would happen with
other conditions in terms of behavioural response, with higher risks of further
complications, might be different.
The first main question of this chapter is the impact of the advice on early
detection of hypertension. Results show a large and significant impact of the ad-
vice on the probability to be under BP medication. However, it cannot be rejected
that probability of being diagnosed with hypertension is the same for those people
above and below the threshold. The present analysis cannot distinguish between
two mechanisms. First, a temporal positive impact on both detection and medica-
tion prescription. Second, that the survey intervention might have increased the
odds of choosing a medication-based HBP treatment by local family doctors. This
is due to the lack on information about demand of health-care services in ELSA
for waves 0 to 5.
The second element to discuss is the impact on lifestyle. Guidelines suggest
a lifestyle intervention that curve smoking, bad dietary habits and heavy alcohol
drinking. A clear impact in this direction is found for drinking frequency, and evi-
dence for improved fruit portions’ consumption is also found. On the other hand,
there is evidence of risk compensation in smoking an caloric intake (reflected on
obesity). In contrast, Steptoe and McMunn (2009) has previously shown that hy-
pertense individuals in ELSA smoke less and drink more than non-hypertense
individuals. This chapter, focused on those individuals who are in the borderline
of the diagnosis, finds that the effect of the advice is precisely to reduce heavy
drinking patterns.
Finally, whether the advice had a positive effect on respondents’ health after
nearly four years is an unresolved question. None of the effects on blood pres-
sure, cholesterol levels, or sugar in the blood are statistically different from zero.
However, this might be due to the limited sample size
These findings complement Kaestner et al. (2014) results on the use of statins,
where an increase on obesity was found but at the same time physical activity
increased for men. Also, such results can be contrasted with Fichera et al. (2016)
who found that an increase in the quality of medical services in England im-
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proved behaviour, including smoking and heavy drinking. Pooling together this
evidence, risk compensation and complementary health-investment mechanisms
are likely to be relevant elements to consider in preventive care policies. However,
such responses are likely to be heterogeneous and hard to extrapolate to general
circumstances.
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2.A Sample selection
The analysis is carried out a subset of all the available data from the HSE-ELSA
data. Individuals who were not diagnosed with HBP and were not taking BP
lowering medication28 are selected. Even though it drastically reduced the sample
size, such restriction avoids potential biases as individuals who are above the
threshold are more likely to report to be diagnosed with HBP before the nurse
visit.
Using all the data, the jump estimator for the systolic BP is apx. 6.5 pp. while
for the diastolic it is -0.6pp. Only the first one is statistically different from 0. How-
ever, Figure 2.9 shows that there might be a potential bias. Instead of reporting
the proportion of those who are reported to have HBP at the following wave, the
outcome is measured at the baseline. That is, what they reported before the nurses
visited them. The same pattern is present: a jump of 5 pp. for systolic BP and of
1.1 pp. for diastolic BP. While it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of them
equal to zero under the quadratic specification, the estimate for the systolic cutoff
is different from zero under a triangular kernel. If we consider BP medication
instead of the self-reported diagnosis, such issue is not present (Figure 2.10).
As a result, in order to avoid the potential bias provided by this discontinuity,
I restrict the sample only to the new cases at the cost of larger standard errors.
28On the ELSA, everyone who is asked about BP medication reports to be diagnosed with HBP
by design of the survey. That is not the case for the HSE, where the analysis of medication is much
more detailed.
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Figure 2.8: Nurse Advice and self-report of HBP at the following-wave
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Sample: Individuals aged 60 or younger from the HSE-ELSA data.
Notes: Calculations using a quadratic function within 1 standard deviation of the cutoff. A 90% CI is presented.
Significance level: *90%, ** 95%, *** 99%
Figure 2.9: Nurse Advice and self-report of HBP at the same wave (balance test)
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Figure 2.10: Nurse Advice and BP medication in the same wave (balance test)
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2.B Alternative Specifications
There are many ways to implement the strategy. The general idea is to choose
the parameters that minimize the distance between the observed outcome and the
prediction from a model m, giving different weights K to each observation i as
shown in Equation 2.3. Such a model, characterized by a set of parameters α,δ
and restrictions, takes into account the relation between Yt+1 and the BP index
BPct measured at wave t and standardized according to the relevant advice cut-off
c (it changes according to the year of the survey, gender and age as described be-
fore). The weights K are assigned using some arbitrary rule based on the forcing
variable BPct . The most simple specification gives equal importance to all obser-
vations between 0 and h standard deviations, and disregards the remaining data
(rectangular kernel). A common alternative is the triangular kernel, where the
relevance of observations decays linearly. For the main results, the value of h is
determined following the rule of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011).
min
{δ,α}
N
∑
i=1
K(BPcit/h)(Yi,t+s −m(δ,α, BPci,t))2 , s ∈ {1,2} (2.3)
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The model m specifies how BP and the outcomes are related, and in par-
ticular the parameter of interest, the difference δ between being above or below
the cut-off. The relationship can be allowed to be different above and below the
threshold as shown in Equation 2.4. In this expression, α is allowed to be specific
above and below the BPcit ≥ 0, a condition defined by the dichotomous variables
Wit. The implementation was carried out following Nichols (2012), under different
bandwidths and specifications for f .
m(δ,α, BPci,t) = δWit + α0 + fl(αl , BP
c
i,t|Wit = 0) + fr(αr, BPci,t|Wit = 1) (2.4)
Results are presented using three specifications for f (·):
• Local linear regressions: fl = αl1BP
c
i,t and fr = α
r
1BP
c
i,t. Triangular and rectan-
gular weights are considered. The difference between them is that triangular
weights give more importance to the observations close to the threshold.
• Local quadratic function: using rectangular weights, fl = αl1BP
c
i,t + α
l
2BP
c
i,t
2
and fr = αr1BP
c
i,t + α
r
2BP
c
i,t
2.
2.C Further Robustness Checks
An usual concern with non-parametric estimators is their potential dependence
on ad hoc parameters. In this particular case, the jump estimator might be very
sensitive to the ‘bandwidth’ selection. Optimal selection procedures like the one
presented by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) help to determine a proper value
for it. Nevertheless, the question on the sensitivity is still present. Figure 2.11
present the case of usage of BP-lowering medication for different values of the
parameter, the horizontal axis, across multiple specifications. As a reference, the
optimal bandwidth is highlighted by a vertical line and a confidence interval of
95%, which corresponds to the local linear triangular kernel. We can observe that
the estimated values of the jump change notoriously according to the underlying
assumption but results are relatively stable close to the optimal one.
One concern could be that the nurses registered a value above 140 for individ-
uals who had BP levels slightly below it. This would have been translated into a
56 Chapter 2. Early diagnosis of chronic conditions and lifestyle modification
Figure 2.11: Jump estimator for multiple bandwidths (BP medication)
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discontinuity in terms of the density at the threshold. Though the reasons for this
potential manipulation are not clear, McCrary (2008) test can asses if that is the
case. The test creates a histogram of the BP and defines the mid-point of each bin
as the dependent variable of the RDD in a non-parametric way. Table 2.8 presents
the estimator of the jump θ for different bin sizes around the optimal one. There
is no evidence of a discontinuity in the density as such point.
Table 2.7: RDD sample restrictions
Xi = δ(BPi ≥ 0) + f (BPi |BPi < 0) + f (BPi |BPi ≥ 0) + ui |BPi /∈Ω
RDD on systolic BP standarized around 140 mmHgDependent variable: whether diagnosed with HBP in
the follow-up, conditional on not been diagnosed before with HBP or being taking medication for blood
pressure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Restriction
Ω
Quadratic
1 SD
Loc
Linear
Rectang
h∗
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗
Local
Quad 1
SD
Local
Quad 2
SD
Without restriction 1.76 4.19∗∗ 4.27∗∗ 5.59∗∗∗ 2.50
N: 2483 (h∗ = 0.59), 4195 (h = 1) , 6562 (h = 2) (1.48) (1.97) (1.73) (2.02) (1.60)
Taking out 139 mmHg† 2.11 4.77∗∗∗ 3.88∗∗∗ 7.10∗∗∗ 3.04∗
N: 3657 (h∗ = 0.90), 4088 (h = 1) , 6455 (h = 2) (1.51) (1.53) (1.42) (2.00) (1.59)
Taking out 140 mmHg† 0.69 2.91 3.06∗ 5.23∗∗ 1.00
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Restriction
Ω
Quadratic
1 SD
Loc
Linear
Rectang
h∗
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗
Local
Quad 1
SD
Local
Quad 2
SD
N: 2621 (h∗ = 0.65), 4084 (h = 1) , 6451 (h = 2) (1.61) (2.04) (1.86) (2.49) (1.88)
Taking out 141 mmHg† 2.02 5.12∗∗ 5.13∗∗ 6.63∗∗∗ 2.84
N: 2163 (h∗ = 0.56), 4117 (h = 1) , 6484 (h = 2) (1.62) (2.30) (2.05) (2.29) (1.80)
Taking out 139-141 mmHg† 1.19 6.15∗∗ 4.91∗∗ 9.10∗∗∗ 1.58
N: 2187 (h∗ = 0.59), 3899 (h = 1) , 6266 (h = 2) (1.85) (2.81) (2.46) (3.35) (2.27)
† For males aged 50 or over in wave 0, the values are 159, 160 and 161 mmHg. Robust SE in parenthesis.
Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 2.8: McCrary Test for those aged 60 or younger
Bin Size (mmHg)
0.279 0.335 0.391 0.447 0.503 0.558 † 0.614 0.670 0.726 0.782
θ 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16∗ 0.17∗
( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09)
SE in parenthesis. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. McCrary test on the continuity of the density at the
threshold. Triangular kernels are fitted on the means of the bins of a particular bin size. The optimal bin
size (†) and, the bandwidths are chosen following McCrary implementation of the test.
A further test consist of considering placebo discontinuities. In other words,
given the index of standardized systolic BP, it is possible to perform the exercise
but assuming that the jump is at values different from 0. Figure 2.12 shows that
the only values in which a discontinuity is observed are those around 0.
A final test consist on including controls in our regressions. Normally they
should not affect the results in any way. Table 2.9 presents such a regression for
the case of medication. Essentially, there are no noticeable changes; the signifi-
cance is only affected when the sample size is reduced due to the availability of
information.
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Figure 2.12: Placebo jumps over Std. Systolic BP index (BP medication)
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Table 2.9: RDD including covariates for those aged 60 or younger: Takes BP medication
Yi = δ(BPi ≥ 0) + f (BPi |BPi < 0) + f (BPi |BPi ≥ 0) + Xiβ+ ui
RDD on systolic BP standarized around the value. Dependent variable: Takes BP medication, conditional
on not been diagnosed before with HBP or being taking medication for blood pressure.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable at t + 1 Mean
Loc
Linear
Rectang.
h∗1
Loc
Linear
Triangular
h∗2
Loc Quad
Rectang.
h = 1SD
Without controls 3.36% 2.80∗ 2.56∗ 4.28∗∗
N: 3322 (h∗1 = 0.93), 2784 (h
∗
2 = 0.73) , 3717 (h = 1) (1.54) (1.51) (2.02)
Demographic 3.37% 2.67∗ 2.53∗ 4.21∗∗
N: 3313 (h∗1 = 0.93), 2777 (h
∗
2 = 0.73) , 3706 (h = 1) (1.52) (1.51) (2.01)
+ Health and Behaviour 3.32% 2.88∗ 2.70∗ 4.25∗∗
N: 3176 (h∗1 = 0.93), 2656 (h
∗
2 = 0.73) , 3559 (h = 1) (1.57) (1.56) (2.09)
+ Health and Behaviour (extended) 3.42% 2.27 1.94 2.94
N: 1263 (h∗1 = 0.93), 1043 (h
∗
2 = 0.73) , 1404 (h = 1) (2.26) (2.37) (2.90)
Robust SE in parenthesis. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Demographic Characteristics: Age, gender,
ethnicity, education level, marital status. Health and Behaviour: to report to be on bad health, BMI, any
parental CVD-related death, smoking status. Extended variables: Cholesterol (Total and HDL), framingham
CVD risk, alcohol and physical activity levels.
Chapter 3
On the economic value of preventive
care: a life-cycle model perspective
3.1 Introduction
Health is an essential determinant of individuals’ financial choices during their life
cycle, as stated in the classic Grossman Health Capital model (Grossman, 1972).
This is the case even if individuals’ utility does not depend directly on health, as
there are alternative mechanisms such as absence of from work due to disability, or
out-of-pocket expenditures. For these considerations it is relevant to incorporate
the economic consequences of health treatments when ranking the allocations of
health resources. This is of particular interest when consequences are not immedi-
ate, such as for preventive care interventions. This paper introduces a framework
that improves traditional economic evaluation techniques, such as cost-benefit and
cost-effectiveness analysis, by modelling both health and economic consequences
in a dynamic structural life-cycle model.
In general terms, the framework presented in this paper expands on stan-
dard Markov disease progression models, where health is categorised into states
that account for the severity of illness, in two directions. First, it incorporates an
index of risk of disease progression, which allows for heterogeneity in the tran-
sition probabilities between the states. Essentially, the probability of transiting
into worse states of health is higher when the value of the index is higher. Thus,
it is possible to model preventive care interventions as either exogenous transi-
tory or permanent shocks to the value of the index. Second, the health model is
complemented by a life-cycle model in which individuals, whose utility might be
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affected by health status, are able to smooth consumption via savings and labour
supply. This structure can be adapted to any chronic disease where early stage
treatments are available, and can be estimated with datasets that already exist in
many countries.
As a concrete example, I consider the role of a preventive care innovation, a
class of medications called statins, which reduces the odds of serious health com-
plications such as heart attacks or strokes, which might result in disabilities that
inhibit working and increase the risk of death. This is relevant as improvements
in medical care for cardiovascular disease (CVD) have been the main source of
improvement in healthy life expectancy in the last 20 years (Chernew et al., 2016).
First, the progression of CVDs is modelled with four health states: (i) having
no signs of any related condition; (ii) having been diagnosed with mild condi-
tions such as hypertension, which increase the odds of developing cardiovascular
events; (iii) to have survive to such events; and (iv) death. In this setting, the em-
pirical counterpart of the risk index is a summary variable that involves biomark-
ers that are known to be good predictors of future CVD complications such as
blood pressure and cholesterol levels. This formulation is a contribution to the
efforts directed towards modelling health investments (Kaestner et al., 2014; Hai
and Heckman, 2015), when there is a clear distinction between the prevention and
treatment of diseases (Ozkan, 2014). The model also includes a rule for the adop-
tion of the treatment that incorporates a variation across local providers of health
care services. This allows for a better understanding of the benefits of policies
aimed at improving care in a population.
The model considers how health shocks affect individual labour supply and
savings conditional on social security arrangements. This is built the on-growing
literature that considers the role of health in shaping economic choices for indi-
viduals close to retirement age (Palumbo, 1999; French, 2005; Halliday et al., 2015;
De Nardi et al., 2010; French and Jones, 2011; Yogo, 2016). Poor health derived
from such complications has direct effects on wages, via a productivity effect, and
on assets. It also introduces a penalty on the cost of working in terms of time
resources of individuals. This, as in the original Grossman (1972) health capital
model, has a direct effect on utility even if quality of health is not considered as a
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separate commodity. By acknowledging these channels, it is possible to take into
account selection into labour market participation derived by the onset of health
complications (French, 2005). Also, it is possible to incorporate the economic gains
of a medical treatment on top of conventional cost-benefit analysis of health inter-
ventions. In order to do this, a compensating variation is obtained by calculating
the expected life-time utility from a counterfactual scenario in which the technol-
ogy is not available, but a lump sum is given in compensation. Thus, the estimate
of the value is the amount of the lump sum that minimises the difference in ex-
pected utilities from both the observed and counterfactual scenarios.
The framework presented below contributes to the literature devoted to as-
sessing the value of health, medical innovations and policies while taking into
account their economic implications. Murphy and Topel (2006) considers the
social welfare value of improvements in longevity in the US over the 20th cen-
tury using a life-cycle model for computing willingness-to-pay, but without con-
sidering reduced productivity or disabilities. The same consideration applies to
Hall and Jones (2007), which is devoted to understanding rising medical expen-
diture. Papageorge (2015) introduced a major contribution by considering the
labour market implications of a new treatment for HIV/AIDS. Moreover, he iden-
tifies willingness-to-pay for a treatment based on revealed preferences instead of
relying on stated preferences or indirect approaches. While Papageorge’s proce-
dure is ideal, the availability of revealed preferences information is scarce as in
most setups, consumer prices, if they exist, are not informative given that they
suffer from a substantial impact of government interventions. For instance, work
by Murphy and Topel (2006), Nordhaus (2003) or Hall and Jones (2007) matched
the willingness-to-pay for extending life derived from their models with estimates
from labour literature based on the wage premium from jobs according to risk
or death. The procedure of this study introduces a novel alternative by deriving
the value of a statistical life (VSL)1 from the estimated bequest motive that accounts
for assets’ accumulation at the end of life (De Nardi, 2004; French, 2005). Thus
the identification of the compensating variation in the framework derived in this
1This is the willingness-to-pay for a reduction of 1 unit on risk of death, normally extrapolated
from calculations based on small variations on such a risk. See Murphy and Topel (2003) for an
introduction of the concept in on the context of life-cycle models.
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paper comes from the observed losses of people who suffered a CVD event, and
from the value of assets of the elderly.
Another contribution of this project is that it improves the cost-effectiveness
analysis of health interventions. McIntosh (2006) and Borghi (2008) mention that
very few of the stated preference willingness-to-pay studies aggregate their results
for conducting a cost-benefit analysis that will inform policy decisions. Instead,
productivity gains and cost savings are used for this purpose, based on the idea
that decision makers might have objectives other than ‘making Pareto improve-
ments’ (Culyer, 1989; Brouwer and Koopmanschap, 2000). In fact, in the UK tech-
nology adoption decisions are explicitly made based on the cost of increasing 1
quality adjusted life year (QALY),2 regardless of its impact on other elements that
might affect individuals’ utility. This model is able to improve this methodology
by considering the effect of health on labour supply and then on labour derived
income. This provides an additional variable to consider when taking decisions
and allows for the calculation of potential resources that might revert back into the
health care system via taxation. Standard cost-effectiveness analysis is produced
by simulating the lives of a set of individuals under two scenarios, one with and
one without treatment, and then adding up the total QALYs and the total costs
for the reference population. Then, the additional QALYs are divided by the to-
tal amount of costs. With the framework presented above, on top of simulating
health scenarios, it is possible to simulate consumption, savings, labour supply
and income of individuals.
Another key difference from the literature is that the model is estimated us-
ing data from England, where out-of-pocket medical expenditures is low due to
the presence of a publicly funded health care system. For this reason, medical ex-
penses and health insurance are not considered. This allows for a lower bound on
the potential value of preventive care innovations for those institutional setups, as
such elements are crucial determinants of savings in old age as shown by Blau and
Gilleskie (2008), De Nardi et al. (2010), and French and Jones (2011). The parame-
ters are estimated using the method of simulated moments (MSM) with informa-
2It is a simple measure that combines quantity and quality of life. In it, for a given health state a
health utility is assigned, which is a number that represents quality relative to a life without health
problems (Phillips and Thompson, 2001).
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tion from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). This survey is similar to
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US, and is devoted to improving the
understanding of health, well-being and general economic circumstances of indi-
viduals aged 50 and older since 2002. It not only includes self-reported diagnoses
of several chronic diseases or conditions, but also involves detailed information
on blood pressure, cholesterol levels and other variables that provide an objective
picture of the state of the current and future health of an individual. This dataset
is linked with characteristics of the local medical services based on the post-code
of residence, which provides exogenous variation to the availability of preventive
care treatment.
The estimated model captures retirement and labour and non-labour supply
patterns, and particularly, the impact of CVD onset, which is allowed to differ
by gender and education level. The required compensation for removing statins
therapy for primary prevention while keeping the same expected utility is on
average £5300. This figure is 12% higher than the value that would be obtained
if in the calculation of benefits we only consider a willingness-to-pay of £23.000
per QALY gained (Shiroiwa et al., 2010), which is between the thresholds for cost-
effectiveness considered by the NHS (£20 to £30 thousand).
This result is based on productivity gains, extra leisure, and a reduced risk
of death (the model predicts a VSL of £1.05 million). At the population level,
aggregating such compensations provides the value of the drug: £79 billion by
2005. This drug, by NHS standards, is cost-effective as it costs £4641 to gain one
QALY. As an additional benefit, labour-income is increased by £684 per year with
such an investment.
The model also provides estimates for three crucial elements linked to the
value of a drug. First, it allows for understanding how the value varies with re-
spect to the efficiency of the drug. In the specific example, doubling the ability of
statins to reduce the CVD-risk index implies an increase of 69% in its value. Sec-
ond, the role of policies for increasing the availability of the treatment for whoever
needs it can be understood, especially since the estimation relies on a variation in
the probability of being on medication coming both from time and local family
doctors’ characteristics. An increase of 3 pp. in the odds of a prescription implies
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an increase of 24.6% in the value of the drug (an elasticity of 0.59).
A final exercise shows how the value of the medication depends on the char-
acteristics of institutional arrangements non-directly related to health. Given that
there was an increase in the state pension age for women that covers some of the
cohorts involved in ELSA, a natural exercise is to assess how much the value of
the drug is affected by this policy change. For women with the characteristics
observed in 2004, the model predicts an increase of 59.26% in participation in the
labour market between the ages of 60 and 65 if they were exposed to such an in-
crease in the state pension age. In terms of the drug, there is hardly any change
in the overall value of the drug in terms of welfare, but there is an increase of 22
times in the labour gains per QALY gained.
After this introduction, a brief discussion of statins prescription in the UK is
presented in Section 3.2 in order to provide some background for the case study.
Next, the model is presented in Section 3.3, and it is followed by the compensating
variation calculation in Section 3.4 and the cost-effectiveness discussion in Section
3.5. This is followed by the empirical component of the paper, which involves the
procedure for the structural estimation of the model in Section 3.6, and the data
used for this in Section 3.7. Finally, the results for the fit of the model and the
value of statins are presented in Section 3.8, and Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Statins and prevention of cardiovascular diseases in the
UK
Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is a heavy and growing burden for health care sys-
tems worldwide, making their prevention an important objective of public policy.
Murphy and Topel (2003) calculated the value of a permanent 10% reduction in
death rates due to major CVD events of around $5 trillion dollars of 1996. As a
result, the pharmaceutical industry has been developing therapies aimed at reduc-
ing the risk of the onset of CVD such as statins. Before introducing the model, this
section presents a brief introduction to the role of this medication in the prevention
of CVDs, and how this therapy was adopted in the UK.
As described by Cutler et al. (2003), high cholesterol started to be pointed out
as a risk factor for CVDs in the late fifties, and suggestive evidence and public
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awareness built up until such a link was confirmed in the early eighties. This was
translated into both a radical change in nutritional habits, but also into a race for
developing safe and effective drugs for reducing cholesterol. Statins, which inhibit
the production of LDL cholesterol by the liver, were introduced for the first time
with the approval of Lovastatin (Tobert, 2003). Other molecules followed during
the next decade. While they eventually became blockbusters for their developers,
statins development and adoption involved several controversies about potential
side effects, and about their effectiveness for reducing mortality.
In the 2000s in the UK, lipid-lowering drugs - mostly statins - prescriptions
grew notoriously, specially if compared with the growth of well-established drugs
as analgesics or anti-hypertensive therapies which have similar target population
(see Figure 3.1). Between 2002 and 2012, there was an increase of 266% in the
prescription of statins, which was the largest for any British National Formulary
(BNF) section (HSCIC, 2013). This is similar in other countries like the US as
discussed by Chernew et al. (2016). Since their initial approval, it was already
clear that statins should be prescribed for secondary prevention of CVDs. In other
words, use them in order to reduce the risk of repetition of CVD events on those
patients who already suffered one. However, there was still a debate centred
on whether they should be prescribed to general population who have no prior
history of CVDs (primary prevention). As discussed by Tobert (2003), this last
controversy was solved by the Heart Protection Study (Group et al., 2002), one of
the largest medical trials ever.
Statins for primary prevention are prescribed by family doctors, also known
as general practitioners (GPs). They are essential for access to this type of medi-
cation due to three main characteristics. First, given that GPs are the gatekeepers
of the public health system, almost all non-urgent health care service starts with
them. Second, individuals can choose a GP only if they live within a geographi-
cal zone defined by the practice where the physician is register (catchment area).
They are appointed by regional administrative bodies called Primary Care Trusts3
(PCT), which act as commissioners. By law, GPs are free to prescribe according
3PCTs have changed through the years. Prior to 2006/07, there where 303 of them but they were
merged into 152 and most of them remained stable for the following years. A major reorganization
took place in 2013, where PCTs were transformed into 211 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG).
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Figure 3.1: Lipid-lowering medication prescriptions in England
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to their criteria receiving suggestions by the guidelines provided by the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). This institution is responsible in
the UK for technical advice and care standards at primary care level. By 2006,
NICE issued a technology appraisal suggesting Statins for primary prevention of
CVDs (NICE, 2006).
Use of this medication is rewarded under the Quality and Outcomes Frame-
work (QOF). This is a pay for performance scheme designed to improve quality
of family doctors services in the UK.4 Under this system, practices gain points
for achieving certain targets, which are translated into cash for the practice every
year. These goals range from administrative registries to precise clinical measures
of people with a particular disease, and their achievement was monitored by their
corresponding PCT. Since its introduction in 2004, QOF have rewarded GPs for
keeping controlled the cholesterol level of their patients who have history of CVD
or diabetes. In 2009, goals related to primary prevention were introduced for the
first time. It incentivised doctors for assessing the risk of developing CVDs follow-
ing a standard procedure for those individuals recently diagnosed with high blood
4How much and what is paid is negotiated between the British Medical Association (physicians
union) and the National Health Service (NHS) every year, with suggestions made by NICE. Prior
to QOF, GPs were paid only according to the population size under their care and their length of
service within the NHS.
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pressure. Such risk calculators are directly related to NICE guidelines for the use
of statins. In 2011, usage of the drug became explicit for secondary prevention,
and the same happened for primary prevention in 2013.
Assessing the impact of QOF on health is particularly challenging as there is
no simple counter-factual (Gillam and Steel, 2013), but there is evidence of some
modest gains when comparing incentivised with non-incentivised measures (Do-
ran et al., 2011). One of the main goals of the QOF is to homogenize primary care
services. In general, there was a gradient on performance with respect to depriva-
tion which narrowed down after the first years (Dixon et al., 2010). In particular,
there is evidence that the introduction of this policy in 2004 reduced heterogene-
ity in access to statins for secondary prevention of CVD (CQC, 2009), or even on
general preventive measures as blood pressure monitoring (Ashworth et al., 2008).
Apart from deprivation, other characteristics associated with performance on the
scheme are related to the number of patients registered on the practice (Dixon
et al., 2010), or the number of GPs working on it (Kelly and Stoye, 2014). Small
practices typically underperformed during the first year of the QOF in several
clinical indicators, but differences narrowed down in the following years (Doran
et al., 2010; Ashworth et al., 2011).
3.3 Life-cycle model with health
This section develops the model which relates economic activity with health pro-
gression. Individuals life is modelled from age 52 until their death, which will
come no-later than 100 years old. In the time being, health deteriorates affecting
the probability to die as well as the trade-off of participating or not in the labour
market. Such decision and the amount of resources to be saved or borrowed from
the future are the choice variables available. With them, individuals maximize
their expected utility conditional on their resources.
The model is organised on periods that cover 2 years of age (t = 1, ..., T =
25), following the data collection interval, and current health is discretised on
four states (S = 1, ...,4) including death. Health states cover progression of CVD
diseases, allowing us to explore the role of statins. In this model calendar years (w)
are not relevant for economic choices, however they do play a role determining the
odds of getting a statin prescription. Apart from wealth, individuals are allowed to
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be heterogenous on the risk of developing CVDs and the potential labour income
that they would obtain if they work. Moreover, there is permanent heterogeneity
on gender g ∈ M, F5 and an index based on education level EDUC ∈ 0,0.5,1.6
In order to describe the model, I will start by explaining the components
related to health progression. After this, I will continue with the choices and
restrictions available by agents every period. This is followed by the optimization
problem and how it is solved.
3.3.1 Health Progression
As described before, there are two different types of health in this model. First,
a present CVD-related health status, discretised in the four states S described in
the profiles section, which directly affects the utility function. Second, continuous
CVD-risk index H, based on observed biomarkers, that affects the transition be-
tween these states. Essentially, by controlling the progression of H it is possible to
diminish the odds of transition into states that reduce utility of individuals.
3.3.1.1 Markov Model
The are four health states. First, individuals do not present signs of any cardio-
vascular condition (S = 1). This might change, and they might present early signs
denoted by persistent levels of high blood pressure, cholesterol or sugar in their
blood (S = 2). Those are chronic conditions that can be managed, but not re-
versed. Additionally, they indicate that for them the risk of suffering a CVD event.
This state (S = 3) makes it more difficult to work, as we will see in the following
subsection, and drastically increase the odds of death.
5In the data,45.6% of the individuals ever observed from waves 1 to 6 are men.
6Level 0 represents no formal education, 31%(40.5%) of (fe)males. Level 0.5 covers from some
formal education up to high school (up to NVQ3/GCE A level) or a foreign degree, 36.4%(38%)
of (fe)males. Finally, level 1 is given to individuals with any tertiary education, 32.4% (21.5%) of
(fe)males.
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Figure 3.2: Health states and disease progression
A Markov process describes the transition between the four health states as
described in Figure 3.2. First, it is assumed that transitions cannot be reverted, so
individuals’ health can only deteriorate7. Individuals can suffer a CVD event even
without the diagnosis of milder conditions, or they can die without suffering this
type of events. These restrictions simplify the transition between states at a given
period t into the matrix Pt,t+1 presented in Equation 3.1.
Pt,t+1 =

p11 p12 p13 p14
0 p22 p23 p24
0 0 p33 p34
0 0 0 p44
 (3.1)
Transition probabilities in Pt,t+1 are modelled using a multinomial logit struc-
ture. In this way it is possible to allow for different probabilities according to age
t, gender g, education level index (EDUC), and CVD-risk index H but with a re-
duced number of parameters to estimate. In state 1, the process is governed by
the three latent indexes (xb2,xb3,xb4) presented in Equation 3.2, and four extreme-
value type I shocks (one per state) denoted by ξsit. In state 2, only the last two of
the latent indexes (xb3,xb4) and three of the shocks are valid. This is because the
no-reversibility assumption stated above. Consequently, in state 3 only the last
latent index (xb4) and two of the shocks are relevant.
7In epidemiological and health economics literature there might be several alternative CVD states
according to the type of event, the number of years after it, or the secondary onset of another
event. For simplicity, and for data restrictions, I will assume just one state, without any further
differentiation.
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xb2(t, Ht) = τ21 ∗ ageit + τ22 ∗ age2it + τ23 ∗ exp(Hit) + τ24 ∗ EDUCi + τg;25 (3.2)
xb3(t, Ht,St = s ∈ {1,2}) = τ3,s,1 ∗ ageit + τ3,s,2 ∗ age2it + τ3,s,3 ∗ exp(Hit) + τ3,s,4 ∗ EDUCi + τg;3,s,5
xb4(t, Ht,St = s ∈ {1,2,3}) = τ4,s,1 ∗ ageit + τ4,s,2 ∗ age2it + τ4,s,3 ∗ exp(Hit) + τ4,s,4 ∗ EDUCi + τg;4,s,5
For instance, for an individual who is in state 1, death (state 4) will come if
three conditions hold at the same time: xb4 + ξ4 > xb3 + ξ3, xb4 + ξ4 > xb2 + ξ2
and xb4 + ξ4 > ξ1. But if he is in state 3 already, it is only necessary that xb4 +
ξ4 > ξ3. Under this logic, in states 1 and 2, transition can be represented as a
multinomial logistic process. For instance, the odds to transit from state 1 to 3 can
be expressed as follows:
p13 = Pr(St+1 = 3|t, Ht,St = 1) = exp(xb3(t, Ht,St = 1))1+ exp(xb2(t, Ht)) + exp(xb3(t, Ht,St = 1)) + exp(xb4(t, Ht,St = 1))
In state 3, transition is simplified to a logistic process as their is only one state to
transit into:
p34 = Pr(St+1 = 4|t, Ht,St = 3) = exp(xb4(t, Ht,St = 3))1+ exp(xb4(t, Ht,St = 3))
A limitation of the presented formulation is that it does not consider com-
peting risk of death or disability. Chernew et al. (2016) presents evidence of a
substitution between causes of death in the US, where mortality associated to
CVDs have been declining in the last 20 years while those associated with res-
piratory and central nervous system are increasing. This means that the current
model might overestate the value of extremely effective interventions if transition
probabilities of observed survivors in the data might be higher not only for CVDs
but also for those competing risks.8 For practical purposes, ex-ante it might be
hard to know if it is
3.3.1.2 CVD-Risk progression
Observed H is composed by permanent and transitory elements (Equation 3.3).
This specification aims to capture the persistence of some conditions like choles-
8In other words, if it is the case that even if CVD become as treatable as hypertension (no differ-
ence on survival odds between states 2 and 3), the life-expectancy of those who transit into state 2
is lower than for those who never transit into such state. That is, if those at high risk of developing
CVD are also at higher risk of developing dangerous complications non directly associated with
CVD.
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terol and blood pressure, jointly with the almost immediate effect (in weeks) of
medication for controlling them.
The permanent component is the product of a long-run process that includes
both an initial genetic endowment but also life-style choices as dietary habits,
smoking and physical activity. These factors build up into chronic conditions,
which are captured here with the persistence parameter ω1 in Equation 3.4. Thus,
heterogeneity on investments are captured by the observed initial variation on
H. Such initial level will be transformed by iid normal innovations e (mean 0,
standard deviation σe). In this AR(1) process, the long-run trend differs according
to the education level and gender of the individual.
The transitory element captures the effect of health care into the index. While
medication therapies reduce the levels of blood pressure and cholesterol, their
effect is temporal. For instance, statins inhibits the production of an enzyme that
is essential for the production of LDL cholesterol. Because the enzyme is only
inhibited while the drug is in the body, statins are typically prescribed indefinitely.
Hence, Equation 3.5 presents a specification where medication h has a linear effect
on the temporary component of H. It also shows that each health state has a
different constant which comes from other health-care interventions that might
affect the index.
Hi,t = H
p
i,t + H
t
i,t (3.3)
Hpi,t = ω1H
p
i,t−1 +ωg;2 +ω3EDUCi + ei,t (3.4)
Hti,t = ω4hit +
3
∑
s=2
ω5,s1(Si,t = s) , s ∈ {1,2,3} (3.5)
3.3.1.3 Medication choice
Medication choice is assumed to be exogenous to the individual. While it is true
that in reality individuals might decide to accept or not a prescription by their
doctor, it is not possible to distinguish such decision in the data. It is also assumed
that medication’s sole impact is through health transition probabilities. Hence, we
are assuming that there are no noticeable secondary effects and that monetary
costs are negligible.9
9The actual monetary cost was below 100£per year, or even 0 if individuals meet certain income
conditions. However, other individual costs include to visit the GP practice for a repeated prescrip-
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The probability to get a prescription is given by individuals’ health (S, H),
their education (EDUC), local area characteristics that vary on time, and an un-
observed component (e). Equation 3.6 expresses such process for individual i at
calendar year w and living in an area r. The model is a logit, as e follows an Ex-
treme Value Type I distribution. Local area is characterised by one characteristic,
whether GP practices in the area are on average small or large (SL ∈ {0,1}), an
effect that might change according to the calendar year associated to the survey
collection time (w ∈ {4,5,6}). Such time variation according to practice size is
allowed because of the increasing trend on prescription presented in Figure 3.1,
and due to the introduction of pay-for-performance rewards related to primary
prevention of CVDs in 2009 (see Appendix 3.F for further details).
hirw = 1(R > 0) (3.6)
R = ζ1 + ζ2H
p
irw + ζ3H
p
irw
2
+ ζ4EDUCi
+ ζ5Female+ ζ61(w ≥ 5) + ζ7SLr + ζ8SLr · 1(w ≥ 5)
+ eirw(h) , eiw(h) ∼ EV1(0,1)
The decision rule presented above can be understood as the reduce form of
the optimal prescription behaviour of a practitioner that is partly altruistic and
gets utility from the health of their patients. However, such decision depends on
the constraints and incentives faced by her local practice which are captured by
the size of it, and the calendar year.
3.3.2 Life-cycle model
This is a Finite-Horizon Life-cycle model, for which each period timing, states
and choices are sketched in Figure 3.3. Each period, individual i chooses hours
of leisure 1 − l and consumption c conditional on being prescribed with lipid-
lowering medication h ∈ {0,1}. Individuals are assumed to consider that the pre-
scription rule is fixed and will not change in the future. It is important to notice
that individuals are constrained by their assets Ait and exogenous shocks that
might affect their potential income, which is a function of their education level
tion. On adverse effects, it is not expected to be harmed due to statins (Ebrahim et al., 2014).
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and has a persistent component Υit. When an agent dies, he gets utility from
leaving a bequest b. Apart from death (S = 4), the only health-state that has a
direct impact on utility is to have suffered a CVD-disease (S = 3). However, notice
that individuals will carefully consider their current CVD-risk index H and health
state S in order to make decisions, as they rationally forecast the future of their
health.
Figure 3.3: Life-cycle model diagram
3.3.2.1 Utility
Individual i, in period t chooses consumption c and hours of leisure `. Utility
follows a Cobb-Douglas function between consumption and leisure and it is nested
within a constant relative risk aversion function (CRRA), with parameters that
are gender and education specific. Consumption has a weight of ηg,ED and risk
aversion γg,ED.
Individuals younger than 90 can work either full-time (FT,l = 40 hours) or
part-time (PT, l = 20 hours10) out of an available endowment of L¯ = 112 hours, a
10On practice, I followed Institute for Fiscal Studies derived variables which sets as full-time any
work with more than 35 hours per week.
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number that comes from the average awake time of people in the UK (Lader et al.,
2006). Part-time and full-time working costs in term of hours are also shifted by
parameter θP;g,ED. Notice that if people have suffered from a CVD event (Sit = 3),
there is a penalty of φ1;g,ED of their time if they want to work (lit > 0). This penalty
might be higher or lower if they decide to work PT (φ2).
If in a given period the individual is alive (S = 1,S = 2,S = 3), they get util-
ity according to Equation 3.7, but if it is death by this period, he will get it from
their bequest as shown in Equation 3.8. Notice that this is equivalent to a non-
depreciated durable good, generating a fixed flow of utility from the time of dead
until the last potential life period T. This ensures that for any given period, the
comparison between death and life has the same sign. As a result, it is not neces-
sary to add a constant to the utility function to ensure that individuals prefer to
be alive to be death.
U(ct, lt;St, At,Υt, X) =u(cit, lit;Sit) =
(cηg,EDit `
1−ηg,ED
it )
1−γg,ED
1− γg,ED if Sit < 4 (3.7)
`it = L¯− lit − θP;g,ED ∗ (lit = 40)
− (φ1;g,ED + φ2;g,ED ∗ (lit = 20)) ∗ (Sit = 3) ∗ (lit > 0)
lit ∈ {0,20,40}
U(ct, lt;St, At,Υt, X) =b(Ait) = θB
(Ait + θK)(1−γg,ED)ηg,ED
1− γg,ED if Sit = 4 (3.8)
The central parameters for our analysis are φ1;g,ED,φ2;g,ED. These parameters
tell us about the burden of CVDs. Such effect is unlikely to be homogeneous across
occupations, and for that reason it is allowed to differ by education level. Another
crucial element is the utility of ‘death’, which is typically captured by the bequest
model θB. This motive is typically identified by the amount of asset holding of the
oldest individuals. Bequest motive is particularly important in the UK context:
Blundell et al. (2016) report that in ELSA nearly 70% of households with one
member aged 70 and older consider at least fairly important to leave property or
money as an inheritance, in comparison with just 50% of similar households in the
US. Notice that apart from these characteristics, health does enter directly into the
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utility function.11
3.3.2.2 Assets progression and income processes
Individuals get resources for consumption from their household assets, which
evolve according to Equation 3.9. Assets accumulate with the financial returns
from the difference between income and consumption, given a risk-free and con-
stant interest rate. Income comes either from labour (yLi,t) or other alternative
sources (yNLi,t ).
12 Borrowing is limited by the maximum amount of resources that
they could potentially earn given a minimum consumption (Equation 3.10).
The onset of a CVD event has a one-off impact on assets accumulation, cap-
tured by parameter φ3. This parameter considers out-of-pocket expenses, but in
the UK this are more related to temporal disability, informal care provided by
other economically active members of the household, and in general other costs
related to the recovery time Liu et al. (2002). Expenses associated to demand of
health care services, which increased notoriously during and after these events,13
are normally covered by the publicly funded National Health Service (NHS).
Ai,t+1
1+ r
= Ai,t + yLi,t ∗ κ ∗ li,t + yNLi,t (agei,t, li,t,Si,t,EDUCi, g,b)− ci,t − φ3 · (Si,t = 3) · (Si,t−1 6= 3) (3.9)
Ai,t ≥ BCt where BCi =
T
∑
i,t=1
BCi,t+1
1+ r
− ymin + cmin
(3.10)
As shown in Equation 3.11, income from labour yLi,t (κ transforms weekly
income into yearly one,14) either from wages or self-employment earnings, is a
function of a stochastic idiosyncratic productivity process Υ, current CVD-status,
gender and of their education level. The productivity process follows an AR(1)
given an initial draw Υi,0 and is shaped by iid normal innovations υ.
Non-labour income is the deterministic process presented in Equation 3.12.
As it involves income from non-labour sources, earnings from other family mem-
11An alternative would be to weight Equation 3.7 by a function of the current health status as in
De Nardi et al. (2010); Palumbo (1999).
12Even tough periods cover a two-years span, parameters in the income equations will be calcu-
lated for a year for interpretation purposes. In the data, income is elicited at week level, so reported
figures are multiplied by 52 weeks and then doubled.
13See Appendix 3.E for more details.
14κ = 52/1000, for 52 weeks per thousand GBP.
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bers, and the benefits and tax system, the two main drives behind this process
are age and education level. In other words, instead of formally modelling such
elements of the household, I will estimate a reduce-form version of it. First, the
base level is determined by the education level and gender, but with a permanent
jump at state pension age (SPAg,b) which is gender (g) and cohort-of-birth specific
(b). In the model, SPA is 65 for all men and for women born on and after 1954,
while it is 60 for women born before such date.15 Second, it has a positive trend
with age which changes at SPA. The trend is quadratic after SPA in order to avoid
huge non-labour incomes as age approach to 100. The third element is a response
to labour supply: features of the benefit social welfare system like job-seeking al-
lowance increase non-labour income as working hours decrease, which changes
according to education level and age. The fourth element are pensions on top of
the state pension: individuals who do not work will receive part of their potential
labour income according to their participation status.
ln(yLi,t) =ι
L
g;1 + ι
L
2 ∗ EDUCi + ιL3 ∗ (Sit = 3) + Υi,t (3.11)
Υi,t =ρΥi,t−1 + υi,t , υi,t ∼ N(0,συ)
ln(yNLit ) =ιg;1 + ιg;2 ∗ EDUCi + (ιg;3 + ιg;4 ∗ EDUCi) ∗ [age≥ SPAg,b]
+ ιg;5 ∗ (age− 50) ∗ (age< SPAg,b)
+ [ιg;6 ∗ (age− SPAg,b) ∗ (age≥ SPAg,b)
+ [ιg;7 ∗ (age− SPAg,b)2 ∗ (age≥ SPAg,b)
+ [ιg;8 + ιg;9 ∗ EDUCi] ∗ (age≥ SPAg,b)] ∗ lit
+ [(ιg;10 ∗ (lit = 1) + ιg;11 ∗ (lit = 2)] ∗ ln(yLit) ∗ [age≥ SPAg,b] (3.12)
3.3.3 Solution
Individuals solve:
15Traditionally, the SPA was 65 for men and 60 for women. However, the 1995 Pensions Act
equalised it to 65, with a transition regime from April 2010 to 2020. A new Pensions Act in 2011
speeded up the transition and increased the age for both genders to 66. For simplicity, the model
assumes that SPA jumps immediately from 60 to 65 for women born in 1954 and afterwards, and
that there is no change from 65 to 66. It is assumed that women knew well in advance the first
change, so it is effectively incorporated in their behaviour.
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max
(ct,lt)Tt=1
u(c1, l1;S1, X) + E
[
T
∑
t=2
βt−1U(ct, lt;St, At,Υt, X)
]
(3.13)
given a vector of parameters Θ= {β,η,γ,φ,θB,θK,µ,συ,ρ, ι,ω,τ,ζ}, conditional
on fixed characteristics X (education level, gender and birth-cohort,16 calendar
year and type of nearby GP practice). They have to decide the full stream of
choices considering the potential utility every period (Eqs 3.7 and 3.8) subject to
the progression of income (Eqs 3.11, 3.12), assets (Eqs 3.9, 3.10), health states (Eq
3.2), CVD-risk index (Eqs 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) and odds of prescription (Eq 3.6 ).
An essential assumption for guaranteeing a solution is that in T + 1 the in-
dividual will be death with certainty. This problem can be reformulated using
bellman equations, which allows for the problem to be solved backwards from
period t = T. As a result, all the estimated parameters will be relative to such
arbitrary value set by the bequest function. This is a fundamental assumption for
calculating the compensating variation for the drug, and will be further discussed
in the welfare section.
Conditional on education level and prescription status, the value function for
an individual who is still alive is shown in Equation 3.14. This means that rational
individuals consider the potential paths of both their health (CVD-risk index, pre-
scription, health status) and income (labour and non-labour). Notice that calendar
year is not considered, this means that individuals take current prescription pro-
cess as granted and do not expect it to change in the future. For notation benefit,
individual subscript was removed, and time notation was simplified: V = Vt and
V ′ = Vt+1. More details on how the problem is solved are in the Appendix 3.D.1.
There are two main output of the solution. First, the expected maximised util-
ity at a given point of the state space, V(A, H,S,Υ; X), presented in Equation 3.14.
It is crucial as it allows us to calculate the measure of value as will be described in
the next section. Second, the arguments of the problem at a given point of the state
space, A′∗(t,S, A, H,Υ, h; X)17 and l∗(t,S, A, H,Υ, h; X). These policy functions are
16There are three options: males, females born before 1954, and females born on and after such
date.
17 A′ (future assets) is stored instead of c as it is in the same units and magnitude of the state
variable A (assets). Nevertheless, results should be similar using either of them.
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used to predict choices while doing simulations. More details on the simulation
procedure can be found in Appendix 3.D.4.
V(A, H,S,Υ;X) =Vh=1 ∗ Pr(h = 1) +Vh=0 ∗ (1− Pr(h = 1)) i f S < 4 (3.14)
V(A) =b(A) i f S = 4
Vh =argmax
(c,l)
u(c, l;S) + βE
[
V′(A′, H′,S′,Υ′;X)|A, H,S,Υ, h, c, l]
3.4 The measure of value: compensating variation
The measure is obtained by comparing the expected utility of both scenarios. The
question, as show in Equation 3.15, is to determine the amount of money pii that
would be required in order to compensate an individual i for living in the no-
medication world if we want him to attain the same expected utility as in the
current scenario. It can also be interpreted as the maximum amount of assets that
the individual will give up in order to live in a world where the medication system
is available.
pii ∈ argmin
∣∣∣∣∣E0 T∑t=τi βtU(lit, cit|h∗it, Ait)− E0
T
∑
t=τi
βtU(lit, cit|hit(Sit = 2) = 0, Ait + pii)
∣∣∣∣∣
(3.15)
This compensation variation can also be interpreted as the willingness-to-pay
for the drug. How much will a person give up in order to enjoy the benefits of a
treatment? A substantial difference from literature is that the value of this technol-
ogy is not based solely on the trade-off life vs. death but also considers observed
differences on labour hours and consumption. This means that it considers the
value of quality of life improvements of the technology.
Papageorge (2015) exploits rich data on medication prices and choices, allow-
ing him to identify willingness-to-pay based on revealed preferences. This is not
feasible for most applications, therefore most of them are based on the implicit
values of life present in the trade-off between wages and mortality risk of cer-
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tain occupations (Viscusi, 1993). While this approach does not take into quality
of health, it allows to incorporate estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL)18
already established on the literature. For instance, Hall and Jones (2007) calibrate
their utility function, where death is normalised to 0, in order to match VSL esti-
mates.19 In the model presented above, the sole driver of the difference between
life and death in the model is the bequest motive presented in Equation 3.8, which
is identified by the shape of the assets rather than from an observed trade-off that
involves mortality risk.
In order to contrast the implications of this assumption I will calculate the
VSL implied by the model. This is done by considering a counterfactual reduction
in the mortality rate (Murphy and Topel, 2010).
3.5 Improving Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
The most common approach for evaluating whether or not to adopt a technology
is the cost-effectiveness analysis. In the UK, NICE considers that an interven-
tion provides value for money if it is able to gain one quality-adjusted life year20
(QALY) if it costs £20.000 or less to do so. By using this criteria, this valuation strat-
egy avoids economic considerations and centers the decision on the pure ‘health’
benefits. However, such economic benefits might produce extra resources to the
health system.
QALYs calculation comes from calculating the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio (ICER), in the scenarios with and without the drug. For it, it is required
to simulate two datasets under the estimated policy rules and the counter-factual
scenarios. In total k datasets of size N are simulated in both scenarios. It is
normally interpreted as the amount of money that would be required in order to
18How much of their assets an individual is willing to give up in order to reduced probability of
death by 1 unit. However, calculations are based on extrapolating small reductions, for instance, of
1/1.000 or of 1/10.000. See (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) for a good review.
19Hall and Jones (2007) also considers quality of life by introducing extra elements on the utility
function that are calibrated with quality adjusted life years weights.
20In the health economics literature, health states are given a factor called utility that represents
the physical and mental capacity of each state. Typically, an utility of 1 is considered one quality-
adjusted life year. Such factors are normally derived from surveys that consider perceived quality of
life and health conditions. For example, according to the EuroQol 5 dimensions (EQ-5D) measure of
health status (Devlin and Krabbe, 2013) which is typically used in NICE guidelines, if the number
1 represents the best health state, a value of 0.079 is given for a state in which individuals require
assistance for daily-life activities. For a simple introduction see Phillips and Thompson (2001) and
Malek (2001).
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gain 1 QALY using this treatment. Even though this interpretation has assumes
that the production function is linear on resources and that there are no fixed
costs, it is a simple and widely used reference for cost-effectiveness evaluation:
ICER =
Coststatin −Costno statin
QALYstatin −QALYno statin (3.16)
where CostΞ = ∑kNi=1∑
T
t=1 costit(Ξ) and QALYΞ = ∑
kN
i=1∑
T
t=1 QALYit(Ξ), with
Ξ = statin when h∗it operates, and Ξ = no statin when hit(Sit = 2) = 0.
The same equation can be used for determine not the cost but any other
simulated variable. For instance, we can obtain how much extra labour income is
associated to 1 extra QALY in the treatment-available world as follows:
YLstatin −YLno statin
QALYstatin −QALYno statin (3.17)
where YLΞ = ∑
kN
i=1∑
T
t=1 YLit (Ξ).
3.6 Structural Estimation of the Model
The model was estimated in several steps, separately for men and women. First,
adjusted profiles are obtained in order to derive moments from the data. Most
of the moments are unconditional means per age, but they also include transition
probabilities, variances and serial covariance of labour income and the health-
index. Next, initial conditions for simulating predictions by the model are derived.
This involves an imputation procedure for the potential labour-income of those
who are not working. This is carried out using a Heckman selection model where
participation is instrumented with a dummy for having a partner who reports to
be in bad health (see appendix 3.D.3 for more details).
The next step is to determine the value of the parameters that will reproduce
the profiles observed in the data. First, the health-model parameters are estimated
independently, and given their results, life-cycle model parameters are estimated
for men and women separately. The discount factor is calibrated from literature
and set to β = 0.960421 and the interest rate set to r = 0.030225.22, all other pa-
rameters θ, a q × 1 vector, are estimated via the Method of Simulated Moments
21This is the two-years equivalent to the more standard β = 0.98.
22This is equivalent to r = 0.015 in a one-year term.
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(MSM). This requires to simulate a dataset similar to ELSA, which involves also to
consider sampling and attrition. Details on how the simulated dataset is prepared
are presented in appendix 3.D.4.
Let x = {xi}Ni=1 be the data where we have N individuals. Each individual
is observed at least two times or at most 6 between age 53 and T. Such data is
transformed by a vector functions m of size p× 1, such that p> q. The individual
functions, mj select a variable, or a combination of variables, at a specific age.
For instance, wage; conditional on being observed at wave 2, being 53 to 54 years
old, and being working at such year. Appendix 3.D.2 presents in detail each
of the moments considered. These conditional moments are transformed into
a unconditional ones using an indicator function. In other words, in order to
produced sample averages, the sum of individual contributions is divided by the
total number of individuals N, rather than the number of individuals who meet
the condition set by the moment.23 Given such information is possible to construct
a sample average, the observed moment, ψj(x), such that as N→∞
ψj(x) =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
mj(xi)→ E(mj(x))
Given the model and the vector of parameters, it is possible to construct a simu-
lated data analogue, x(k) = {xi}Nki=1, which size is k times the original sample. With
it, we can apply the same vector m and construct simulated moments ψj(x(k)),
such that as kNj→∞
ψj(x(k)) =
1
kN
kN
∑
s=1
mj(xs)→ E(mj(x(k),θ))
If the model is correctly specified ∀j, E(mj(x(k),θ)) = E(mj(x)). This motivates the
MSM estimator (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989; Duffie and Singleton,
1993):
θˆ = argmin
θ
(
ψj(x)− ψj(x(k))
)′
W
(
ψj(x)− ψj(x(k))
)
(3.18)
Where W is a diagonal matrix constructed with the diagonal of the inverse of
23See for instance Chamberlain (1992) and French and Jones (2011).
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the covariance matrix of the data:24 W−1 = diag(S) and S = Var
(
1√
N ∑
N
i=1 m(xi)
)
;
and J is the jacobian matrix of the simulated statistics with respect to θ, J =
∂ 1kN ∑
kN
i=1 m(xi)
∂θ . In practice, it is derived numerically using steps of 25% of the original
parameter value, or of 0.01 if it is 0.
Then θˆ is a consistent estimator of θ, and its asymptotic distribution is given
by
√
N(θˆ − θ0)→ N (0, Q). Matrix Q =
(
1+ 1k
)(
Σ−11 Σ2Σ
−1
1
)
, with Σ1 = J′WJ and
Σ2 = (J′W) ∗ S ∗ (WJ).
The health model was estimated using an amoeba algorithm starting from
a defined set of starting values. Parameters of the transition equations were ini-
tialised at 0, while starting values for CVD-risk dynamics and prescription equa-
tions come from estimating them outside the model. In terms of identification, the
Markov health transitions and prescription equation involve a collection of logis-
tic regressions which are identified by observing transitions between states across
ages, education levels, GP-sizes and different values of the CVD-risk index. For the
CVD-risk dynamics equation it also required to include moments that account for
variance and autocovariance (4 and 8 years). The list of the moments constructed
with such information is in Appendix 3.D.2. As any logistic models, parameters
are relative to the variance of the innovations that have been standardised to 1.
On terms of the economic choices model, parameters are relative to β and r
which were fixed. The are two motives for savings in this model: risk aversion,
captured by the parameter γg; a the bequest motive represented by θB. While the
shape of the assets’ profiles is dominated by both parameters (inducing labour
participation), the bequest motive allow us to understand why there is not a sharp
drop in assets for the elderly (above age 80). These utility parameters were ini-
titalised to standards in the literature, but several combinations were manually
calibrated. Transitory and persistent components of labour income per hour are
identified by including up to 4 autocovariances of the variable (from 2 to up to 8
years), on top of its cross-sectional variance.
24The optimal weighting matrix might be biased in small samples, so the diagonal is used as
recommended by Pischke (1995).
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3.7 Data
This section presents the main sources of data for estimating a model that jointly
considers life-cycle choices, health progression and statins prescriptions. First, a
description of the individual-level dataset will cover the first two elements. Sec-
ond, GP practice and PCT levels data will allow us to understand how health-care
services are related to individual choices.
3.7.1 ELSA
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (Marmot et al., 2013) is a panel of indi-
viduals aged 50 and over, representative for those living in private households
in England. I consider its first 6 waves spanning the period 2002/03 to 2012/13.
Together with socio-economic information, it includes biomarkers collected by
nurses in waves 2,4 and 6 (Figure 3.4).25 Financial variables as wealth, income
and non-labour income26 of the household based on the Institute of Fiscal Studies
income calculations. Financial figures were adjusted to May/June 2005 constant
prices using monthly regional consumer prince index from the Office for National
Statistics. A final element which makes the dataset attractive is that mortality in-
formation was obtained by ELSA directly during field work but also by it with
data from the Department for Work and Pensions and the National Health Service Cen-
tral Register.
Figure 3.4: Survey timing
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While ELSA includes information from partners and other household mem-
bers, the present study includes individuals who are part of the core dataset, that
is, those selected in order to make the sample representative of England’s pop-
ulation. Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the number of individuals observed in each
wave according to their original inclusion. From the 11391 observations included
25For further information, please refer to:http://www.ifs.org.uk/ELSA/about
26This is calculated as non-housing and non-pension wealth of the benefit unit minus the labour
income of the individual. All income measures in ELSA are net of tax. See Section 3.A.2 for more
details about wealth calculations.
84 Chapter 3. On the economic value of preventive care
in wave 1, 8780 were reinterviewed in wave 2. The other 2611 are either death
(506 of them) or not considered because they asked not to be re-contacted, it was
not possible to do it, or moved out of Britain. Hence, it is possible to follow-up
81.5% of the original sample.27 According to ELSA reports (Bridges et al., 2015),
missing information is correlated with age, ethnicity, region and subjective health
measures.
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the number of individuals included in the main
estimation. In wave 2, nurses visited 88% of the interviewed core members. The
remaining refused to be contacted for such purpose (Scholes et al., 2008). From
81% of those who were visited by a nurse, a blood sample was collected (6231
individuals). The figure in Table 3.1 is smaller as the measurements had to be
valid for blood pressure and cholesterol levels, as it will be discussed in Section
3.7.1.2. This is a common problem for this kind of instruments (Heidi Guyer,
2010), and as a general rule, the resulting analysis will be over a population who
is in better health relative to the general population.
ELSA provides population weights in order to recover representative esti-
mates. Cross-sectional weights are going to be used in this analysis when dis-
cussing the willingness-to-pay calculations from wave 1 perspective, however, lon-
gitudinal weights are not considered as the model will incorporate attrition.
27Given that ELSA wave 1 is based on the Health Survey of England, ELSA wave 2 report estimated
the longitudinal response to be around 46.6% of the original sampling framework (Scholes et al.,
2008).
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Table 3.1: ELSA Structural Estimation Sample
Number of individuals
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Source Sample 2002/03 2004/05 2006/07 2008/09 2010/11 2012/13
Panel A: Original sample
Since wave 1 11391 8780 7535 6623 6242 5659
Since wave 3 0 0 1275 972 936 888
Since wave 4 0 0 0 2291 1912 1796
Since wave 6 0 0 0 0 0 826
Total 11391 8780 8810 9886 9090 9169
Confirmed Deaths 0 506 1033 1663 2229 2701
Total Observed 11391 9286 9837 11499 11286 11867
Panel B: Included sample
Used for the moments 11358 9260 9807 11450 11214 11737
CVD-risk index 0 5058 0 5631 0 5439
Source: Own calculations based on ELSA waves 1-6, core members.
Notes: Panel B consider observations that are used for calculating the moments for the structural estimation of the model and
includes registered deaths. In this context, observations without a valid age, work or health status were discarded. Also, notice
that CVD-risk index is based on those individuals for which there is valid measurements of blood pressure and cholesterol.
3.7.1.1 Data profiles
Following the model, health is categorise in four states which are based on re-
ported conditions diagnosed by a physician. First, individuals do not present
signs of any cardiovascular condition (S = 1). This might change, and they might
present early signs denoted by persistent levels of high blood pressure, cholesterol
or sugar in their blood (S = 2). Those are chronic conditions that can be managed,
but not reversed. A more serious scenario is to suffer an CVD event, which might
generate permanent limitations for work (S = 3). Last state, S = 4, is death.28
Figure 3.5 shows the proportion of individuals in each health state, at a given
two-years age group (52-53, 54-55 and so on).29 For both men and women the
proportion of individuals in high risk of suffering from a CVD event is increasing
until age 70. For those who survived such event, the peak age is around 80. The
main difference is that more male are affected by CVD than women, but more
women move into the ‘at risk’ status.
28Death is observed via an administrative linkage from ELSA with ONS records.
29Age is grouped in order to boost the number of observations per group.
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Figure 3.5: Observed progression of health states
Female Male
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
50 60 70 80 90 10050 60 70 80 90 100
Age in years
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
al
ive State
(S=1) No signs
(S=2) At risk
(S=3) CVD survivor
(S=4) Death
Figures 3.6, 3.8 and 3.7 show the assets, income and labour supply profiles
after netting out the effects of cohorts, family size, and seasonal and business cy-
cle.30 I follow a procedure similar to French (2005) which using linear regressions
estimates the contribution of all this confounding elements in each one of the out-
comes, while controlling for the contribution of health states and age. Given this
estimates, variables are adjusted by removing the specific effects in favour of com-
mon normalisation. Specifically, the profiles adjustment aims to set all individuals
in a world with a fix unemployment rate of 5, a family size of 2, and to be born in
1946. Appendix 3.A explains in detail this procedure.
First, Figure 3.6 shows that assets are considerable smaller for CVD survivors.
Part of this might be triggered by lower participation in the labour market as
shown in Figure 3.7. As a second observation, it is clear that there are differences
on this aspect, specially before the SPA. The effect is larger in full-time participa-
tion for men, and in part-time for women. Third, Figure 3.8 shows that earnings
per hour are slightly lower for those participating in the labour market after sur-
viving a CVD event. This suggest a productivity effect if those working are those
who are more likely to earn more.
3090% confidence intervals are based on the standard error of the mean
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Figure 3.6: Observed Assets Profile
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Notes: Own calculations based on IFS derived variables on ELSA waves 1 to 6. Ad-
justed for Birth cohort, family size and regional unemployment. Includes 90% CI.
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Figure 3.7: Observed Labour Supply Profiles by Health State
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Figure 3.8: Observed Income Profiles by Health State
(a) Wage per hour
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(b) Yearly non-labour, non-financial income
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90 Chapter 3. On the economic value of preventive care
3.7.1.2 Cardiovascular Risk Index
A CVD risk index was built using some of the biomarkers collected by ELSA:
systolic and diastolic blood pressure, non-HDL31 and total cholesterol. These vari-
ables are summarized into a single index using the Anderson (2008) summary
index. Anderson’s summary index weight standardised version of the variables
in order to maximise de variance of the index. Panel A of Table 3.2 presents the
weights given to each variable given such criteria.32
Table 3.2: Anderson Summary Index (2008) for CVD-Risk Biomarkers and Statins
A. Anderson Summary Index (2008) for CVD-Risk Biomarkers
Variable Mean SD Weight
Systolic BP (mmHg) 132.655 16.908 0.346
Diastolic BP (mmHg) 74.253 10.978 0.209
Total Cholesterol (T-C, mmol/L) 5.684 1.203 0.253
Non-HDL Cholesterol (Non-HDL-C, mmol/L) 4.103 1.125 0.191
B. Cochrane’s (2013) estimates of Statin effect on Cholesterol
Variable Reported SDvs
Total Cholesterol (T-C, mmol/L) -1.05 -0.873
Non-HDL Cholesterol (Non-HDL-C, mmol/L)† -1.01 -0.898
Total effect (ω4) -0.392
Notes: † Cochrane (2013) reports effects on LDL Cholesterol (-1.00 mmol/L). This number was
translated into Non-HDL-C given the observed relationship in the ELSA sample: 1 mmol/L of
LDL-C is equivalent to 1.005 to 1.0155 mmol/L of Non-HDL-C. Moreover, the correlation coefficient
between LDL-C and Non-HDL-C is 0.9476. The advantage of Non-HDL-C is that fasting is not
required for the validity of the measure, which is essential for LDL-C calculation.
31While the dataset includes LDL cholesterol, sample size is smaller than for HDL cholesterol due
to the nature of the test: LDL requires fasting prior to the blood sample, while HDL does not.
32The index is a weighted average of the standardised variables, with weights that maximize the
variance of the index. For more details, see Appendix A from Anderson (2008). Alternatively, a
factor model was calculated. While both of them are highly correlated, the Anderson’s version is a
better predictor of the Framingham score. Fundamentally, the weight for each variables is calculated
as the sum of the elements of the respective row of the inverse of the covariance matrix, with respect
to the total sum of the elements of the same matrix. Therefore, more weight is given to those
variables for which their variation is less captured by other variables variation. In comparison, the
factor analysis captures the common variance of those variables. In this particular application, it is
important to take into account both individuals with either high cholesterol or high blood pressure,
rather than those with high levels of both biomarkers. The reason is that each measure might include
essential information for predicting CVD risk.
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The resulting index, a number between -2 and 2, is a measure of the underly-
ing risk of developing a CVD event. Figure 3.9 presents its distribution according
to their medication status, where despite selection,33 there is a clear difference be-
tween those who are and not taking statins, possibly due to their beneficial effect
on CVD risk.
The role of statins in the model is defined in Equation 3.5. This parameter is
calibrated based on evidence from literature. In particular, Taylor et al. (2013) re-
view on the effect of statins on primary prevention of CVDs, estimates the impact
of the drug usage on the reduction of cholesterol levels. Given that the CVD-risk
index mixes standardised versions of cholesterol and blood pressure, Panel B of
Table 3.2 translates those point estimates into the index.
Figure 3.9: Distribution of the log CVD-risk index ln(H)
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Figure 3.10 presents the age profiles for the resulting index and medication
intake, showing a similar picture for both men and women. In general, there
is a large decrease on the CVD-risk index for those who survive a CVD event.
Appendix 3.E discusses the potential channels behind these trends in detail.
One concern is the potential effect of the drug-therapy on other factors that are
related with the risk of developing a CVD or death. Strazzullo et al. (2007) review
of clinical literature shows that Statins cause a small (1.1 mmHg) but significant
reduction on systolic blood pressure. This implies an underestimation of the value
33Those under medication should have, on average, a higher CVD-risk than those who are not.
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of the drug. Nevertheless, a risk compensation mechanism might be triggered,
Kaestner et al. (2014) have found that Statins’ adoption is related to an increase on
BMI and alcohol use. If such compensation is not of the same magnitude in the
clinical trials, this might generate an upward bias on the current estimates of the
drug’s benefits.
3.7.2 Practices data and prescription rule
Equation 3.6 presented the probability to be prescribed with statins. Information
for constructing moments required for its identification comes from administrative
data on primary care services from the QOF registers34 which apart from perfor-
mance for each GP practice, includes data on raw prevalences of some diseases
derived from clinical records, and the number of registered patients.
Panel A presents the size of GP practices measured according to the number
of patients registered in them. As a general trend, the number of practices has
reduced while the number of patients per practice has increased. On average,
each practice has around 60 new patients per year. At the same time, there was
an increase in the adjusted number of physicians per capita. However, detected
prevalence of risk conditions as hypertension and diabetes have increased, part
of it due to ageing of English population and to better quality of primary care
services.
ELSA data is linked to GP practices’ information based on respondents’ post
code of residence. While PCTs cover a well defined geographical area, practices
catchment areas definition is not standard and overlap in urban areas. As a result,
individuals are able to choose among nearby practices. In order to stablish a
measure of the type of available health care services, I have considered information
for the 10 closest GP practices within 15 Kms, according to Euclidean distance. For
each respondent, list size information of the selected practices was averaged with
equal weights as long as they are within 1 Km of the postcode, based on 2009/10
information. For observations outside that range, their relative weight decays with
the inverse of distance.35
34This data archived and published by the Health & Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). It is
recorded in the Quality Management and Analysis System (QMAS), which is the source for deriving
the payments calculations.
35See Appendix 3.B for further details.
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Figure 3.10: Observed progression of CVD-risk Index and Medication
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Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the result of the process. Nearly 80% of the ob-
servations included in the model (Panel B of Table 3.1) analysis were matched to
at least one GP practice. However, if we do not consider those who are already
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death by each wave, almost 90% of the observations have a valid match. Around
a third of them live in areas where the closest GP practices are small, that is, with
an average of less than 6000 patients. Such practices are almost half of the more
than 8000 GP practices in England.
Table 3.3: GP Practices List Size Summary
Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Source Sample 2006/07 2008/09 2010/11 2012/13
Panel A: GP Practices Average by practice
Number of patients in thousands (list size) 6.41 6.60 6.69 6.98
Less than 6000 patients 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.49
Between 6000 and 8300 patients 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19
8300 patients and above 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33
List size year variation . 60.56 58.64 91.62
Number of practices 8372 8229 8245 8020
Panel B: ELSA matched with nearby GP practices 2009/10 data Average by individual
Number of patients (1000s) 7.48 7.51 7.51 7.50
Less than 6000 patients 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Between 6000 and 8300 patients 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39
8300 patients and above 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33
QOF: PP01 achievement . . 80.67 82.61
Number of individuals included in the sample 7683 9213 9005 9377
Source: Own calculations based on the Attribution Data Set GP-Registered Population.
Notes: Prevalences and list size (number of patients) information is derived from QOF data. PP01 is a clinical indicator of the
QOF on primary prevention of CVDs.
3.8 Results
3.8.1 Parameters and Fit
The main goal of the model is to be able to forecast lifetime choices and states for
English population aged 53 and over at a given moment. As a result, a first im-
pression of such ability is how it fits the actual progression of observed data. The
next set of figures present the data profiles both from ELSA and from a dataset
simulated using the model. Such simulations are based on the estimated coeffi-
cients presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
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Table 3.4: Parameters from the Structural Model I: Utility and Income Process
Male Female
Parameter Value SE Value SE
Utility
β Discount factor (Cal) 0.9604 0.9604
No Education (ED=1)
η Importance of consumption in utility 0.5018 0.0049 0.4307 0.0012
γ Relative risk aversion 3.9561 0.1656 3.2435 0.0148
θp Unflexibility penalty for FT work -3.1488 0.2074 1.3808 0.2554
φ1 Disutility of bad health while working 7.7135 1.2082 6.2889 1.1380
φ2 Additional disutility of bad health while PT -1.5579 0.5250 -3.1569 0.9432
At least high school (ED=2,3)
η Importance of consumption in utility 0.5491 0.0033 0.5951 0.0003
γ Relative risk aversion 3.4819 0.1765 3.9129 0.1569
θp Unflexibility penalty for FT work (ED=2) -3.6253 0.1298 -0.3484 0.0944
θp Unflexibility penalty for FT work (ED=3) -3.9688 0.1110 -2.0189 0.1593
φ1 Disutility of bad health while working 7.5768 0.5876 7.5214 1.0271
φ2 Additional disutility of bad health while PT -2.4389 0.1949 -4.6596 0.9254
All levels of education
φ3 Asset one-off cost of CVD event -54.0091 6.6823 -35.0947 3.4689
θB Bequest importance 0.6926 0.0388 0.4646 0.0237
θK Base for not leaving bequest penalty (Cal) 30.0000 30.0000
Earnings per hour
σu Variance innovations 0.5804 0.0158 0.5349 0.0102
ρ Persistence innovations 0.5507 0.0216 0.3897 0.0222
ιL1 EDUC 0.8778 0.0476 0.9161 0.0361
ιL2 To be in State 3 -0.1125 0.0269 -0.5587 0.0804
ιL3 Mean 1.1904 0.0345 1.0199 0.0272
Non-labour Income
ι1 Constant 2.1653 0.0189 2.5744 0.0033
ι2 EDUC 0.3302 0.0236 0.2536 0.0210
ι3 Age ≥ SPA 0.5931 0.0245 0.1323 0.0161
ι4 Age ≥ SPA * EDUC -0.4526 0.1549 -0.8998 0.1940
ι5 (Age<SPA) * (Age-50) 0.2136 0.0161 0.0890 0.0153
ι6 Hours of work -0.4307 0.0242 -0.2076 0.0181
ι7 Hours of work * EDUC 0.4988 0.0393 0.2034 0.0284
ι8 Hours of work * Age ≥ SPA 0.0437 0.0125 0.1690 0.0163
ι9 Hours of work * Age ≥ SPA * EDUC 0.0563 0.0188 0.0228 0.0122
ι10 Age ≥ SPA * YL * Not work 0.1011 0.0078 0.1961 0.0036
ι11 Age ≥ SPA * YL * Part-time 0.0653 0.0041 0.1017 0.0022
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Table 3.5: Parameters from the Structural Model II: Health Process
Parameter Value SE
CVD-risk index
σe Variance innovations 0.4242 0.0008
ω1 Persistence 0.7234 0.0005
ω2 Constant 0.0232 0.0011
ω3 EDUC -0.0296 0.0015
ω4 Health investment effect (Cal) -0.3900
ω5,2 To be in State 2 0.1315 0.0029
ω5,3 To be in State 3 -0.2107 0.0034
ω6 Female 0.0371 0.0005
Prescription Model
ζ1 Constant -2.8955 0.0476
ζ2 H 0.0943 0.0143
ζ3 H2 2.0189 0.0741
ζ4 EDUC 1.1630 0.0350
ζ5 To be in State 3 1.6119 0.0339
ζ6 Female -0.0558 0.0100
ζ7 Wave 6 0.4128 0.0489
ζ8 Small list area 0.5984 0.0310
ζ9 Small list area after 2009 0.5825 0.0456
XB2: latent evolution of transition into State 2 (CVD risk)
τ21 Age 0.0000 0.0019
τ22 Age Sqd/100 0.0000 0.0016
τ23 CVD-risk index H 0.7994 0.0109
τ24 Constant -3.4827 0.0748
τ25 EDUC -0.0054 0.0031
τ26 Female 0.0059 0.0058
XB3: latent evolution of transition State 1 into 3 (CVD event)
τ311 State 1: Age -0.3103 0.0004
τ312 State 1: Age Sqd/100 0.2747 0.0017
τ313 State 1: CVD-risk index H 0.2807 0.0151
τ314 State 1: Constant 3.5065 0.0866
τ315 State 1: EDUC 0.9040 0.0516
τ316 State 1: Female 0.1802 0.0248
XB3: latent evolution of transition State 2 into 3 (CVD event)
τ321 State 2: Age 0.0000 0.0022
τ322 State 2: Age Sqd/100 0.0000 0.0018
τ323 State 2: CVD-risk index H 0.3239 0.0093
τ324 State 2: Constant -3.5000 0.0867
τ325 State 2: EDUC -0.1784 0.0198
τ326 State 2: Female -0.6525 0.0164
XB4: latent evolution of transition State 1 into 4 (death)
τ411 State 1: Age -0.3103 0.0004
τ412 State 1: Age Sqd/100 0.2747 0.0015
τ413 State 1: CVD-risk index H 0.0009 0.0022
τ414 State 1: Constant 4.6067 0.0632
τ415 State 1: EDUC -0.0621 0.0096
τ416 State 1: Female -0.7480 0.0437
XB4: latent evolution of transition State 2 into 4 (death)
τ421 State 2: Age -0.2929 0.0004
τ422 State 2: Age Sqd/100 0.2683 0.0010
τ423 State 2: CVD-risk index H 0.7348 0.0094
τ424 State 2: Constant 4.1552 0.0391
τ425 State 2: EDUC -1.0362 0.0234
τ426 State 2: Female -0.8065 0.0129
XB4: latent evolution of transition State 3 into 4 (death)
τ431 State 3: Age -0.2974 0.0020
τ432 State 3: Age Sqd/100 0.2657 0.0027
τ433 State 3: CVD-risk index H 0.7410 0.0258
τ434 State 3: Constant 4.3937 0.0462
τ435 State 3: EDUC -0.0079 0.0029
τ436 State 3: Female -0.6562 0.0215
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Figure 3.11 presents the proportion of individuals per health state by gender.
The continuous line presents the proportion per age derived from ELSA while the
dashed one comes from the simulations. The other main components of the health
model are presented in Figure 3.12, where Panel A presents the average CVD-risk
index progression while Panel B the proportion of individuals under statins. In
general terms, the model fits adequately such profiles.
Figure 3.11: Observed and Simulated Health States progression
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Notes: Own calculations based on IFS derived variables on ELSA waves 1 to 6. Ad-
justed for Birth cohort, family size and regional unemployment.
Assets are presented in Figure 3.13, labour supply in Figure 3.14 and income
in 3.15. As a whole, the model captures the general trends of the data. Labour
participation is reduced after the onset of a CVD principally due to the extra
cost of labour (parameters φ1, φ2), the reduced payoff per hour (parameter ι3).
Such behaviour is reflected in a reduction on assets, which is exacerbated by an
onset shock on expenditures (parameter φ3). A clear limitation is the inability of
the model to accurately forecast selection into work according to potential labour
income. In this case, despite of the wage penalty, labour income of those who
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decide to participate is higher than those who have not suffered such events. This
is evident in Panel A of Figure 3.15 for females.
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Figure 3.12: Observed and Simulated Health Model Profiles by Health State
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(b) Under Statins Treatment
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Notes: Own calculations based on IFS derived variables on ELSA waves 1 to 6. Ad-
justed for Birth cohort, family size and regional unemployment.
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Figure 3.13: Observed and Simulated Assets Profiles by Health State
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Notes: Own calculations based on IFS derived variables on ELSA waves 1 to 6. Ad-
justed for Birth cohort, family size and regional unemployment.
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Figure 3.14: Observed and Simulated Labour Supply Profiles by Health State
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Figure 3.15: Observed and Simulated Income Profiles by Health State
(a) Wage per hour
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(b) Yearly non-labour, non-financial income
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Notes: Own calculations based on IFS derived variables on ELSA waves 1 to 6. Ad-
justed for Birth cohort, family size and regional unemployment.
3.8. Results 103
3.8.2 The Value of Statins
Table 3.6 presents the main elements for an economic evaluation of a lifetime
treatment with statins for primary prevention of CVD for age 53 onwards. In other
words, here we are comparing the observed state of the world, where someone at
risk of developing CVDs (S = 2) obtains a statins prescription with a probability
given by Equation 3.6, against the counterfactual where statins are only available
for those who already have been diagnosed with a CVD (S = 3).
In first place, panel A presents the value of the drug taking into account
individuals’ utility. In this case, they compare their expected utilities under the
current state of the world, against an scenario where preventive care medication
is not available but that includes a monetary compensation. The amount of such
compensation require to make both expected utilities the same is the willingness-
to-pay. It is on average £5300. By aggregating such amounts36 we are able to
obtain the value of the drug if give an equal weight to all individuals: £79 billion
2005 pounds.
As expected, there is substantial heterogeneity on the required compensa-
tion. Figure 3.16.A presents its distribution according to the current health state
of individuals. Figure 3.16.B shows that valuation is heterogeneous along many
dimensions apart from gender. It shows the value of the intervention across age
for a selected set of characteristics, leaving all the other state variables constant.
It does depend on CVD-risk and health status, but also on the main drives of
financial gains: income (education level in the graph) and assets. A remarkable
result to discuss is that while the gains are monotone on CVD-risk index, that is
not the case for assets. The reason for this is the existence of a bequest motive that
depends only on such variable.
36ELSA sample is weighted according to age and gender in order to obtain a figure that is repre-
sentative of England’s population aged 53 and older by 2004. Notice that this procedure implies an
utilitarian welfare function.
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Figure 3.16: Heterogeneity on the compensating variation for primary prevention of CVDs
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The estimated value can be compared with a QALY based equivalent. Panel B
of the table present the total amount of QALYs gained if we simulate the lives of all
individuals considered in Panel A until their death, weighting their contribution
in order to be representative on England’s population in 2004. In total, nearly 3.1
million QALYs would be obtained through all the remaining years of life if we
compare the current progression of health with a counterfactual without access to
primary prevention statins. Shiroiwa et al. (2010) estimate the willingness-to-pay
per QALY in the UK on £23.000, which is between the cost-efficiency threshold
used by the NHS as a reference for the value of each QALY (£20 to £30 thousand).
The total value of the drug would be between Â£61 to Â£92 billion. Hence, the
compensating variation estimate would be nearly 12% higher with respect to the
£23 thousand value per QALY.
Nevertheless, the most common economic evaluation approach for health is
the cost-effectiveness analysis, presented in panel C. Details on how QALYs and
costs are computed is presented in Appendix 3.C, following Ward et al. (2007) who
did a systematic review of the cost-effectiveness of statins for primary prevention
of CVDs using UK data. In terms of life years gained (LYG) and QALYs gained,
estimates are smaller than to those presented by Ward et al. (2007). Undiscounted
estimate for ICER with 50% non-compliance37 is of £4641 while it is around £10.000
in Ward et al. (2007) for people of such age and with a compliance rate of 65% after
2 years and of 50% after 4 years. The ICER is normally interpreted as the amount
of money required to obtain 1 QALY. If compared with NICE threshold of £20.000,
this is a cost-effective treatment.
37Non-compliance refers to those individuals who are prescribed but do not take the drug. Here I
assume that for each person prescribed and who takes the drug, there is another who does not take
it. Effectively, this doubles de costs of prescription per patient. Discounting under usual rates from
medical literature has little impact on the estimates, for this reason is not presented.
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Table 3.6: The Value of Statins for Primary Prevention of CVD at age 53
Male Female Both
Panel A: Compensating variation by 2004/05 (Wave 2)
Required compensation (thousand £) (mean) 5.7 5 5.3
Required compensation (million £) (sum) 38965 40407 79372
Panel B: Total gains:
Total gained QALYs (millions) 1.1 2 3.1
Value if each QALY is worth £20.000 (million £) 21729 40019 61748
Shiroiwa et al. (2009): WTP of £23.000 QALY (million £) 24988 46022 71010
Value if each QALY is worth £30.000 (million £) 32593 60029 92622
Panel C: Cost-Effectiveness:
Undiscounted ICERs:
1 Life Year Gained 1890 1312 1508
1 Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) Gained 2699 1900 2172
Undiscounted ICERs with 50% non-compliance:
1 Life Year Gained 3865 2893 3221
1 Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) Gained 5518 4187 4641
Notes: Own calculations. Panel B is based on 41028 simulated individuals. The initial sample replicates ELSA wave 2 age-gender
distribution.
In order to calculate the number of QALYs gained, it was only required to
use the health component of the model. In this respect, the only difference with
traditional analysis is the inclusion of the prescription equation. However, we can
take advantage of the economic side of the model to add value to this exercise. The
ICER definition in Equation 3.16 allows to approximate the cost-per-QALY gained,
hence the same exercise can be used for any other variable, in particular labour
supply variables. Table 3.7 presents such exercise. According to it, with every
1000 QALYs gained, approximately 1.8 individuals who would participate in the
labour market one year in the observed state of the world, would not do so in a
world without statins for primary prevention. The mean reason for this is that risk
averse individuals might reduce their labour intensity if there is a less risky future
ahead. An additional effect is that some individuals shift their labour supply in
the intensive market as well: the treatment implies that some individuals decide
to change their decision of participate part or full time. The last consideration
is the productivity effect of statins. As part of the model estimation, CVDs were
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found to impose a penalty of 30% on wage per hour. The table shows that with
the treatment it is possible to avoid the burden of such penalty and increase wage-
per-hour in £.3 per QALY gained. This result is enough for offsetting reduced
part-time participation for men.
The result is that £1972 per year will be produced for men and of £17 for
women. Population-wise, the net effect is an increase of £684 . Thus, if it costs
£4641 to produce 1 QALY, it will come with £684 which is a potential source of
income for the health system.
Table 3.7: Labour market implications of primary prevention
Male Female Both
Undiscounted effect on labour supply per 1 QALY gained
Persons working per year .089 -.049 -.0023
Persons working FT per year -.022 -.065 -.05
Persons working PT per year .11 .016 .048
Working Hours per week 1.3 -2.3 -1.1
£ from yearly labour-income 1972 17 684
Notes: Own calculations. Panel B is based on 41028 simulated individuals. The initial sample replicates ELSA wave 2 age-gender
distribution.
3.8.2.1 Bequest motive and the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL)
A final element for discussion is the interpretation of previous results as a
willingness-to-pay estimate. As discussed before, in this model difference between
life and death is based on the bequest motive. This is a central difference with re-
spect to value-of-life literature that traditionally calibrates this difference using
occupation-based estimates of the value of a statistical life. Table 3.8 presents an
equivalent exercise for the simulated dataset in 2004/05: which is the maximum
amount of money that an individual would give up in order to attain a reduction
of 1/1000 on the odds of death for the rest of his life? The average is around £1050,
or £1582 for individuals younger than 60. This implies a VSL of £1.05 million, or
£1.582 million for those aged 60 or younger.38 Such figure is similar to the average
value of preventing a casualty in 2004 estimated by the Department for Transport
in the UK, £1.4 million (DfT, 2005). However, is below VSL estimates for the UK
38Willingness-to-pay for risk reductions is not linear, this is just a standard normalization of the
estimates in the VSL literature.
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derived from risk-compensating premium in wages. Following Viscusi and Aldy
(2003), the implicit VSL from Sandy et al. (2001) is of £7.65 to £99.6 in 2005 prices.39
Thus, this paper presents a lower bound of the willingness-to-pay measure that
would be obtained under such literature.
Table 3.8: The Value of a Statistical Life (VSL)
Male Female Both
Required compensation (million £) 1.193 .9339 1.05
Required compensation (million £), age ≤ 60 1.875 1.337 1.582
Notes: Own calculations. Based on a counterfactual reduction of 1/1000 on the odds of death for the remaining life for a
simulated sample of individuals that replicates ELSA Wave 2 age-gender composition.
While the model design implies a VSL, it is still possible to use (Hall and
Jones, 2007) strategy and introduce a constant to Equation 3.7, which plainly
would represent the difference on utility between of life and death in any given
period. This one can be calibrated it in order to match a particular VSL value.
Figure 3.17 presents the resulting average value of statins under different implied
VSL. The point on the lower left is the present estimate. It shows that the value of
the treatment greatly depends on such figure, and after a £10 million figure, the
relationship is almost linear.
39$5.7 - $74.1 millions, 2000 USD. Translated into 2000 £using an exchange rate of 1.51 £/USD.
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Figure 3.17: Simulated Labour Supply under SPA=60 and SPA=65
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3.8.3 Retirement age and the value of preventive care
One of the central implications of the model presented in this paper is that the
value of a medical innovation depends on the institutional arrangement of a soci-
ety. Specifically, the model considers the role of social protection when considering
non-labour income as a function of retirement age in Equation 3.12. As discussed
when the equation was introduced, there are two retirement regimes for women
in the model. This is because the 1995 Pensions Act implied a radical increase on
retirement age for women during our study period, from age 60 to age 65 depend-
ing on the date of birth. A natural question is that given everything else equal,
women from these two generations value differently the introduction of statins for
primary prevention.
In other to answer this question, the value of statins is computed for women
considering both retirement regimes separately. For this, a counterfactual scenario
is constructed: all simulated women in wave 2 are switched to the new 65-years-
old standard pension age.40 Figure 3.18 presents the simulated age profiles for
40All women aged 52 and over at wave 2 would be eligible for the former retirement regime
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labour market participation under both scenarios. It shows that the model predicts
an increase on full-time labour supply participation after the age of 60 due to this
retirement-age reform. In total, there is an increase of 59.26% in participation in
the labour market between ages 60 and 65 .
Table 3.9 presents the calculated value of statins in both scenarios. The first
column shows results under the regime applicable to women in wave 2, and the
second the counter-factual scenario. First, willingness-to-pay is slightly higher
in the 60-years-old SPA regime than in the new alternative, but there are extra
gains of 22 times of the income produced when obtaining 1 extra QALY with the
medication.
Figure 3.18: Simulated Labour Supply under SPA=60 and SPA=65
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Table 3.9: The Value of Statins and Retirement Age
Female SPA=60 Female SPA=65
Panel A: Compensating variation by 2004/06 (Wave 2)
Required compensation (million £) 40407 39918
Panel B: Undiscounted effect on labour supply per 1 QALY gained
1 person working per year -.049 -.0055
1 person working FT per year -.065 -.06
1 person working PT per year .016 .054
1 Working Hour per week -2.3 -1.3
£ of yearly labour-income 17 399
Notes: Own calculations based on 22720 simulated individuals that replicates ELSA Wave 2 age-gender composition.
3.8.4 Counterfactual technology scenarios
Our analysis above depends crucially on the evolution of CVD-risk index and
medication prescription when individuals are at-risk of developing CVDs (S=2).
With the model we can analyse how the compensating variation would change if
we modify the two basic pieces of this process: how effective is the drug and how
likely is that one gets a prescription. These two channels allow for an improvement
on health of the population from different perspectives. The first one is a pure
medical innovation result, while the second can be attained under government
policies.
With the model we can consider alternative values for the effect of statins in
the CVD-risk index. Figure 3.19.A presents the average required compensation
for not having access to the drug (vertical axis) according to its effect on reducing
cholesterol (horizontal axis). The vertical line corresponds to the value ω4 (Equa-
tion 3.5 calibrated from RCTs discussed in section 3.7.1.2, and the corresponding
average compensation is the value presented in Table 3.6 for both men and women.
It shows that the value is increasing on the effect of the drug (a more negative ω4),
as expected. If there is a drug that doubles current statins efficiency, its value will
be 69% larger than the estimated one for statins. This calculation involves both the
drug effect on people at-risk of CVD and those who already survived at least one
of such events. The diminishing returns are produced by the functional forms of
the latent indexes presented in equation 3.2. As the risk-index H enters exponen-
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tially on the transition probabilities, it implies that a reduction when the index is
high is much more important for cutting the odds of bad health events that when
the index is low.
Figure 3.19.B considers the value under different values of the parameter ζ1
from Equation 3.6. This parameter governs the probability to get a prescription for
statins when regardless of CVD-risk and gender, thus the horizontal axis considers
the derived average probability rather than the value of the coefficient. In order to
consider only the primary-prevention extent, parameter ζ3 is adjusted in order to
keep the probability of prescription constant for those who already suffered a CVD
event. A striking result is that increasing the probability to access a prescription
might increase the value of the drug notoriously. For instance, the model predict
that the value of a coverage of nearly 80% for those at-risk of CVD events would
be higher than a potential drug that is more than twice as effective in reducing the
CVD-risk index. This is a suggestive result, because the model does not considers
differently those individuals who are at-risk but should not take statins.41 More
informative is to consider an impact on prescription probability similar to the
increase obtained in the quality and outcomes framework for individuals living in
small relative to large GP practices. A 3 pp. increase on the odds of prescription
is obtained (see Appendix 3.F). And additional advantage is that the model is
estimated taking into account his exogenous variation. Then, an increase of 3 pp.
on the probability to be treated results on an increase on the value of the treatment
of 24.6%. This implies that at such point there is an elasticity of the value with
respect to the prescription probability of 0.59.
41Because they interact with other medication increasing the risk of
adverse effects. See https://www.gov.uk/drug-safety-update/
statins-interactions-and-updated-advice-for-atorvastatin.
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Figure 3.19: Counterfactual technology scenarios
A. Value as a function of the effect of statins on CVD-risk
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Note: Based on 42610 simulations which replicate ELSA wave 2 age-gender structure.
Counterfactual value of the drug was computed by modifying the value of parameter ω4 (Equation
3.5). The vertical line corresponds to the estimated value of the parameter calibrated as discussed
in section 3.7.1.2.
B. Value as a function of the average probability of prescription in (S=2)
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3.9 Conclusion
This paper introduced a framework for assessing the economic benefit derived
from the adoption of a health-care technology. It introduces a life-cycle model for
savings and labour supply decisions into a Markov health progression model.
It is found that statins therapy for primary prevention, a drug for reducing
the odds of CVD onset, had a pure economic value of £79 billion by 2005. This
figure is 12% higher than the value that would be obtained if in the calculation of
benefits we only to consider a rate of £23.000 per QALY gained, which represents
the willingness-to-pay per QALY in the literature.
As is widely accepted in the clinical literature, primary prevention is cost-
effective in comparison with NICE standards. In terms of the drug, it costs £4641
to gain one QALY (undiscounted, 50% non-compliance), but by doing so, it in-
creases labour-income by £684 per year. Such additional gains depend on the
trade-off between the direct avoidance of CVD events and a reduction in the pre-
cautionary motive for asset accumulation. This is reflected in the sharp differences
by gender; the labour income gains of using statins for primary prevention are
£1972 per year for men and £17 for women. The role of a recent retirement age
increase for women was also considered, and almost no difference was found in
the value of the drug.
A relevant question is the relevance of the economic benefit of a health in-
tervention when considering its adoption. In particular, labour income gains will
also be reflected in extra taxable income, which should be deduced from the cost
figures. Let us consider a back-of-the-envelope calculation assuming that the total
net of tax £684 comes from a pure increase in taxable income. For an individual
subject to deductions of 25%, assuming than half of those resources are directed
to the health service, the total gains for the health system would be of £327.
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3.A Data profiles and cohort effects
3.A.1 Adjustment procedure
First, Equation 3.19 is estimated from the data, where Y corresponds to the rele-
vant variable to be adjusted, for individual i at period t living in region r. Second,
the predicted effects of unemployment, family size and cohort are removed from
the data, while keeping the predicted values from the age-health status interac-
tions. Third, the predicted effect of an unemployment rate of 5, a family size of
2 and of cohort 1946 are added to all observations. Notice that cohort effects are
allowed to be different from age 70 onwards. The reason for this is to avoid high
levels of participation on the labour market after SPA.42
Yitr =
3
∑
s=1
80
∑
k=50
dksitr × (ageit = k)× (Sit = s)
+
F
∑
f=1
d fitr × ( f amsize = f )itr +ΠU ×Utr
+
C
∑
c=1
dC1itr × (cohorti = c)× (age < 70) +
C
∑
c=1
dC2itr × (cohorti = c)× (age ≥ 70) + uitr
(3.19)
Figure 3.20 illustrates how profiles are affected by this procedure. The graphs
on the left show that it induces a notorious divergence on labour participation
after SPA. This is driven by the difference between cohorts presented on the right
graph: younger generations are more likely to be working. Also, notice that the
adjusted profile is a normalization with respect to a given cohort at a specific
time. Thus, if we consider a young cohort as the base, the procedure implies a big
difference at old ages. I have consider this cohort as the benefits of a reduction of
CVD-risk is aimed towards individuals below the SPA.
42Younger cohorts are observed to work more as their are observed before SPA, which implies
an upward correction on those cohorts which having retired for most of the observed time. In
practice, without the differential cohort effect by age, nearly 20% of individuals aged 80 and over
are suggested to be working while the observed figure is almost 0%. This is attenuated with this
strategy, as shown in Figure 3.20.
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Figure 3.20: Observed Income Profiles by Health State
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Notes: ELSA data profiles for individuals aged 50 to 80. Cohort, unemployment and
family size effects were removed in the ‘adjusted’ series.
The most affected variable is assets. Figure 3.21 shows how a hump-shape
average is generated if no correction is applied to the data. However, if we group
data by birth cohort, an increasing pattern is observed. Hence, the correction has
a strong implication on the profile. One the reasons behind is the strong cohort
effects on housing ownership in the UK, described by Banks et al. (2012): older
cohorts are notoriously less likely to own their dwelling with respect to younger
ones due to a Government policy that allowed individuals to buy the council house
that they were renting. However, as discussed in Appendix 3.A.2, the pattern is
also present in non-housing assets. This is central as the value of assets late on life
identify the bequest motive with is the main driver of the statistical value of life
in the drug value calculations. If individuals rapidly de-accumulate at the end of
life, it means that the bequest motive should be small.
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Figure 3.21: Assets by Birth Cohort
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Notes: ELSA data profiles for individuals aged 50 to 80. Cohort, unemployment and
family size effects were removed in the ‘adjusted’ series.
3.A.2 Assets
Assets include all liquid and non-liquid financial positions reported by the house-
hold excluding pension wealth. The main reason for this is that its returns are
already included in the non-labour income equation (Eq. 3.12). Also, before 2015
it was not possible to borrow against pension-wealth before age 55 without paying
a tax of 55%. After it, individuals can get up to 25% tax-free. In this model, as
pension release is not the main focus of the analysis, it is assumed that individuals
cannot access to their pension pot at all.
An important element of interest in housing. One of the potential reasons
for the increasing pattern of assets with respect to age could be house prices.
If housing wealth increased notoriously during all the decade for all cohorts, I
might be confounding the savings pattern with the commercial hike on prices.
Figure 3.22 presents assets measures both with and without housing, before and
after adjusting them from cohort and other variables effects. In both cases the
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hump-shape of assets is transformed into an age-growing trend, meaning that
both housing and non-housing assets are corrected.
Figure 3.22: Assets Correction
(a) Including housing
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(b) Excluding housing
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Notes: ELSA data profiles for individuals aged 50 to 80. Cohort, unemployment and
family size effects were removed in the ‘adjusted’ series.
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3.A.3 Non-Labour Income
Non-labour income is the total non-financial household income minus employ-
ment and self-employment earnings of the respondent. Total household income in
ELSA includes employment, self-employment, benefits, state pension, annuities or
private pension, assets income and others. Asset income is not included as asset’s
law of motion equation (Eq. 3.9) captures capital gains directly, and not as a part
of the non-labour income equation (Eq . 3.12). In ELSA, asset income includes:
interest from savings, TESSA, ISA or National Savings; income from Bonds, PEPs,
Shares, Trusts, Bonds and Gilts. Also, it considers gains from renting property, or
returns from businesses and farms.
The non-labour income process of this article makes several assumptions on
its functional form. This reduce-form equation roughly summarizes the benefits
and retirement system in place.43 This appendix explains some of them in detail.
1. To be working has different returns before and after SPA: ELSA data shows that in
aggregate terms, retirement age drastically change the profile of labour and
non-labour income. Part of this can be backed-up with the design of benefits
system: state pension replace other type of benefits as job-seeking allowance
or income support. Also, the fact that couples retire together also explains
why after SPA there is no difference on non-labour income.
2. EDUC variable only affects the mean of both working and non-working profiles:
While potentially many aspects of non-labour income might differ accord-
ing to past economic background, evidence shows that profiles are almost
parallel for different levels of EDUC.
3. Health states do not influence the profiles: This is probably the most surprising
element of this model, however it is a result of the data. As can be seen in
the figure, there is almost no difference on the profiles across health states.
Although not presented, similar results are found for separate working and
not-working profiles.
43See Bozio et al. (2010) for a detailed exposition of the main characteristics and changes of the
system.
120 Chapter 3. On the economic value of preventive care
3.B Matching GP practices and ELSA respondents
Figure 3.23 presents an example for a postcode in London (NatCen office). The
first 8 practices are within 1 Km of the postcode while 9th and 10th are around
1180 meters from it. As a result, while the weight for the first eight is 18+2/1.18 , for
the last two are 1/1.188+2/1.18 .
Figure 3.23: ELSA and QOF linkage example
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The goal of this procedure was to stablish a link between ELSA respondents
and nearby GP practices. This is possible as for waves where there is a nurse visit,
ELSA has a record of the postcode of residence of the respondent. For other waves,
the last available residence postcode was assumed. Under this criteria for 97% of
the respondents (present in any ELSA wave) there is a valid postcode. For the
case of GP practices, their postcode is publicly available in the directory epraccur,
published by the HSCIC. As a result, it is possible to calculate the distance between
a given postcode centroid and all its nearby practices’ postcode centroids. Such
calculations were made using the geodist routine (Picard et al., 2012) for STATA
13. This procedure was carried out in NatCen’s secure data enclave in order to
protect confidentiality of ELSA respondents. Finally, it was possible to provide a
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measure for 87% of the respondents.
Table 3.10 tells us that the example in the data description is far from the
usual case as expected given that it is based in central London. In general within
1 Km there is only 1 or 2 GP practices, a number that can go up to 19 in densely
populated areas. Moreover, Table 3.11 shows that the mean distance to the closest
practices is around 700 to 1200 meters, but it can go up and beyond the 15Km
boundary in some rural areas. The most common distance to the furthest practice
is beyond 3.7 Kms, if available. This can be. Back in Table 3.10, we can see that
the average scenario is that the 10 closest practices are located within 3 Km. This
is also reflected in Figure 3.24, which is a graphical version of Table 3.11.
Figure 3.24: Distance to the nearest GP practice
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The selected weighting of practices’ information is based on the previous de-
scriptive information. The goal is to give more importance to the nearest practice
but still considering the possibility of choice when it is available. Figure 3.25
presents the density of the 10 closest practices and the weight according to dis-
tance. By setting it fix to 1 Km, I am assuming that individuals will have a similar
preferences for the average two practices that are quite close to their home, but
will still consider those nearby. On the other hand, in rural areas, a considerable
more weight will be given to a practice in 5 Kms rather than 10 Kms.
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Given that all the elements (maximum distance, number of practices and
weights) are arbitrary, I considered several alternative. Figure 3.25 shows how
the weighted average list size measure varies under the different elements. While
there are differences, in general all of them are highly correlated.
Figure 3.25: Weights allocation
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Table 3.10: Number of GP Practices Given a Distance Buffer
Practices
within
Mean Median Max
1 Km 1.735 1 19
2 Km 5.264 3 50
3 Km 10.228 6 98
4 Km 16.468 9 151
5 Km 23.954 13 207
Source: own calculations based on ELSA respondents’
postcode and epraccur GP practices’ postcode.
3.B. Matching GP practices and ELSA respondents 123
Figure 3.26: Alternative criteria
Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics of the Distance to the 10 Nearest GP Practices
Practice
Number
Number
Available
within 15
Km
Mean
Distance
Percent 25
Distance
Percent 50
Distance
Percent 75
Distance
Minimum
Distance
Maximum
Distance
Closest 8878 1.171 0.408 0.714 1.269 0 14.886
2 8865 2.035 0.744 1.244 2.404 0 13.502
3 8823 2.680 1.027 1.686 3.475 0 14.916
4 8779 3.228 1.278 2.124 4.355 0.086 15.020
5 8706 3.610 1.484 2.446 4.934 0.143 15.878
6 8574 3.927 1.686 2.790 5.467 0.143 15.690
7 8467 4.233 1.869 3.118 5.892 0.143 15.833
8 8318 4.433 1.999 3.339 6.104 0.143 15.874
9 8178 4.597 2.149 3.526 6.358 0.143 15.963
10 8051 4.764 2.282 3.750 6.579 0.143 15.802
Source: own calculations based on ELSA respondents’ postcode and epraccur GP practices’ postcode.
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3.C Cost-effectiveness details
Ward et al. (2007) summarised the main models for statins in the literature and
developed a Markov model for the NHS framework, the ScHARR model. In order
to provide a comparison as close as possible, I will follow their costs and benefits
calculations. In their model, individuals are heterogeneous on their initial CHD-
risk (CVD without stroke or TIA) and gender. Every year patients can transit into
several CVD events or death, until they reach age 100. Age-dependent transition
probabilities between those states are derived from the Health Survey of England,
which is the same base population as this study. It is assumed that health-care or
life-style advice do not differ between treatment and control scenarios. Also, that
side-effects or the odds of adverse events associated to the medication are negli-
gible. Both assumptions are also in place in the model presented in the previous
sections.
With respect to the health-state utilities U,44 baseline levels were estimated
based on the EQ-5D questionnaire and CVD-states taken from the literature. Given
that Ward et al. (2007) considers several CVD illness separately while this model
only have one CVD event state, an adjustment is required in order to obtain costs
and associated utilities. I will get a single number by weighting according to the
their figures on the distribution of primary events. Given these considerations,
Equations 3.20 and 3.21 show how utility values and costs are assigned in the
model in order to estimate the cost of gaining one QALY. One drawback is that the
present model does not distinguish deaths from CVDs or other causes, as a result
it is imposed that only deaths of previous CVD-survivors are linked to a different
cost. This is likely to underestimate the true cost reduction of the intervention.
A final cost to consider is the value of statins treatment. At 2005 prices, Ward
et al. (2007) costs of prescriptions are £281 per year, £127.5 for monitoring the first
year and £33.42 for the subsequent ones. Their estimates are based on the mix of
statin molecules used in the NHS by 2003, and of the usual tests required by guide-
lines at that point. These figures do overestimate the cost of the treatment as the
mix of molecules and the intensity of generics prescriptions changed notoriously
44These utilities are different to the output of the utility function presented in the model as they
are not designed to represent economic choices but quality of health. See footnote 20 for more
details.
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during the past decade. Nevertheless, these figures are going to be preserved in
the present analysis in order to make both models comparable.
For this exercise, for both scenarios, with and without statins for primary
prevention, a group of individuals is simulated without attrition under the con-
ditions of ELSA wave 2 from age 50 until their death or until they are 100 years
old. Initial conditions and shocks are the same in both groups, the sole difference
is the governing prescription process. Given these datasets, utilities and costs are
aggregated in each scenario. The resulting figures provide the values required for
Equation 3.16 in the two-years cycle. Notice that apart from utilities, which give
the QALY estimates, we can aggregate pure life years (LY), or any other outcome
as number of working hours of labour-income.
Ut = 2 · (1.060− 0.004 · aget) · $t · (St 6= 4) (3.20)
$ =
 1 if St ∈ {1,2}0.77 if St = 3
costt =

6980 if St = 3 & St−1 ∈ {1,2}
1400 if St = 3 & St−1 = 3
4000 if St = 4 & St−1 = 3
(3.21)
One clear limitation of ELSA data is that prescriptions are patient reports,
hence we do not know if those who are not reporting it were prescribed with
it. Also, we cannot infer the actual compliance of those who report to be taking
the drug, as discussed in section 3.3.1.3. In order to understand its effect on the
estimates, I will consider an scenario with a 50% non-compliance rate, the most
extreme case presented in Ward et al. (2007), which effectively means than the cost
of prescription is doubled.
Ward et al. (2007) performed a systematic literature review on costs and utili-
ties for major CVD events, with emphasis on studies which are based on UK data.
Their estimates are presented in Table 3.12. However, a major difference with this
study is that separate states are defined based on the primary CVD event suffered
by the patients. Hence, it is necessary to collapse their figures into a single number
per state in order to use the same costs and utilities. This is done by weighting
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each state according to the proportion of individuals who suffered it as primary
event. Table 3.13 present such results by gender and age. Given these numbers, an
utility factor of 0.77, a cost of £3490 for the first year and £700 for the subsequent
ones are assumed. Deaths of CVD survivors will be given a cost of £2000.
Table 3.12: Ward et al. (2007) utilities and costs per health-state
Health States
Stable angina Unestable
angina
MI TIA Stroke
Panel A: Utilities for Health
Utility factor 0.808 0.77 0.76 1 0.629
Panel B: Costs
First year 175.8 452.3 4572.5 1093.8 8271.3
Subsequent years 175.8 175.8 175.8 271.4 2223.6
Fatal event 1198.6 7238.1
Notes: Based on Table 55 (2005 prices) and Table 61 of Ward et al. (2007).
Table 3.13: Ward et al. (2007) utilities and costs per age
I. Distribution of primary events for non-
fatal post-CVD events
II. CVD-state utility and costs
Gender Age
Stable
angina
Unestable
angina
MI TIA Stroke
Utility
factor
First
year
Subseq.
years
Fatal
event
Males 45 28.7 10 37.4 7.2 16.6 0.7696 3257.6 522.4 1321.4
55 37.2 8 36.2 4.3 14.2 0.7696 2978.4 470.5 1123.7
65 31.2 12 32.1 7.5 17.2 0.7716 3081.6 535.2 1388.8
75 29 12.4 30.5 4.8 23.3 0.7562 3481.4 657.5 1835.1
Average 0.7716 3481.4 657.5 1835.1
Females 45 34.1 11.9 26.3 4.6 23 0.7577 3269.1 651.0 1807.4
55 41.1 8.9 21.8 8.2 20 0.7741 2853.3 593.2 1554.3
65 33.4 12.9 25.7 4.7 23.4 0.7587 3279.1 659.6 1848.4
75 34.3 14.6 18.7 6.9 25.4 0.7605 3157.8 702.3 2013.5
Average 0.7741 3279.1 702.3 2013.5
Notes: Panel I is based on Table 51 of Ward et al. (2007), and Panel II are derived using utilities and costs presented in Table
3.12. Each figure from such table is multiplied by the weights provided in Panel I for each age and gender. Costs are in 2005
constant prices.
3.D Model Solution and Estimation details
3.D.1 Detailed solution
Calculating the expectation in Equation 3.14 in each period below T + 1 involves
solving several integrals as shown in Equation 3.22, a problem that is solved by
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both numerical and analytic methods. This section discuss them in more detail.
Vh = argmax
(c,l)
u(c, l) + βEe′ ,S′ ,υ′ ,e′h
[
V′(A′(c, l), H′(h, e′), s,Υ′(υ′); X)
]
(3.22)
Vh = argmax
(c,l)
u(c, l)
+ β(1− p4,S(H(h))) ·
3
∑
s=1
ps,S(H(h))
∫
e′
∫
υ′
∫
e′d
V′(A′(c, l), H′(h, e′), s,Υ′(υ′); X,e′h) · f (e′h)de′h · f (υ′)dυ′ · f (e′)de′
+ p4,S(H(h)) · b(A′(c, l))
First, as e′h follows an extreme value type I distribution, the most internal
integral can be analytically expressed in terms of the value of V ′1 and V
′
0.
45 Second,
the value function conditional on the state values is calculated over a grid of the
potential permanent income Υ′ that guarantees that each point is equally feasible
(Tauchen discretisation of the AR(1) process). Third, the most outer integral is
solved numerically by averaging over an equi-probable grid of shocks e′. Fourth,
the analytical transition probabilities are calculated conditional on the choice h.
Once the expectation is solved, the resulting Vh are functions of optimal (c, l). This
optimization problem is discretised over 25 points for c, on top of the 3 points of l.
A final consideration is that as V(·) is a function of continuous state variables A,Υ
and H, in practice the function is evaluated over a grid that covers the potential
values of such variables, conditional on the discrete states, and then interpolated
when called.
Some details about the implementation of the solution:
• The structural estimation was programmed in JULIA 0.4.
• Linear interpolation of the Emax functions
• Grid on A: 24 points, log-spaced around 0.
• Grid on H: 10 points, constant-spaced
• Grid on log Υ: 8 points, Tauchen version of the AR(1)
45The advantages and limitations of dynamic discrete choice problems where there are taste-
shocks distributed as Extreme Value Type-I is discussed in detail by Arcidiacono and Ellickson
(2011).
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• Optimal consumption and labour are derived after populating a grid of 25
points for consumptions times the three labour-supply options.
• Optimization algorithm (estimation): Subplex (from NLopt), derived from
Nelder-Mead simplex.
3.D.2 Detailed steps for the structural estimation of the model
1. Initial steps
• EDUC and CVD risk index were constructed
• Data profiles are derived as described in the data section
• Initial values for the simulations are obtained for those aged 50 to 53
in waves 2 and 4, as we require biomarkers information. See Appendix
3.D.3 for more details.
• Potential labour income per hour is imputed for those not working us-
ing the heckman selection model presented in Appendix 3.D.3
2. Estimate Markov process independently
• For a given set of parameters, a dataset is simulated as discussed in
Section 3.D.4. As in this model choice and transition probabilities can
be computed directly from the functional forms, there is no solution
step prior to the simulations.
• Matched moments. Age cells go from 53-54 to 79-80 for the case of the
CVD-risk index and medication intake, and from 53-54 to 97-98 for all
the other variables.
(a) Average CVD-risk index, the proportion of individuals in each
health state, and the proportion under medication.
i. For a given age cell (ex. all individuals aged 61 to 62 years old)
ii. For a given age cell by health state (ex. all individuals aged 61
to 62 years old, who have been diagnosed with a CVD)
iii. For a given age cell by waves’ groups: 1-2, 3-4, 5-6 (ex. all indi-
viduals aged 61 to 62 years old, who were interviewed either in
wave 3 or 4)
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iv. For a given age cell by education level (ex. all individuals aged
61 to 62 years old, who have no formal qualification)
(b) Average CVD-risk index for a given age cell by medication status
(ex. all individuals aged 61 to 62 years old, who report to be under
lipid-lowering medication)
(c) Average CVD-risk index and the proportion of individuals under
medication
i. For a given age cell by size of the nearby practice (ex. all indi-
viduals aged 61 to 62 years old, who live in an area where the
average practice size has been classified as small)
ii. For a given age cell by size of the nearby practice and waves’
groups: 1-2, 3-4, 5-6 (ex. all individuals aged 61 to 62 years old,
who live in an area where the average practice size has been
classified as small, and who were interviewed either in wave 3
or 4)
(d) Variance of CVD-risk index for a given age cell
(e) Autocovariances of CVD-risk index for a given age cell, of order 2
and 4 (ex. covariance of H at age 61 with H at ages 57 and 53),
provided that an individual is observed as many times as required.
(f) Elements of the state transition matrix, for all age cells (ex. propor-
tion of those aged 55 who were in risk of CVD -S = 2- two years
ago, and by age 57 were diagnosed with a CVD -S− 3-)
(g) Average CVD-risk index according to current and future health sta-
tus in 4 years. For example, the average for those who currently are
in. There are 9 possible combinations.
3. Obtain starting values for the income model parameters
(a) A linear fixed effect model equivalent to equation 3.12 was estimated.
As the model depends on earnings, it was approximated with the ob-
served median labour income during all waves prior to SPA.
(b) Fixed-effects and idiosyncratic residuals were predicted, and then re-
gressed into EDUC index in order to estimate persistent differences
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(c) Parameters from Equation 3.11 were pre-estimated using OLS. A first
regression takes into account EDUC, to have had a CVD event ever, and
a constant. From such regression’s residuals, an autoregressive process
was fitted in order to get an approximation to the persistent innovations
process.
(d) As the income process involves selection due to participation, these
parameters are also included into the main model estimation.
4. Jointly estimate the utility function parameters and income model.
• Part of the parameters are calibrated as the model and data used do not
allow for identification of all them. Bequest motive penalty was set to
8, β= .9604 (two-years equivalent of the common annual rate 0.98), and
interest rate r = 0.030225 (annual rate of r = 0.015).
• For a given set of parameters, the model is solved as described in Sec-
tion 3.D.1. Then, specific state-space policy rules are used for simulating
a dataset as discussed in Section 3.D.4
• Matched moments. Age cells go from 53-54 to 97-98 for the case of
assets, and from 53-54 to 75-76 for all the other variables.
(a) Average assets, labour (if working) and non-labour/financial in-
come; and the proportion of individuals in each health state, work-
ing part-time, working full-time.
i. For a given age cell (ex. all individuals aged 61 to 62 years old).
Average assets at age 53 is not matched as it is considered a
starting condition.
ii. For a given age cell by health state (ex. all individuals aged 61
to 62 years old, who have been diagnosed with a CVD)
iii. For a given age cell by waves’ groups: 1-2, 3-4, 5-6 (ex. all indi-
viduals aged 61 to 62 years old, who were interviewed either in
wave 3 or 4)
iv. For a given age cell by education level (ex. all individuals aged
61 to 62 years old, who have no formal qualification)
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(b) Average assets and non-labour/financial income for a given age cell
according to being working or not (ex. all individuals aged 61 to 62
years old, who are working)
(c) Variance of labour-income for a given age cell
(d) Autocovariances of labour-income for a given age cell, of order 1 to
4 (ex. covariance of income at age 61 with income at ages 59, 57, 55
and 53), provided that an individual is observed working as many
times as required.
5. Calculate the compensating variation
• The treatment implies a different effective discount factor for the
counter-factual as the odds of survival might change. Hence, in or-
der to calculate the compensating variation (pi), Equation 3.15 has to be
computed.
• Equation 3.15 is solved by considering a grid of pi between -50 and 50
3.D.3 Deriving Initial Conditions
An essential element of the estimation procedure is to obtain initial conditions of
the state variables in order to perform the simulations. In a nutshell, observed
data for individuals ages 50 to 53 in waves 2 and 446, for whom there is informa-
tion on all variables, is randomly replicated until the desired number of simulated
individuals. While this is straightforward for most variables, it is not the case for
potential labour income as it is not observed for those who do not work. Given
that the non-inclusion of individuals who are not working would generate a bi-
ased sample, I imputed wages based on a cross-sectional auxiliary income model.
In order to take into account selection, a traditional Heckman selection model was
implemented. Explanatory variables for income involve a comprehensive set of
measures with respect to education, demographics, cognitive skills and health,
and whether or not the respondent’s partner is sick as an excluded variable in
46There are 589 respondents that meet these ages, and 322 (55%) for which there information on all
variables. The main sources of missing data are biomarkers information (172, 30%) and assets (135,
23%). Lack of data for the first variable is not associated to the education level, but it significantly
negative related to the second. Data for wave 6 is not considered as there are few individuals within
the age range and some of the variables used for the income imputation model are not available.
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the participation equation. Estimated coefficients for the auxiliary model are pre-
sented in Table 3.14 for men, and in Table 3.15 for women.
Table 3.14: Initial labour income per hour:males
OLS Sel. Model
(1) (2)
Log-Wage per hour Log-Wage per hour
_ Log-Wage per hour Is working
Age 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.032)
Age finished full-time education 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.013) (0.013) (0.027)
Educ: Some medium qualif. 0.182∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.144
(0.071) (0.071) (0.114)
Educ: Some high level or above qualif. 0.320∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.129)
State 2: early signs of CVD 0.008 0.005 -0.179∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.089)
State 3: suffered a CVD -0.172 -0.187∗ -0.954∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.108) (0.150)
Reg. Unemployment rate for the month -0.004 -0.005 -0.058∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.028)
BU total net (non-pension) wealth (1000£ of May2005) 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.007 0.002 0.684∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.088)
Partner sick (not sick if not have a partner) 0.000 -0.550∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.147)
Observations 1499 1785
Censored Obs. 286
ρ_ε 0.0448
χ2 test on H0: ρ_ε = 0 0.8888
p-val 0.3458
Males aged 50 to 53 years old from ELSA waves 1 to 6.
Standard errors clustered at individual level in parenthesis. This table reports coefficients from
an OLS and and ML Heckman selection model.
Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3.15: Initial labour income per hour: females
OLS Sel. Model
(1) (2)
Log-Wage per hour Log-Wage per hour
_ Log-Wage per hour Is working
Age 0.034∗∗ 0.034∗∗ -0.045∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025)
Age finished full-time education 0.034∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025)
Educ: Some medium qualif. 0.068 0.068 0.485∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.053) (0.087)
Educ: Some high level or above qualif. 0.311∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.068) (0.114)
State 2: early signs of CVD 0.011 0.010 -0.332∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.041) (0.072)
State 3: suffered a CVD -0.166 -0.169 -0.975∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.152) (0.199)
Reg. Unemployment rate for the month -0.009 -0.009 -0.040∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022)
BU total net (non-pension) wealth (1000£ of May2005) 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.002 0.003 0.133∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.076)
Partner sick (not sick if not have a partner) 0.014 -0.392∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.108)
Observations 1656 2177
Censored Obs. 521
ρ_ε 0.0081
χ2 test on H0: ρ_ε = 0 0.0033
p-val 0.9542
Males aged 50 to 53 years old from ELSA waves 1 to 6.
Standard errors clustered at individual level in parenthesis. This table reports coefficients from
an OLS and and ML Heckman selection model.
Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
3.D.4 Detailed simulation
The goal of the simulations is to generate a dataset that have the same structure
as the ELSA survey in terms of age profiles per wave. This implies that for a
given set of simulated individuals with starting values at age 53, we will need to
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decide when each of them is observed for the first time and for how long are they
observed. In order to do this, the model replicates selection related to age of the
observed data.47 This section explains on detail how the data generating process
accounts for both elements.
Step 1: take initial values and simulate the life-profiles of 10 times the num-
ber of individuals ever observed in ELSA from waves 1 to 6 (14967) from
age 53 until their death for our gender-cohort-education groups. This is
21.620/24.680/21.960 men (without formal education/at most high school/college
or above); 32.340/27.810/15.270 women born before 1954, and 1.060/2.990/1.940
born after such date. For the willingness-to-pay exercises, sample size is equiv-
alent to 10 times ELSA sample. At the end, nearly K=29.772 individuals are in-
cluded in the simulated dataset (almost two times the original ELSA sample). As
we will see, the dataset is simulated twice the required size as some observations
will not be included due to attrition.
Given the starting values and a set of random shocks, simulations operate by
applying the correspondent law of motion of each state and choice variables. Most
of the states laws are motion are straightforward given their functional form. For
instance, for the transition between health states, the difference in shocks drawn
from an extreme value type-I distribution are contrasted with the difference be-
tween latent indexes described in Equations 3.2. For the economic-choices model
the policy rules c∗(t,S, A, H,Υ, h, X) and l∗(t,S, A, H,Υ, h, X), derived from the so-
lution, are used to infer the progression of these choices and the state A.
Step 2: individuals are assigned to be observed by the econometrician. This means
that a given individual is observed at most for 6 consecutive periods, and that the
resulting observed dataset resembles ELSA sampling structure according to age
and wave. This involves deciding when an individual enters and quits the study.
This is attained as shown in Figure 3.27 for males of high level of education in
waves 1,2 and 3. This figure shows the proportion of individuals according to their
age in each wave of ELSA and the simulated dataset. It takes into account both the
initial sampling of the survey and the refreshment samples that are introduced.48
47For example, at age 73 we don’t observe a random sample of the initial individuals at age 53.
We do observed the healthiest and wealthiest ones, which are the one who survive and are more
likely to stay for longer in the survey.
48Given that the data considers individuals from ages 52-53, younger ones are considered to be
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Such process is done separately for the three groups of gender-cohort-education.
Figure 3.27: Age distribution of males by wave in ELSA and the simulated dataset
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For step 2, the censoring of data due to mortality is modelled explicitly by the
model. This is specially important with age, as oldest observed individuals are
likely to be the healthiest of their cohort. The DGP replicates this selection pattern
as ‘weaker’ individuals are less likely to be observed with age as they are more
likely to die prior to be selected to be observed for the first time.
On top of mortality, there is non-random missing information related with
age. This means that for some individuals, despite of being alive, we cannot
observe the value of at least one of their choice or state variables, and that such
event is correlated with age. The reasons for this are assumed to be independent
of other choices and states. The probability of an observation being missing for
individual i in wave w, Pr(Mwi = 1), conditional on age is estimated outside the
model using a logistic regression and, as shown in Equation 3.23 (Λ(·) is the
inverse of the logistic function), its parameters are allowed to differ by wave and
are gender-education-specific. Tables 3.16 and 3.17 presents the estimates for them.
observed for the first time only when they meet the age criteria.
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Here we assume that individuals are always observed once they are death given
the administrative link between ELSA and ONS mortality statistics.
Λ(Pr(Mi,w;g = 1)) =ψ1,w;g(60≤ agei,w;g < 70)+ψ2,w;g(70≤ agei,w;g < 80)+ψ3,w;g(80≤ agei,w;g)
(3.23)
Table 3.16: Coefficients of missings model: Males
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Panel A: No Formal Education
Age [60,70) -0.158 -0.039 0.259 0.443∗∗ 0.309
(0.171) (0.175) (0.192) (0.203) (0.236)
Age [70,80) -0.343∗∗ -0.163 0.120 0.433∗∗ 0.399∗
(0.173) (0.174) (0.189) (0.201) (0.233)
Age 80+ -0.174 -0.123 0.193 0.732∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.189) (0.203) (0.216) (0.244)
Constant -0.824∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.389∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.148) (0.166) (0.181) (0.217)
Observations 1534 1485 1374 1492 1437
Panel B: Up to high school
Age [60,70) 0.001 0.115 0.244∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗
(0.163) (0.147) (0.145) (0.135) (0.144)
Age [70,80) -0.419∗∗ -0.173 -0.003 0.092 0.063
(0.188) (0.161) (0.155) (0.147) (0.155)
Age 80+ 0.156 0.098 -0.048 0.152 0.163
(0.218) (0.198) (0.200) (0.186) (0.182)
Constant -1.334∗∗∗ -0.950∗∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗ -0.960∗∗∗ -0.844∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.115) (0.119) (0.113) (0.125)
Observations 1498 1564 1588 1927 1922
Panel C: College and above
Age [60,70) -0.144 -0.066 -0.027 0.031 -0.008
(0.185) (0.168) (0.150) (0.144) (0.157)
Age [70,80) -0.074 0.296 -0.029 -0.041 -0.105
(0.215) (0.189) (0.177) (0.167) (0.171)
Age 80+ -0.197 -0.373 0.025 0.127 -0.329
(0.337) (0.297) (0.223) (0.215) (0.224)
Constant -1.662∗∗∗ -1.489∗∗∗ -1.070∗∗∗ -1.242∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.127) (0.120) (0.118) (0.138)
Observations 1277 1388 1477 1820 1842
Notes: Coefficients of probability of not observing an individual conditional
on being alive and being observed in at least one previous wave (see Equation
3.23). Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The following example illustrates on how the simulation algorithm works.
Figure 3.28 presents a hypothetical simulated dataset. Each cell shows the number
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Table 3.17: Coefficients of missings model: Females
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
Panel A: No Formal Education
Age [60,70) -0.506∗∗∗ 0.205 0.010 0.318∗∗ 0.208
(0.144) (0.144) (0.154) (0.152) (0.175)
Age [70,80) -0.457∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.138 0.055 0.081
(0.140) (0.143) (0.153) (0.152) (0.174)
Age 80+ -0.298∗∗ 0.228 0.109 0.595∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.147) (0.156) (0.154) (0.175)
Constant -0.760∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.121) (0.134) (0.133) (0.159)
Observations 2438 2422 2325 2570 2485
Panel B: Up to high school
Age [60,70) -0.240 0.061 -0.036 0.319∗∗∗ 0.190
(0.147) (0.131) (0.122) (0.118) (0.130)
Age [70,80) -0.521∗∗∗ -0.198 -0.310∗∗ 0.001 -0.053
(0.178) (0.148) (0.138) (0.137) (0.144)
Age 80+ -0.069 0.297∗ -0.061 0.467∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.173) (0.162) (0.153) (0.157)
Constant -1.371∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗ -1.133∗∗∗ -0.939∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.098) (0.097) (0.099) (0.115)
Observations 1868 2012 2136 2624 2624
Panel C: College and above
Age [60,70) -0.476∗∗ 0.178 0.110 -0.113 -0.092
(0.230) (0.202) (0.176) (0.163) (0.169)
Age [70,80) -0.385 0.295 0.080 -0.067 -0.404∗∗
(0.278) (0.231) (0.208) (0.191) (0.194)
Age 80+ 0.194 0.497∗ 0.178 0.437∗ 0.376∗
(0.316) (0.274) (0.247) (0.227) (0.225)
Constant -1.670∗∗∗ -1.658∗∗∗ -1.266∗∗∗ -1.287∗∗∗ -1.009∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.157) (0.139) (0.129) (0.144)
Observations 956 1035 1134 1432 1444
Notes: Coefficients of probability of not observing an individual conditional
on being alive and being observed in at least one previous wave (see Equation
3.23). Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
of wave assigned to each individual observation. For instance, individual 1 is
observed in wave 1 when aged 53, while individual 6 is observed in the same
wave but at age 55. In this case, the desired number of individuals is 10. As we
will see, it is required to simulate 11 in order to fulfil the desired sample size.
Moreover, let’s assume that the observed dataset has the following structure:
1. 50% of the individuals are observed for the first time at age 53. Of those,
40% in wave 1, 40% in wave 2, and 20% in wave 3
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2. 40% are observed at age 55 for the first time. Of those, 25% in wave 1, 50%
in wave 2, and 25% in wave 3
3. The last 10% is observed for the first time at wave 3 when aged 57.
As it is required to replicate such structure, the first 5 individuals are assigned to
be observed at age 53: two in wave 1, two in wave 2, and one in wave 3. Notice
that we will follow them every period until wave 6. However, randomly we might
be unable to observed them due to the missing information mode. For example,
individual 4 was supposed to be observed ad ages 57 and 59, but it is not. Also,
we fully observe them if they die, even if they have not been observed for some
periods, as happens with individual 4. At age 55, we need 4 additional individuals
to be observed in order to meet the data age-structure. That is one in wave 1, two
in wave 2, and one in wave 3. However, notice that individual number 8 is already
death, so it has to be replaced. For this reason individual 10 is considered while
number 8 is completely discarded from the analysis. Finally, the sole observation
left is number 11, this one is assigned to wave 3.
Figure 3.28: Example of the simulation procedure
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3.E Health Investments
Receiving a diagnosis of hypertension or the onset of a stroke might have an im-
pact on the CVD-risk index progression and the transition probabilities. Equation
3.5 shows that there health-status has an effect on the level of the CVD-risk index.
Also, there is full heterogeneity on τ according to health-status in Equations 3.2.
However, the model is agnostic on why there is such heterogeneity, and more ex-
plicitly, individuals’ investment in their own health is not disentangle from health
care treatments. This is important as one potential mechanism to consider is that
drug treatments might imply different investments in a dimension that is not al-
ready considered by the model.
Preventive health investments come in two main groups: lifestyle and medical
care. The first one involves personal choices as diet, physical activity, or smoking.
Individuals normally know that their CVD-risk is affected by such habits. Figure
3.29 shows cohort-adjusted profiles, by age and health status, of some behaviours
that might be relevant for CVD-risk. Both smoking and alcohol consumptions
seem to decline with age, while the opposite is observed for physical activity.
However, other choices as fruit and vegetables consumption are more stable on
time. However, while it is true that selection is in place, it is difficult to observe
a clear difference between profiles according to health state. The sole exception
is physical activity, but this is a variable that might be a bad proxy for health
investments as the capacity to perform certain exercises might be seriously affected
by a CVD event.
The second group is related to demand of health care: check blood pressure
and cholesterol, x-rays, blood tests and visits to the doctor. Figure 3.30 presents
data averages per age-group and CVD status from the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS). It is clear that the increasing risk of further health complications
imply more demand of preventive medical services as regular BP and cholesterol
checks, blood tests, and even simple interaction with the family doctor.49 While
once again these profiles involve selection, they suggest that main mechanisms
behind the different trends in CVD-risk accumulation are related to health-care
49The question refers about the amount of times the respondent has talked or visited a GP for the
same reference period as the check-up questions. They are specifically instructed to not take into
account visits to the hospital.
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procedures rather than lifestyle modification.
Figure 3.29: Lifestyle
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Figure 3.30: Demand for Health-Care (BHPS)
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3.F Financial Incentives
The QOF introduced a pay for performance scheme into primary care services in
the UK. Since 2009/10, a new clinical area was introduced with the aim of prevent-
ing the onset of CVD for the first time (primary prevention). The first indicator
promotes the use of risk assessment for patients recently diagnosed with hyper-
tension without pre-existing diagnosis of CVD-related conditions (PP01), and the
second refers to provide lifestyle recommendations to the same patients (PP02).
These indicators were suggested by NICE and are based on the Clinical Guideline
67 (NICE, 2008). The first indicator, which was paid at most £1016 in that year for
the average practice, is the main focus of this analysis. The precise definition of
indicator is as follows:
PP01: In those patients with a new diagnosis of hypertension (ex-
cluding those with pre-existing CHD, diabetes, stroke and/or TIA)
recorded between the preceding 1 April to 31 March: the percentage of
patients who have had a face to face cardiovascular risk assessment at
the outset of diagnosis using an agreed tool.
In other words, GPs are paid for meeting with their new hypertense patients
and apply a standard CVD risk calculator, initially the Framingham equation (An-
derson et al., 1991), or more recently the QRISK2 model (Hippisley-Cox et al.,
2008). These epidemiological models predict the odds of developing a CVD within
the following 10 years, given a set of risk factors that typically involve biomakers as
blood pressure and cholesterol. Their prediction is the standard for NICE guide-
lines on preventive care. For instance, guideline 67 recommended that patients
with a 10-year risk of 20% or above should be under lipid-lowering medication.
More recently, the threshold was reduced to 10% (NICE, 2014) and the indicator
became explicit about the statins prescription.
QOF payment in clinical indicators is given according to a number of points
obtained by a GP practice. They follow a non-linear function of indicator achieve-
ment, which is the reported usage of the services described. In this case, the
proportion of new hypertense patients who received the risk assessment. Prac-
tices start to earn them if the achievement is above 40%, with a maximum number
reached at 70%. The exact amount of money derived from each point depends
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on the size of the practice and how common are new cases of hypertension in
the practice, with respect to the national average. Hence, practices that before
the intervention did not use such tools have incentives to do it. After the first
year, nearly 86% of all GP practices with at least one new case of hypertension50
attained the maximum amount of points.
As discussed in Section 3.2, there is evidence of differential performance in
the QOF according to the number of patients registered in the practice, a variable
known as the list size. While there is not conclusive evidence on the superior-
ity of bigger practices (Ng and Ng, 2013), they have advantages as economies of
scale for hiring staff and adopting information technologies in their favour. Such
advantage seems to be clear given the increasing administrative pressures that
family doctors are facing. This is a feature that motivates policy recommendations
suggesting a move towards bigger primary care provider institutions (Goodwin
et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013). For the PP01 indicator, nearly 90% of the big prac-
tices (above 8300 patients) obtained the maximum amount of points for PP01 in
2009/10, against 83% of the small ones (less than 6000 patients). Rather than QOF
achievement, what is central for this study is the odds of being prescribed with
statins.
The essential question is if the introduction of affected changed the odds of
being prescribed with statins between small and non-small practices. Guideline 67
suggests the usage of the risk assessment tool for people aged 40-74, so individuals
aged 52 to 74 will be considered for our analysis. Equation 3.24 presents the
main specification for testing this hypothesis. Here the variation in lipid-lowering
Yir,w−Yir,w−1 medication from an individual i between 2010 and 2012 is compared
with such increase between 2006 and 2008, between areas r with small practices
(SLr = 1) relative to areas with non-small practices (SLr = 0). As a condition, the
individual cannot be previously diagnosed with a CVD by the first year of the
respective variation. This is conditional on second order polynomials on age and
biomarkers measured in 2008 (for 2010 to 2012) and in 2004 (for 2006 to 2008),
gender, smoking status, PCT covariates and government region dummies (Xi,w−2).
BMI, systolic blood pressure, total and HDL cholesterol are considered two waves
5092 practices did not have one case.
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before in order to avoid contamination from current medication status.
Yir,w −Yir,w−1 = α1SLr + α21{w = 6}+ α3SLr · 1{w = 6}+ αXi,w−2 + uirt, w ∈ [4,6](3.24)
Column 1 of Table 3.18 presents the results for this analysis. It shows that
in , those living in small GP practices areas it was around 2 pp. less likely to be
under lipid-lowering medication conditional on age and objective health measures.
However, this difference is removed by 2012.
An additional concern is that QOF policy is intended to include lifestyle ad-
vice. As we have seen, doctors are also paid for providing such advice. Therefore,
the benefits of the program might be understated. More worrying is that individ-
uals might increase their unhealthy behaviour due to the medication, or at least
fail to reduce it as much as those who are not under the drug. This will imply
an overestimation of the effects of the policy. Table 3.18 also shows that there is
no evidence of different lifestyle changes as smoking, physical activity of fruit and
vegetables consumption. Also, there is no evidence that other essential medication
for CVD-risk reduction, hypertension treatments, are modified.
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Table 3.18: QOF impact on primary care prescription of health investments according to
list size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LIPID
PILL
BP PILL SMOKE LOW PA
FRUIT
VEGT
(=1) Living in a Small Practice (SP) -0.025∗ -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.241
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.024) (0.537)
(=1) Interviewed in 2012/13 (1{w = 6}) -0.023∗ -0.013 -0.004 -0.038 0.043
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.024) (0.393)
(=1) Interaction (SP) · (1{w = 6}) 0.035∗∗ 0.002 0.016 0.009 -0.036
(0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.032) (0.549)
Observations 5338 5339 5337 5275 4620
Clusters 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: This table presents coefficients associated to be in a small GP practice area, to be surveyed in 2012/13 instead of 2008/09,
and their interaction , for five different dependent variables (columns) The sample consist on ELSA core individuals aged 52
to 74 in 2012 or 2008, for which there is information on their lipid-lowering medication status in the current and previous
wave. All models include a second order polynomial on age and 4 year lagged biomarkers (BMI, systolic blood pressure, total
and HDL cholesterol), blood pressure medication, previous signs of CVD status (State 2), and smoking status. Governement
office region and education level fixed effects, and PCT level controls are also included. LIPID PILL: to be under lipid-lowering
medication. BP PILL: to be under any type of blood pressure medication; lagged version of this variables is not included as a
control. SMOKE: to report to be an active tabacco smoker. LOW PA: to be sedentary or to have a low physical activity level. This
is, either not working or at sedentary occupation, and at most engages in mild exercise less than three times a month or less.
FRUIT VEG: portions o fruit and vegetables per week. Standard errors clustered at individual level in parenthesis. Significance:
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Chapter 4
Identifying complementarities across
tasks using two-part contracts. An
application to family doctors
Joint work with Marcos Vera-Hernández
4.1 Introduction
Principal-agent relationships are widespread in economics. Since Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991)’s seminar article, it is well understood that the agent’s cost func-
tion plays a crucial role in a multitask environment, that is, when the agent must
carry out more than one task. If tasks complement each other, rewarding one task
will be enough to increase the production of an unrewarded task. If, however,
tasks substitute for each other, rewarding one will reduce the effort exerted on
the unrewarded task. Complementarities/substitutions across tasks not only play
a role in the structure of incentive contracts, but also in job design. Whenever
possible, tasks that are substitutes should be performed by different agents, each
of them carrying out tasks that complement each other.
In this paper, we show how to recover from the data whether tasks are com-
plements or substitutes when the agent faces a two-part linear contract, essentially
a contract with two different piece-rate levels. Our approach exploits a change in
the incentives faced by the agents, but in contrast to the literature, we can exploit
nationwide incentive changes, and do not need that a “control” group, that is, a
group of agents not eligible for the change of incentives.
Our main insight is that when agents face two-part linear contracts, a group
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of agents will naturally choose to produce at the level of the kink of the two-part
contract, the level at which the piece rate changes. We show that these agents
are insensitive to local changes in the incentives of other tasks, independently of
how the tasks interact in the cost function. Hence, the individuals at the kink will
work as a “control” group. Because linear two-part contracts are quite prevalent
(and we do not need an explicit control group), our method greatly expands the
situations in which we can test for complementarities/substitutions in the agent’s
cost function.
We apply our method to identify whether different activities that family doc-
tors perform are complements or substitutes in their cost function. Examples of
the activities that we analyse include carrying out certain tests on diabetic patients,
recording smoking history in at risk patients, or reviewing asthmatic patients with
some minimum frequency, among others.
The types of activities that we analyse contrast with much of the existing em-
pirical literature that has focused on much simpler activities.1 This literature has
focused on studying a specific case of multitasking: the trade-off between quan-
tity and quality within a single activity. Because of the very nature of it, quantity
and quality are either substitutes or independent at best, but complementarity is
rightly dismissed.2 Because we study genuinely different tasks (rather than the
quantity and quality of a single task), the possibility of complementarities across
them is real. It might well be, for instance, that the marginal cost of carrying out
a test is smaller if another test is also being conducted during the same visit.
Monetary incentives are also used amongst professions with a large pro-social
component, such as teachers and doctors. Although crowding out of intrinsic mo-
tivation is usually cited as a concern, multitasking is another one. Unsurprisingly,
there is a reasonably large body of literature for “teaching to the test”, and more
generally whether teachers shift effort from unrewarded tasks to rewarded ones
(see Neal (2011) for a review of US focused studies).3 The evidence on health care
1See for instance, Lazear (2000), Shearer (2004), Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), Bradler et al.
(2013).
2Al-Ubaydli et al. (2012) finds that higher piece rates leads to higher quality when stuffing en-
velopes, but this is explained because the piece-rate mechanism signals to the agent that the principal
has a good monitoring technology rather because there are complementarities in the cost function.
3Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), and Glewwe et al. (2010) are examples of developing
country studies).
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probably lags behind that on education. Dumont et al. (2008) found that Canadian
physicians who voluntary signed up to a contract that paid less for a specific quan-
tity of consultations, increased the average time per consultation (an indicator of
quality) as well as other activities unremunerated at the margin (i.e. teaching).
Feng Lu (2012) exploited a mandatory quality disclosure policy and found that
nursing homes improved scores on quality measures for the reported dimensions,
but deteriorated in regard to unreported ones.
In this paper, we exploit the Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF), a programme
established in 2004 that remunerated all family doctors in England according to
their performance in a large battery of indicators. There is a remuneration sched-
ule for each rewarded indicator, which has a lower and an upper limit. The doc-
tor’s remuneration increases linearly as long as the indicator is between the lower
and upper limit, and flattens out if the upper limit is passed. The programme was
rolled out simultaneously across England, and any changes to the remuneration
schedule also apply nationally. This makes it an ideal setting to apply the method
that we develop in this paper.
The QOF is the largest primary care pay for performance programme world-
wide, and has already received some attention. Sutton et al. (2010)compared in-
centivised and unincentivised measures before and after the introduction of the
program, a improvements in both measures which were higher for incentivised
ones.4 This approach relies on the assumption that incentivised and unincen-
tivised measures would follow a common trend in the absence of the program.
We are able to overcome these limitation thanks to the two-part linear payment
scheme of QOF where there is an upper limit for the increasing payments ac-
cording to performance. Also, as there is a period in which there are changes to
rewards (2010/11), preceded by a period without them (2009/10), we are able to
distinguish effort response to the new rewards from variations linked to year-to-
year variation, which are correlated with performance. We found that there is no
evidence of substitutability between tasks in the system, and if anything, several
of them are complements.
4Kaarboe and Siciliani (2011) motivate their multitasking model using the QOF. They argue,
based on the results of Sutton et al. (2010), that quality dimensions in primary care might be com-
plements.
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After this introduction, we present a basic model of multitasking with a two-
part linear reward function for agents. Given that, we show the conditions under
which we are able to identify complementarities/substitution in the cost function
empirically. This is followed by a description of the QOF and the results of using
our test on it. Finally, the conclusions are presented.
4.2 Model
Our test is based on the existence of a two-part linear tariff on a principal-agent
relationship. In order to understand the intuition behind the test, we will start
by presenting a simple version of the model without uncertainty. In this model,
we will introduce the kink produced by a two-linear tariff and examine its im-
plications. Later, we will consider how this main ideas would be affected by
introducing uncertainty.
Consider a principal-agent relationship with two distinct tasks. The principal
hires the agent to to exert task-specific efforts (e1, e2). The principal benefits in-
creasingly from the output of the two tasks (x1,x2). The agent is paid according
to P(x1, x2; a1, a2) = T + a1x1 + a2x2 , where T represents a lump-sum payment,
and ai is the piece rate associated to xi. The agent’s cost function is given by
C(e1,e2;z). characterised by a parameter z. We assume that for i ∈ 1,2 we have that
∂C
∂ei
= Ci > 0, ∂
2C
∂e2ii
= Cii > 0, ∂C∂z > 0,
∂2C
∂z2 > 0, and that C is a convex function, but
we do not restrict the sign of the cross-derivatives Cij = ∂
2C
∂ej∂ei
, i 6= j. That is, while
we know that it is increasingly costly to exert effort, we do not know if increas-
ing effort in one task, increases or reduces the marginal cost of exerting effort on
the other task. In the former case, the tasks are said to be substitutes, and in the
latter they are complements. Our main goal is to estimate the sign Cij to ascertain
whether the tasks are complements or substitutes.
The agent takes the contract P(x1, x2) as given, and decides optimal levels of
effort in order to maximize his surplus, that is:
max
e1,e2
U = E [P(x1, x2; a1, a2)− C(e1, e2;z)] (4.1)
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4.2.1 Model without uncertainty
Let’s assume that xi=ei and that providers are heterogeneous only on an efficiency
parameter z which is assigned in the population following a pdf g(·), or CDF G(·).
Specifically, let’s assume that C(e1, e2;z) = 1z C(e1, e2). As a result, given a contract
specified by {T, a1, a2}, the provider will solve:
max
e1,e2
U = (T + a1 · e1 + a2 · e2)− 1z C(e1, e2). (4.2)
The first order conditions (FOC) of the problem are given by:5
ai − 1z Ci = 0, i ∈ {1,2} (4.3)
Essentially, the marginal benefit (ai) of exerting effort has to be equal to the
marginal cost ( 1z Ci). If we differentiate these FOC, we obtain:
dai − 1z Ciidei −
1
z
Cijdej = 0, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1,2} (4.4)
This system of equations allows us to explore how optimal allocation of effort
in each task would be adjusted as a response to variations in the piece-rates ai and
to the efficiency parameter z.
Proposition 1. With a linear payment and without uncertainty, we have that de1da2 =
−z·C12
C11C22−C212
> 0, and hence that the sign of de1da2 is opposite to the sign of C12. If the tasks
are substitutes (C12 > 0), we will have that de1da2 < 0. On the contrary, if the tasks are
complements (C12 < 0) then de1da2 > 0.
Proof:
If we set da1 = 0, that is, a1 as the unchanged P4P incentive, we can obtain
that
de2 = −C11C12 de1 (4.5)
And hence, the impact of modifying the reward a2 on e2 is obtained by sub-
stituting (4.5) in the FOC of e2 :
5The second order condition (SOC) is given by C11C22 − C212 > 0, which we assume to hold.
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de1
da2
=− z · C12
C11C22 − C212
(4.6)
Q.E.D.
If we consider that da2 = 0 but da1 6= 0, we can derive the response on optimal
effort for task 1, given variations in its own price. As expected, it is unambiguously
positive:
de1
da1
=
z · C22
C11C22 − C212
> 0 (4.7)
Assumption 1. We assume that de1dz =
a1C22−a2C12
C11C22−C212
> 0, for any value of z.
Note that this is a very natural assumption: if the agent becomes more effi-
cient and its costs decreases, he will exert more effort. It is indeed guaranteed for
the case of complements, because C12 < 0. For the case of substitutes, we need
to assume that C22 is not too small compared to C12. Otherwise, the agent might
greatly increase e2 and decrease e1.
4.2.2 The role of kinks
Now, let’s consider a two-part linear payment function, with a kink at e1 = UL.6
We consider a piece-rate for a given task varies at UL from a1to a¯1, as shown in
Equation 4.8 below. As a notation convention, all objects denoted with a lower
bar will be related to the contract when the output is below UL, and those with
an upper bar for the contract when the output is above such a value. Following
our specific application,7 we will consider a1 > a¯1, so the marginal benefit of e1
decreases discontinuously at e1 = UL. Notice that this payment function also im-
plies that the fix income jumps in order to maintain the total payment continuous
6As will be described in the application section, the QoF is a three-part linear contract. It has
a zero piece-rate below a first threshold, the lower limit, and above a second threshold, the upper
limit. We will concentrate on what happens around the upper limit given that most of the agents are
situated around or above it. Nevertheless, the model and empirical test detailed in this paper could
potentially be formulated to the lower limit if there was enough information.
7The QoF presents an extreme scenario: a1 > a¯1 = 0. The results that we present here do not
require a zero marginal benefit for unit of effort after the upper threshold. An alternative interpre-
tation is that a¯1 represents the altruistic marginal benefit that the physicians obtain for improving
their patients’ health.
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at UL.
P(x1, x2; a1, a2) =

a1x1 + a2x2 + T i f x1 <UL
a¯1x1 + a2x2 + T + (a1 − a¯1) ·UL i f x1 ≥UL
(4.8)
Proposition 2. Without uncertainty, the presence of a kink at e1 = UL implies that those
providers with a z ∈ [z, z¯] choose e∗1 = UL. Moreover, de1da2 = 0 for them.
Proof:
Below the threshold UL, for a given z there is a optimal level of effort
e1(z) = e∗1(z, a1, a2). In particular, we assume that ∃z = z st e1(z) = UL. Above
the threshold, e1 > UL, there is also an optimal allocation e¯1(z¯) = e∗1(z, a¯1, a2), and
we also assume that ∃z st e¯1(z¯) = UL.
Given that a1 > a¯1, the optimal effort above UL, e¯1(z) = e∗1(z, a¯1, a2), has to be
smaller than the corresponding decision if there were no kink: e1(z) > e¯1(z) ∀z.
In particular, UL = e1(z) > e¯1(z). This is due to Equation 4.7. Notice that it has
to be the case that e∗1(z + e, a1, a2) > e
∗
1(z, a1, a2) ∀e > 0, which holds because of
Assumption 1 (a1C22− a2C12 > 0).8 As a result, given that UL> e¯1(z), it is required
that z¯ > z.
Those providers with a z ∈ [z, z¯] have to choose e∗1 =UL, even though the FOC
is not satisfied, because any deviation would be detriment of their utility. Let us
consider the diagram on Figure 4.1 to illustrate the argument. Point A represents
the decision of a provider with productivity z, which is e∗1 = UL as stated before.
Point C does the same for the typical z¯ provider, which also chooses e∗1 = UL.
Let us consider a provider with a productivity in between, z˜ ∈ (z, z¯). Without
the kink, the optimal decision under e1(z) would have been point B′; however
under the kinked payment function it is not optimal. At this point the marginal
cost of exerting effort is larger than the marginal benefit of doing so, C1C2 a2 > a1
(from the FOC), so it is a better idea to reduce effort in order to enhance utility.
An alternative scenario is to consider a world where a1 = a¯1∀e1; in such a scenario
B′′ would have been the choice. Once again, under the actual kinked function
this is suboptimal. The provider is better off if effort is increased, as at that point
8If the assumption does not hold, e∗1 = 0 as discussed before. A milder version would be when
a1 · C22 − a2C12 > 0 but a¯1 · C22 − a2C12 < 0. In such a case e∗1 = UL will always be preferred for all
z ≥ z . This implies that there should not be no provider above UL, regardless of the value of z.
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Figure 4.1: The effect of a kink on rewards at e1 = UL
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Note: Providers’ payment for task 1 effort below UL is a1, and above it is a¯1 < a1. It produces
a piecewise optimal effort function e∗1(z) = e1(z) × 1(e1 ≤ UL) + e¯1(z) × 1(e1 > UL), where
e1(z) = e∗1(z, a1, a2) and e¯1(z) = e∗1(z, a¯1, a2). This diagram assumes constant second derivatives of
function C(e1, e2). It is also assumed that both tasks are substitutes, so the slope above UL is smaller
than below it (see Assumption 1). Nevertheless, in the diagram a˜1C22 − a2C12 > 0, hence the values
of e∗1 above UL are feasible.
C1
C2
a2 < a1. As a result, due to the non-smoothness of the optimization problem,
the provider is better off at point B, even though the FOCs do not hold. Notice
that as C1C2 a2 6= a1, the effect of a small variation in a2 would have no impact on the
allocation of a∗1 . As a result,
de1
da2
= 0 for those providers with a z ∈ [z, z¯].
Proposition 3. Without uncertainty, the presence of a kink at e1 = UL generates bunch-
ing on the distribution of effort on task one, H(e1).
Proof:
This we can follow Saez (2010).9 We define H(e˜1) = Pr [e∗1(z, a1, a2) ≤ e˜1] =
Pr
[
z ≤ e∗−11 (e˜1; a1, a2)
]
= G
[
e∗−11 (e˜1; a1, a2)
]
, where e∗−11 (·) is the inverse function
of e∗1(z). As explained above, e
∗
1(z) is piecewise defined, which is also the case for
H(e˜1). Below UL we have H(e˜1) = G
[
e∗−11 (e˜1; a1, a2)
]
, and above it the relevant
function is H¯(e˜1) = G
[
e∗−11 (e˜1; a¯1, a2)
]
. Given that all providers with a z˜ ∈ [z, z¯]
have to choose e∗1 = UL, an entire mass that would have exerted an effort e1(z˜) >
9See Kleven (2016) for a good review.
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Figure 4.2: The effect on e1 density of a kink on rewards at e1 = UL
z
e1
0
UL
UL + ∆e
e∗1(z)
e1(z)
e¯1(z)
A C
D
Density
e1
b
h(e1)
h¯(e1)
bunching
z
Density
g(·)
z z˜ z¯
Note: Providers’ payment for task 1 effort below UL is a1, and above it is a¯1 < a1. It produces
a piecewise optimal effort function e∗1(z) = e1(z) × 1(e1 ≤ UL) + e¯1(z) × 1(e1 > UL), where
e1(z) = e∗1(z, a1, a2) and e¯1(z) = e∗1(z, a¯1, a2). This diagram assumes constant second derivatives of
function C(e1, e2). It is also assumed that both tasks are substitutes, so the slope above UL is smaller
than below it (see Assumption 1). Nevertheless, in the diagram a˜1C22 − a2C12 > 0, hence the values
of e∗1 above UL are feasible.
UL if there were no kink is now collapsed at that single point and has a value of
b = h(UL) = H(e1(z¯))− H(UL). Above z¯, the distribution will follow h¯(e1)
Figure 4.2 extends the previous example and considers a uniform density g(z)
and how it transforms into h(e1). For z < z, the kink makes no difference at all:
h(e1) = h(e1). However, for those z∈ [z, z¯] there is a clear change. Without the kink,
such provider would have exerted e1 ∈ [UL,UL + ∆e], between points A and D in
the figure, which would have followed the density h(e1). Because of the kink, AD
became AC and the entire area b is now collapsed into a unique spike at e1 = UL.
Finally, for z> z¯ we have that optimal effort is given by e¯1(z), which is reflected by
density h¯(e1). Notice that it is required that 1− H¯(UL) = 1− H(UL), so the final
H(e1) is a valid CDF. This is reflected in the fact that all observations that would
have covered e1 ∈ [UL + ∆,∞), are now spread into e1 ∈ [UL,∞).10
10For the uniform example in Figure 4.2, this means that the maximum value of e1 will fall, but
the density at any point will be larger (h¯(e1) > h(e1) for e1 ∈ [UL, e¯1(zmax)]). See the example in the
Appendix for more details.
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4.2.3 Uncertainty
A common characteristic of multitasking models is the role of uncertainty.11 In
particular, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) discuss the role of using noisy signals
for rewarding agents. Let us consider x1 = e1 + ε1, where ε1 is distributed accord-
ing to F(·), which is a twice differentiable CDF, with PDF f (·). Let us assume
that uncertainty has an impact of −Ω < 0 on utility.12 Hence, we can write their
problem as follows.
max
e1,e2∈[0,1]
U =Pr [e1 <UL− ε1] ·
{
E
[
(T + a1 · e1 + a1 · ε1 + a2e2)−
1
z
C(e1, e2)
]
−Ω
}
+Pr [e1 ≥UL− ε1] ·
{
(T + p1UL + a¯1e1 + a2e2)− 1z C(e1, e2)
}
The FOC for e2 is still the same as before, but for e1 it is different. First, part of
the marginal financial return p1 = a1 − a¯1 is now subject to uncertainty; so as long
as e1 < UL it will be obtained. However, by exerting more effort, the probability
of loosing such a financial reward decreases, but also there is a reduction in the
uncertainty penalty Ω. This is reflected in the term in brackets of Equation 4.11.
FOC1 : = a¯1 − 1z C1 + {F (UL− e1) · p1 − f (UL− e1) · [(e1 −UL) · p1 −Ω]} = 0
(4.11)
We can obtain the marginal variation in optimal effort on task 1 with respect
11For our particular application, the model without uncertainty is not necessarily too simplistic.
This is because the payment is based on the aggregate outcome of the doctor’s patients, and hence
the noise might be averaged out.
12This would be the case with preferences that exhibit absolute risk aversion η. For example:
max
e1,e2∈[0,1]
U = E
[
u(αB(e1, e2) + (T + φ(p1, e1 + ε1) + a2e2 − 1z C(e1, e2))
]
= E[−e−η(αB(e1,e2)+(T+φ(p1,e1+ε1)+a˜1e1+a2e2)− 1z C(e1,e2))] (4.9)
With a linear tariff φ1(x1) = p1x1 = p1e1 + p1ε1 the problem can be expressed in terms of the
certainty equivalent Uˆ. Where, despite risk aversion, the noise plays no role in the allocation of
effort. This is because a provider’s choices do not affect the expected value of the reward for
attaining a certain level of performance.
max
e1,e2∈[0,1]
Uˆ = αB(e1, e2) + (T + a1e1 + a2e2)− C(e1, e2)− 12η(p
2
1σ
2
1 ) (4.10)
4.2. Model 155
to the reward on task 2 following the same procedure as in the case without un-
certainty.
de1
da2
= − z · C12
C11C22 − C212 + p1 · z · C22 · f (UL− e1) ·
{
2+ f
′(UL−e1)
f (UL−e1) ·
[
1
p1
Ω+UL− e1
]}
(4.12)
This expression is equivalent to Equation 4.6, but with D instead of C11. As
before the sign is determined by C12, but the magnitude is a function of current
effort with respect to e1. Hence, Proposition 1 is not affected by the presence of
either risk or uncertainty. However, Proposition 2 requires further analysis.
As with the no-uncertainty scenario, we can derive how general efficiency z
is related to e∗1 .
de1
dz
=
{
a¯1 + p1 ·
[
F (UL− e1) + f (UL− e1) ·
(
1
p1
Ω+UL− e1
)]}
C22 − a2C12
C11C22 − C212 + p1 · z · C22 · f (UL− e1) ·
{
2+ f
′(UL−e1)
f (UL−e1) ·
[
1
p1
Ω+UL− e1
]}
(4.13)
The simulation exercise in Figure 4.3 will be useful to illustrate how Equa-
tions 4.12 and 4.13 compare with the ones in the no-uncertainty case. This Figure
follows the same configuration as the diagram presented in Figure 4.2. In this
simulation, a cost function with constant second order derivatives is assumed. the
noise on the task’s result is assumed to follow a normal distribution. The pro-
vided parameters imply that both tasks are substitutes, and parameter z is drawn
from a uniform distribution. The figure considers three cases: first, in black, the
policy rules for e∗1 derived with no-uncertainty (black); second, with uncertainty
but without risk aversion (orange), and finally including risk aversion (light blue).
Let us consider the case without risk aversion, Ω= 0. As shown in the graph,
uncertainty essentially smooths out the corners of optimal effort e∗1(z). Moreover,
the slope ∂e1∂z is always positive, as predicted by Equation 4.13. While introducing
noise removes the idea of corner solution, it still generates bunching at UL as the
slope becomes smaller rapidly near this threshold.
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Figure 4.3: Simulation exercise
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Parameters: UL=0.5, δ=1, c1 =2, c2 =2,, a2 =1, a˜1 =1, p1 =0.2, σ=0.07 with 10000 simulations
Note: Parameters z drawn from a beta distribution with parameters (5,2) multiplied by 3. The cost
function is defined as C(e1, e2;z, c1, c2,δ) = 1z · ( 12 (c1e21 + c2e22)+ δe1e2). For the cases with uncertainty,
x1 = e1 + v1 where v1 ∼ N(0,σ)
Let us consider first the denominator of Equation 4.13, and in particular, its
last term:(
f ′(UL−e1)
f (UL−e1) · [UL− e1] < 0
)
. When e∗1 < UL, it is implied that (UL− e1) < 0
which also means that f ′(UL − e1) > 0. Hence, the entire term is negative(
f ′(UL−e1)
f (UL−e1) · [UL− e1] < 0
)
, so the denominator will become smaller as e1 moves
away from UL. When e∗1 > UL, exactly the same happens as when f
′(·) < 0 and
(UL− e1) > 0. Hence, the further e1 is from UL, the larger the derivative, at least
until it becomes equal to the no-uncertainty case when f (UL− e1)→ 0.
Risk aversion plays an important role as observed in the example in Figure
4.3 (Ω= 0.05). In the denominator, the term
(
f ′(UL−e1)
f (UL−e1) ·
[
1
p1
Ω+UL− e1
])
changes
the sign near UL three times. First, below UL, it makes the slope even larger, as
it goes in the same direction as UL − e1and the denominator becomes smaller.
Second, in the interval e∗1 ∈ [UL, 1p1Ω+UL], the term f ′(·) becomes positive so the
denominator is larger and then the derivative de1da2 is smaller. Finally, when e
∗
1 ≥
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1
p1
Ω+UL, the derivative starts to grow again. The implication for the distribution
of x1 is that the bunching will be centred above UL.
While the numerator of Equation 4.13 is also a function of f (·) and risk
aversion, it plays a less important role in the graph of e∗1(z). The term[
F (UL− e1) + f (UL− e1) ·
(
1
p1
Ω+UL− e1
)]
decreases as e1 departs from 0.
This is because F(UL− e1) decreases with e1, and so does
(
1
p1
Ω+UL− e1
)
. This
effect is present both above and below UL.
Proposition 4. In the presence of uncertainty on the task result, and if f (·) corresponds
to a symmetric unimodal distribution with mean 0, de1da2 becomes larger in absolute value
as e1 moves away from 1p1Ω+UL.
This proposition replaces Proposition 2, as de1da2 is not required to be 0 at UL
anymore. The denominator in Equation 4.6 is the same as in Equation 4.13, so
the same attenuation pattern when e1 is just above UL can be expected. The main
difference is that the sign is given by parameter C12 and that f (·) and risk aversion
are present only in the denominator. Figure 4.4 presents two additional examples.
The graphs on the left correspond to a cost function that exhibits substitution be-
tween tasks, while the ones on the right come from complementary tasks. The top
graphs show optimal effort exerted on task 1 as a function of the price of task 2,
for each of the cost functions and considering no-uncertainty (black), uncertainty
(orange) and risk aversion (light blue). In the second row, the figure presents the
first derivative of the graphs above, de1da2 . In both types of cost function, the deriva-
tives are closest to zero when e1 = UL or is above it. For the case of substitutes,
there are two additional cases in which the derivative is zero; those are corner
solutions in which either e∗2 = 0 or e∗2 = 1.
4.3 Empirical Test
In this section we present how we implement the test for determining whether
a specific task is a complement or a substitute of a set of tasks for which there
was an observed variation on the reward per unit of effect. The general concern is
that if such a shock to the system occurs, normally it should affect all agents who
are under the same contract. It involves two steps. First, two tests are presented
in order to determine if there is bunching at the upper limit of a given indicator.
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Figure 4.4: Simulation exercise: x1(a2)
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Note: The cost function is defined as C(e1, e2;z, c1, c2,δ) = 1z · ( 12 (c1e21 + c2e22) + δe1e2). For the cases
with uncertainty, x1 = e1 + v1 where v1 ∼ N(0,σ)
It this is the case, for this specific indicator we can establish a set of agents that
will not react to a variation in the reward per unit of effort in other tasks. These
agents, who bunch themselves above UL, constitute a control group that motivates
a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach (Equation 4.20 below). As a treatment
group, agents that originally reported a level of output below the kink point UL
are selected.
In the subsections below, the motivation and identification arguments for the
DiD are discussed first, and the tests for bunching afterwards.
4.3.1 Test Specification
Our object of interest is the sign of C12. According to proposition 1, the sign of C12
is the same as the sign of de1da2 . In this section, we explain how we can use data from
a random sample of agents to estimate the sign of de1da2 (and hence the sign of C12).
Assume that we have available a random sample of N agents, observed con-
secutively for three time periods (t = 1,2,3). For each agent and time period we
observe their task 1 output, that is, {x1it}N,3i=1,t=1. Assume that the payment func-
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tion for output x1 is exactly as (4.8) and is the same in the three time periods. On
the contract, assume that the piece rate for task 2 output is the same in the first
two time periods, but changes in the third time period: a2t=a
′
2 if t = 1,2; and a2t=a
′′
2
if t = 3. Without loss of generality, we assume that a
′′
2<a
′
2.
We will represent agent i’s observed level of task 1 output at time t by:
x1it = e∗1 (a2t,z(i)) + θ1i + λ1t + e1it, (4.14)
where e∗1 (a2t,z(i)) represents agent i’s effort choice on task 1 when he faces
a2t as task 2 piece rate, and z(i) is agent i’s efficiency parameter.13We allow for the
measured level of x1it to differ from the agent’s optimal choice due to a agent fixed
component, θ1i, a time component common across agents, λ1t, and an independent
and identically distributed random error term e1it, which exhibits zero mean and
finite variance.
Using the above, the change in agent i’s observed task 1 output between the
third and second time period is given by:
x1i3 − x1i2 = e∗1
(
a′′2 ,z(i)
)− e∗1 (a′2,z(i))+ λ13 − λ12 + e1i3 − e1i2,
where we are using that the task 2 piece rate, a2t, changed from a
′
2 to a
′′
2 be-
tween these two time periods. We will specialise the above expression according
to whether the agent’s efficiency parameter, z(i), is such that z(i)∈ [z, z¯], and hence
agent i’s optimal effort corresponds to the kink (e∗1 = UL), or when z(i) < z, and
hence the exerted effort is higher. Moreover, we assume that a
′
2, and a
′′
2 are suffi-
ciently close, so that e∗1 (a
′
2,z(i)) = e
∗
1 (a
′′
2 ,z(i)) = UL if z(i) ∈ [z, z¯] (see proposition
2). This means that e∗1 (a
′′
2 ,z(i))− e∗1 (a′2,z(i)) = 0 for the group of agents for which
z(i) ∈ [z, z¯]. Hence, we have that:
x1i3 − x1i2 = λ13 − λ12 + e1i3 − e1i2 if z(i) ∈ [z, z¯] (4.15)
13For ease of notation, we do not make explicit that the agent’s optimal choice of task 1 effort,
e∗1 (·), also depends on the payment function of x1 as well as agent i′s cost function. These elements
are assumed to be constant along the sample period.
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x1i3− x1i2 = e∗1
(
a′′2 ,z(i)
)− e∗1 (a′2,z(i))+ λ13− λ12 + e1i3− e1i2 if z(i)< z (4.16)
Taking expectations of (4.15) and (4.16) over the relevant group of agents, and
subtracting one from the other, we have that:
∆=Eie{i:z(i)<z}[x1i3− x1i2]−Eie{i:z(i)∈[z,z¯]}(x1i3− x1i2) = Eie{i:z(i)<z}[e∗1
(
a′′2 ,z(j)
)− e∗1 (a′2,z(j))]
(4.17)
Note that the left hand side of (4.17), Eie{i:z(i)<z}[e∗1 (a
′′
2 ,z(j))− e∗1 (a′2,z(j))], is
the discrete approximation to (- de1da2 ) (averaged over the set of agents i for which
z(i)< z), whose sign is the same as the sign of C12, our object of interest, and hence
the sign of C12. 14 We can estimate the sign of Eie{i:z(i)<z}[e∗1 (a
′′
2 ,z(j))− e∗1 (a′2,z(j))],
by estimating the sign of the coefficient γ1 in the following difference-in-difference
regression:
x1i3 − x1i2 = γ11(z(i) < z) + vijt (4.18)
which implicitly uses the idea that those agents whose z(i) is between [z, z¯] can
be used as a control group, because they choose to be at the kink of the payment
function of x1and hence are insensitive to small changes in a2, the piece rate of the
other task: x2.
A problem with implementing (4.18) is that neither z(j) nor z will generally
be observable to the econometrician. To address this problem, one could estimate
the following regression diff-in-diff regression:
x1i3 − x1i2 = β11(x1i2 <UL) + v′ijt (4.19)
where we are using the idea that those agents whose z(i)< z are those that have
a output level below the kink (x1i2 < UL), because the individuals that choose
to produce at the kink (UL) are those with z(i) ∈ [z, z¯]. While it is feasible to
estimate (4.19), a problem is that x1i2 depends on the random component ε1,i2,
14Note that we place a minus in front of de1da2 because we assumed that a
′′
2 <a
′
2.
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which introduces a bias due to mean reversion. That is, there might be agents for
which e∗1i2 >UL but due to a large negative transitory shock, ε1,i2 < 0, they end up
with x1i2 < UL. In the following time period, t = 3, we expect x1i3 to be larger or
equal to UL, even if a2twas the same in both t = 2 and t = 3. To net out this mean
reversion bias, we need to estimate the following regression:
x1it− x1it−1 = α11(x1it−1<UL)+ α21(t= 3)+ α31(x1it−1<UL) ·1(t= 3)+ v′′ijt, t= 2,3
(4.20)
where the estimate of α1 absorbs the mean reversion effect, and the sign of
the estimate of α3 will have the same sign as Eie{i:z(i)<z}[e∗1 (a
′′
2 ,z(j))− e∗1 (a′2,z(j))],
and hence the same sign as C12.
4.3.2 Detection of Bunching
It is necessary to construct a counterfactual distribution of achievement in order to
detect the existence of bunching. First, we consider the basic strategy for bunching
developed by Kleven (2016): fit a parametric model on the observed distribution
excluding an interval around UL, and compare it with the observed distribution.
Moreover, if financial rewards play a big role in effort allocation, they will affect
the entire shape of the distribution above UL, not only an interval around the
threshold. For this reason, we borrow a concept from regression discontinuity
design. Essentially, if agents’ effort is the main driver of achievement, this will
produce not only bunching at UL but a discontinuity on the density at that point.
By running a standard McCrary (2008) test, we can determine if this is the case
for a given estimator without imposing an assumption on the endogenous shape
of the density.
In both exercises, our output variables are the histograms of the indicators.
For this purpose we define bins on achievement following McCrary’s procedure
(x˜h) and count the number of agents in each bin
(
nhj
)
.15
15More precisely,
njh =
N
∑
i=1
1
{
x˜h − x˜h−1
2
≤ xij < x˜h+1 − x˜h2
}
, x˜h ∈ {0.5,1,1.5, ...,99.5}
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Bunching strategy We fit restricted cubic splines on the histogram excluding the
interval
[
ULj,ULj + L
]
.16 This strategy essentially splits the domain into segments
defined by K knots (joint points) in order to fit the histogram (nhj) of indicator j
with a piece-wise cubic polynomial in the middle segments, and a linear function
in the first and last ones. It requires the transformation of the domain variable
(the midpoint of the bins, x˜h) into K− 1 constructed variables
(
X(k)jh
)
that ensure
that the resulting function’s first and second derivatives are the same.17 Such
variables are included in the linear expression presented in Equation 4.21 which
also considers dummy variables that indicate the presence of an excluded bin(
1{x˜h = l} , ∀l ∈
[
ULj,ULj + L
])
. The error term, ujh, is assumed to be i.i.d. and
normally distributed.
njh =
K
∑
k=1
ωkX
(k)
jh +
UL+L
∑
l=UL
γl1{x˜h = l}+ ujh (4.21)
After the vector of parameters {ω,γ} is estimated, the counterfactual density
is the predicted value of this equation without the dummies for the excluded
range’s contribution: nˆjh = ∑Kk=1 ωˆkX
(k)
jh . Then, the excess number of observations
that bunch above UL relative to the calculated counterfactual is the difference
between the observed and counterfactual histograms in the excluded range. This
is equivalent to the sum of the omitted dummies γ:
b˜j =
UL+L
∑
l=UL
γˆl =
UL+L
∑
l=UL
(
njh − nˆjh
)
Following Chetty et al. (2009), we compare the amount of excess bunching
with the average density per 1 pp. in the excluded range
bj =
b˜j
1
L+1 ∑
UL+L
l=UL nˆjh
In case there is bunching, the estimated bj overestimates the amount of it. The
16While Kleven (2016) recommends polynomials, such functions might produce poor approxima-
tions in certain cases (Harrell, 2015, Chap 2.4.2). Spline interpolation is a parametric approach that
is as easy to implement as a polynomial, without several of its limitations.
17The procedure was implemented in STATA 13 using mkspline command, using 5 to 7 knots
determined by percentiles recommended in Harrell (2015, Chap 2.4.6).
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reason is that it does not consider that some of the bunched observations in the
interval
[
ULj,ULj + L
]
should be above ULj + L in the counterfactual distribution,
as predicted by the model.18 As our goal is to determine whether or not there
is bunching, we perform a joint significance test of the omitted dummies from
Equation 4.21:
H0 :
UL+L
∑
l=UL
γˆl = 0 (4.22)
RDD strategy In the context of the regression discontinuity design (RDD), Mc-
Crary (2008) introduced a test for the continuity of the log-density g (x) at a given
point:
ι = ln lim
x˜↓UL
g (x˜)− ln lim
x˜↑UL
g (x˜)
The basic idea behind it is that if a treatment were assigned according to being
above or below such a point, individuals would try to ‘choose’ their position in
the domain in order to obtain or avoid the treatment. Such self-selection would
induce a discontinuity on the density. In the bunching literature a discontinuity is
not necessary as it allows for a noisy relationship between individual choices and
observed outcomes. However, if such a noise is not present, the excess of density
at one point will induce a drastic change in the density at such a point.
The estimation of the jump on the log-density, iˆ, is undertaken following Mc-
Crary’s procedure. First, the bin size is determined according to the standard
deviation of the indicator and the total number of indicators. Second, a band-
width is selected based on the non-parametric estimator literature.19 Given the
bandwidth, local linear regressions are fitted to both sides of UL. Finally, the
estimator tests whether the fitted function is continuous at UL.
4.3.3 The importance of bunching
The presence of the kink at UL is essential for the test. If there were no corner
solution near this point, the expression in Equation 4.17 would deliver mislead-
18Chetty et al. (2009) correct for this using an iterative procedure in which the area above ULj + L
is artificially increased in such a way that the area under both the observed and counterfactual
densities is the same.
19In a few cases, the suggested optimal bandwidth is beyond the domain of the indicator (i.e.
upper limit above 100%). In such case, we set the bandwidth to be equal to 100−UL.
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ing results. From Equation 4.6, and assuming as before that the sole source of
heterogeneity is the efficiency parameter z, we can derive the predicted sign of
Equation 4.17 if the UL does not produce bunching. As shown in Figure 4.2, a
higher level of z implies a higher level of e1. As a result, when we compare the
e∗1 response to variation in a2 for an agent with high x1 with one with low x1,
we are comparing an agent with a high vs. low value of z. Then, the essential
question here is how de1da2 changes along z. Equation 4.23 answers that question,
and shows that its sign is determined by the sign of C12, just like the derivative
itself. For substitutes (C12 > 0), the derivative is negative ( de1da2 < 0) and becomes
even more negative with higher values of the productivity parameter
(
d2e1
dzda2
< 0
)
.
For complements the opposite is true.
d2e1
dzda2
= − C12
C11C22 − C212
(4.23)
Equation 4.23 has a strong implication for the test described above. Essen-
tially, if the sorting is based on overall productivity, z, and there is no bunching,
the term ∆ presented in Equation 4.17 will produce a result that is opposite to the
test result. In order to illustrate this, let us compare the response of two practices,
one below UL with a productivity z and the other above such a cut-off with z¯. The
sorting of e∗1 implies that z¯ = z + ι, where ι > 0. As shown below, if we approxi-
mate Equation 4.17 with derivative, it is clear that the sign of ∆ is the same as the
sign of C12, exactly the opposite result from the one stated in the test description.
∆ = Eie{i:z(i)<z}[x1i3 − x1i2]− Eie{i:z(i)∈[z,z¯]}(x1i3 − x1i2)
≈ de1(z)
da2
− de1(z¯)
da2
= − z · C12
C11C22 − C212
+
z¯ · C12
C11C22 − C212
= (z¯− z) C12
C11C22 − C212
=
ι · C12
C11C22 − C212
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The previous derivation was based on particular sorting with respect to over-
all efficiency z. However, sorting might be along other dimensions so no reliable
test can be derived based on such a difference. For instance, if heterogeneity is
only based on the efficiency of task 2, ∆ might always be negative regardless of
the sign of C12. See the example in Appendix 4.A.1 for more details.
4.4 An application: The Quality and Outcomes Framework
4.4.1 Background
The program that we analyse, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), was
introduced in 2004 as part of major reform with the aim of improving service and
reducing inequality in the quality of care received. It is a financial reward system
for achieving a set of administrative and clinical goals. The level of achievement
of these goals is monitored by a regional commissioner. Every year, the NHS
and the physicians trade union, the British Medical Association, negotiate which
indicators should be included and how much money should be paid for each one.
Rewards are defined according to a point system, which is based on indicators.
Administrative indicators are usually binary questions, where the practice obtains
all of the points assigned to an indicator if a certain requirement is fulfilled. On
the other hand, most clinical indicators are a non-linear function of the proportion
of patients that received a certain standard of care. This will be explained in detail
in the next section. Changes to the system have been proposed by the National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), but still have to be negotiated by the
interested parties. These indicators are one of the most significant contributions
of the program, as they provide an image of the quality of primary care services
that was not available before. All the information is published yearly by the NHS
at GP practice level and is the main source of data for the present study.20
Clinical indicators are related to management of chronic diseases and pub-
lic health concerns. They cover chronic patients that require specific treatments
such as those with coronary heart disease, heart failure or diabetes. Moreover,
it involves lifestyle advice for smoking, obesity and primary prevention of car-
diovascular diseases in general. Since their introduction, several areas have been
removed or introduced or indicators replaced.
20Currently date is archived by NHS Digital at http://digital.nhs.uk/qof.
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Analysis of multitasking on the QOF starts with the introduction of the sys-
tem. The first order concern was to determine whether the programme had a
negative impact on unmeasured (thus, unrewarded) indicators of care, one of the
possible outcomes predicted by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992).
Sutton et al. (2010) studied a panel of medical records collected before and after
the introduction of the programme in Scotland, which included both rewarded
and unrewarded outcomes. They claim that after the introduction of the pro-
gramme there was an improvement in record-keeping for both type of outcomes
with respect to the pre-programme trend, but this was larger for those rewarded
measures. This was the case for recordings on blood pressure, cholesterol and
smoking, which were rewarded, against BMI and alcohol consumption, which
were not. Doran et al. (2011) did a similar exercise for a sample of practices in
England, but in this case they had access to prescription and biomarkers data,
and they obtained similar results. In both studies, as unrewarded measures are
affected by the reallocation of effort generated by the introduction of rewards, the
identification of the effects of multitasking relies on the validity of using extrapo-
lated pre-treatment trends as a counter-factual. This has also motivated theoretical
work on the optimal design of the system. such as Eggleston (2005) and Kaarboe
and Siciliani (2011).
As the QOF is adjusted almost every year, a second generation of the analysis
followed these innovations. A first set of changes was introduced in 2005/06,
where the payment thresholds were revised for some indicators making it more
difficult to achieve the maximum number of points. Feng et al. (2015) compared
the evolution of the modified and unmodified indicators in Scotland, and showed
that performance increased for the affected measures.
A final element to consider is gaming of the system. The main concern is
called exception reporting for clinical indicators, which consists of declaring that
a patient should not be treated according to the QOF guidelines due to specific
health conditions. By increasing the number of excepted patients, the relevant
indicator will increase without providing extra services. Gravelle et al. (2010)
showed that GP practices exempt relatively more patients from being considered
for some of the clinical indicators if the overall achievement in the previous year
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was below UL, than if it was above this threshold. For our purposes, cheating
implies that some practices with productivity z0− η would report having produc-
tivity z0. This would be a problem for our estimates if those cheating above UL
adjusted their reported effort in response to changes in the price of alternative
tasks.
Panel A of Table 4.1 presents the number of practices in the financial years
2009, 2010 and 2011 and their average number of patients (list size). There are
around 8000 GP practices covering on average 7000 patients. Panel B shows the
mean achievement per domain in each year, which is very close to 100% in all
years. The big increase from 2010 to 2011 is due to the removal of some of the
indicators, which will be discussed in the next section. Panel C presents the total
clinical points (2009) assigned to those conditions with the highest prevalence
in the population, according to the QOF data reports. Such points assignments
provide an idea on the areas where the NHS considered it a priority to improve
and standardize health care. In 2009, diabetes was the most rewarded clinical
area with 100 points out of 697 available for the clinical indicator, followed by
hypertension and CHD. While these are also some of the most common chronic
conditions, relevance is not the sole criteria. For instance management of new
cases of depression in the previous years received more points than asthma, even
though the latter was the second most common chronic disease after hypertension.
4.4.2 Payment system
In our analysis we will consider that for a GP practice, the marginal benefit of
exerting effort on a task is a linear function that involves both altruism and mone-
tary payments. Hence, the marginal reward above UL for task j, which we called
a¯1 in subsection (4.2.2), refers to the altruistic motive.21 Our analysis is based on
data from the years 2009 to 2011. In 2009 and 2010, GPs could obtain up to 1000
points: 697 for the clinical domain, 167.5 for the organizational domain, 91.5 for
patient experience, and 44 for additional services. In 2011, the clinical domain
was reduced to 661 and patient experience to 33, and 262 points were rellocated
to organizational indicators. Points are translated into income depending on the
21The assumption of a linear benefit to patients’ welfare is relaxed by Kaarboe and Siciliani (2011).
In such a scenario, the relevant function is not C(·) but B(·) − C(·), hence our results will signal
complementarity or substituiability of this function.
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Table 4.1: GP Practices and QOF Descriptives
Panel A: Main Characteristics Average by practice and year
2009 2010 2011
Number of patients (list size) 6602.84 6691.28 6835.62
Number of practices 8305 8359 8124
Panel B: QOF achievement Average by practice and year
2009 2010 2011
Clinical 95.86 96.75 97.01
Organisational 96.34 97.36 96.37
Patient Experience 71.47 72.60 98.95
Additional Services 95.35 97.13 97.02
Total 93.69 94.66 96.91
Panel C: Selected Raw Prevalences and QOF points for 2009
Points Mean Std Dev
Diabetes † 100 4.28 1.85
Hypertension 81 13.53 4.79
Asthma 45 5.95 2.29
Coronary Heart Disease 87 3.45 1.49
Depression new cases † 53 0.76 0.80
Notes: Own calculations based on QOF data published in NHS Digital. † Diabetes raw prevalence is underestimated as it is
calculated as the number of individuals aged 17 and over with diagnosed types I or II, over the total list size (without age
distinction). New cases of depression are those patients diagnosed with the disease during the last financial year (April 1 to
March 31).
size of the practice and how common the underlying health condition is in the
practice’s population.22
Monetary payments in the QOF are determined by achievement according to a
set of indicators, of which there are two main types: binary and ratios. The former
gives a fixed amount of points if a condition is attained.23 For instance, indicator
BP1 gives 6 points if there is a register of people with established hypertension,
or 0 points if there is not. On the other hand, the awarded points for ratio based
indicators depend on the number of patients that should potentially receive a
given treatment (denominator), and the number of those who effectively receive it
(numerator) during a specific period of time.24 For instance, the definition below
for indicators DM17 and ASTHMA6.
Indicator ASTHMA6: The percentage of patients with asthma who
have had an asthma review in the previous 15 months
22See Appendix 4.B for further details.
23Some administrative indicators also involve ratios. For instance, if there are less than 5 years
of records of the blood pressure of patients for 80% of the patients aged 45 and over (indicator
RECORD17). In those cases, the number of points allocated follow a binary allocation instead of a
piece-rate reward system.
24In principle, payment is retrospective, but it is possible to obtain advance payments based on
previous year’s performance, which are known as aspiration payments. More details are available
from the BMA (2013).
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Indicator DM17: The percentage of patients with diabetes whose
last measured total cholesterol within the previous 15 months was 5
mmol/l or less
If achievement is below a lower limit (LLj) zero points are awarded, and if it above
the upper limit (ULj) the maximum amount of available points for indicator j are
awarded.
Returning to the DM17 indicator example, the lower limit is LL = 40% and
the upper limit is UL = 70%. Then, if at least 70 out of every 100 patients with
diabetes have total cholesterol of 5mmol/l or less in the last 15 months, the practice
will receive 6 points, the total number of points allocated to this indicator. For
ASTHMA6 there are 20 points available and it has the same thresholds LL = 40%
and UL = 70%. A graphic representation of such an assignment rule is presented
in the top diagrams in Figure 4.5, where the horizontal axis presents the possible
levels of achievement and the vertical axis represents the number of points that
would be awarded according to the QOF rules. Figure 4.5 also presents histograms
for the actual achievement attained by GP practices in each indicator for the 8301
practices in the 2009/10 financial year.25 From these densities, there are two main
points to remark on. First, there are few practices at or close to the lower limit
LL; and in fact, most of the distribution is above the UL. The mean achievement
for ASHTMA6 was 80% and 83% for DM17 (see Table 4.2). Less than 6% of the
practices attained a level below UL for ASTHMA6, while for DM17 this figure
was 2.5%. This is a common element in all indicators that initially exceeded the
expectations of the policymakers (Gregory, 2009). As a result, the main focus of
this project is the role of the UL, hence the LL will not be discussed.
Second, as seen for the case of ASHTMA6, there is a sudden increase in the
density at UL; in other words, there is bunching above the threshold, which is an
usual feature of the data produced by discontinuities in budget constraints (Saez,
2010). However, this is not the case for all of the indicators. This seems to be the
case of indicator DM17. According to the model discussed before, this might be
either because the financial reward has a minimum impact on the motivation of
physicians for accomplishing the goal or due to substantial noise between effort
25This includes practices without any cases of hypertension (5 practices) or asthma (8 cases). In
those scenarios, zero points are given.
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and the measured achievement indicator.26 Another typical reason for not detect-
ing bunching, the measurement error (Kleven, 2016), is a problem for the present
study as the QOF data are based on administrative records for a large number of
GP practices.
The other main source of variation in the data is time. Given that between
2009/10 and 2010/11 there were not changes to the QOF indicators, we can under-
stand how achievement changes from period to period. First, while achievement
is persistent, there is substantial year-to-year variation. The autocorrelation coeffi-
cients are 0.54 for ASTHMA6 and 0.6 for DM17. Second, practices below the UL
in one year tend to increase their achievement in the next one. The mean variation
for ASTHMA6 is 11 pp. (SD = 14.8 pp.) for those practices below the UL in 2009,
but it is -0.2 pp. (SD = 6.7 pp.) for those above it. Such a mean difference is differ-
ent from 0 at the 99% level. The same happens for DM17, but with a difference of
means of 9 pp. Descriptive statistics for the other indicators are presented in Table
4.7 in the appendix as the pattern is the same.
Table 4.2: DM17 and ASTHMA3 QOF indicators descriptives for 2010/11
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indicator UL Number E[xt] P[xt <UL] ρ(xt) E[xt − xt−1 E[xt − xt−1
|xt−1 <UL] |xt−1 >UL]
ASTHMA06 70% 8245 79.58 5.29 0.54 11.03 -0.19
DM17 70% 8245 82.73 2.43 0.60 8.70 -0.55
Notes: Own calculations based on QOF data. Number: Number of GP practices, including those with 0 elegible
patients for the given indicator. E[xt] : Average achievement per indicator. P[xt < UL] : Proportion of practices
with an achivement below UL. ρ(xt) : Correlation between 2010 and 2009 achivement.
4.4.3 The 2011 changes
While QOF is normally revised every year, there was no change between 2009 and
2010 after an agreement between BMA and NHS during the H1N1 vaccination
program (NHS Employers, 2010). However, between 2010 and 2011 there were
major changes that we will interpret as a net reduction in the financial reward per
26For instance, the staff of the GP practice might have complete control in keeping records of tests
or ensuring that patients with a given condition are prescribed a given drug. However, ensuring that
the levels of cholesterol of their patients are within certain range, as required by indicator DM17
discussed before, might depend on many actions not controlled by providers. Indeed, Fichera
et al. (2014) present a game in which physicians and doctors interact using their available tools,
prescriptions and lifestyle, in response to QOF incentives.
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Figure 4.5: Points reward function and achievement density for Diabetes 17 (DM17) and
ASHTMA6 (2009/10)
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Notes: Own calculations based on QOF data archived at NHS Digital.
unit of effort for part of the clinical indicators. This time-frame between 2009 and
2011 will be the main source of data for our analysis.
There are in total 1000 QOF points in all three years, but several indicators
were either removed, modified or replaced by new ones. We have summarized
them in three broad categories presented in Table 4.3. First, those that imply a
reduction in the financial reward per unit of effort; second, those that we interpret
as an increase in the marginal benefit; and third, those whose nature is ambiguous.
A more detailed explanation of these changes is presented in Table 4.8 in the
appendix.
In the first category (reduction in the financial reward per unit of effort), we
include indicators that are withdrawn,27 increases in UL (which will obviously
flatten the slope of the reward function)28 or changes that consisted of a reduction
27Clinical retired indicators were almost a requirement for measuring other QOF indicators. For
instance, indicator CH5 was about having a recent blood pressure record for patients who suffered
from coronary heart disease but CHD6 rewards practices for keeping the blood pressure of these
patients controlled.
28See Equation 4.25 in the appendix. While the initial proposal was to redefine the UL and make
them a function of the underlying indicator distribution in 2011 (match the 75th percentile), the
negotiations delivered a slow-paced plan. By 2011 two ULs had increased by one pp. However in
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in the number of points allocated to the indicator. In total 143 of the original
clinical points are affected. A different type of change also implied a reduction
in the financial reward per unit of effort: these were wording amendments in
which the goal definition changed to require either additional tasks or reduce the
reference time of the indicator.
The second category (ambiguous change) covers several word amendments
that are not straightforward to classify. In these cases typically a more precise
definition of the goal to be accomplished is accompanied by additional points in
compensation. In total 51 of the original points are in this category.
The third category (increase in the financial reward per unit of effort) includes
new indicators as well as old ones with goals that are easier to achieve. The new
indicators, covering 12 points, refer to tasks that were not financially rewarded be-
fore. Also, for one indicator (17 points) the new wording relaxed the goal defined
in the original version.
As we can see, in terms of clinical indicators, the total amount of points re-
lated to a reward drop are larger than those associated with an increase, even if
we consider all ambiguous changes as increases. Hence, we interpret the overall
changes in 2011 as an overall reduction in the marginal payment per unit of effort.
Administrative indicators suffered a major modification in 2011. Two thirds of
the patient experience domain were removed in favour of the new quality and produc-
tivity indicators. Practices had to agree a plan with the primary care organisations
consisting of three main goals for prescribing (28 points), outpatient referrals (21
points) and emergency admissions (47.5 points). The exact indicator definition
and its upper threshold was defined at local level. The objective of the indicators
was to reduce costs for the PCT by improving the cost-efficiency of prescribing
and by treating more patients at primary care level, reducing both referrals and
emergency admission rates.
For the reasons given above, we consider that the main objective of the
changes was to tighten-up the requirements for obtaining rewards, at least on the
clinical side. We will not discuss the administrative indicators, given that almost
an entire domain was replaced with an other: the perceived time for getting an
2012 both the lower and upper limits were increased by between 4 to 10 pp. for 13 indicators (Doran
et al., 2014).
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Table 4.3: Changes in QOF 2011 with respect to 2009-2010
Panel A. Clinical Indicators
Price
Interpretation
(Total Points)
Status Description Points
Reduction
(143 to 87)
Withdrawn No longer rewarded tasks 32
Points
reduced
Number of assigned points per
indicator was reduced.
26 to 22
Upper Limit
Increased
Increase on UL 22
Replacement
I
New wording with more strict
definition of a goal or a reduced
time-frame for accomplishing it
18
Replacement
II
Decrease in points and new wording is
more detailed
45 to 25
Ambiguous
(51 to 59) Replacement
III
Harder to accomplish or more detailed
goals but compensated with extra
points
51 to 59
Increase
(29)
Replacement
IV
Reference cutoff relaxed 17
New New tasks to be rewarded 12
NA
(486)
Replacement
V
Similar or same wording, but expressed
in new units or highlight recent
changes on diagnostic procedures.
32
Unchanged No change on points, thresholds or
wording
454
Panel B. Non-Clinical Indicators
Price
Interpretation Status Description Points
Reduction Retirements No longer rewarded tasks 60.5
Increase New New tasks to be rewarded 96.5
NA Unchanged No change on either points or wording 242.5
Note: Authors’ interpretation based on NHS Employers public documents.
appointment was replaced with meetings related to prescribing and other super-
vised improvement plans designed by the PCT. Because these are administrative
tasks, we assume that they were not carried out by doctors themselves and hence
that they do not alter the marginal cost of clinical effort.
4.5 Results
The results are presented in two steps. First, we assess the validity of the test by
checking for a discontinuity and/or for bunching at the upper limit (UL). Second,
we test the sign of the response on effort to a price drop in alternative tasks, on
those indicators that were not affected by the QOF 2011 changes.
For the bunching analysis, we pool data from both years 2009 and 2010 and
set 10 pp. an estimation window below and above UL. We also discard the bins
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corresponding to 100%, which is hard to fit with a continuous density function.
Figure 4.6.A presents a graphical representation of the McCrary test for continuity
on the density at UL for indicators DM17 and ASTHMA6, our examples discussed
in the previous section. Both graphs present the histogram (nhj), and the fitted
models to both sides of UL . For ASTHMA6 there is clear evidence of the existence
of a discontinuity as the null hypothesis that both approximated log-densities
are the same at UL is rejected. In both cases the test suggest the presence of a
discontinuity on the density at UL. For DM17 such a null cannot be rejected at the
95% level, but it is at the 90% level. Table 4.4 presents this exercise (Column 4) for
each indicator (rows) given a McCrary’s default calculations for bin size (Column
2) and bandwidth (Column 3).
The calculation of the amount of excess bunching for both indicators is pre-
sented in Figure 4.6.B. Apart from the histogram (nhj), these figures present the
fitted model including dummies γ covering [UL,UL + 5pp.] (orange line) and ex-
cluding them from the prediction (black line). For DM17, the difference between
the histogram and the counterfactual difference is of 42% of the average density
in the interval; and for ASTHMA6 it is 107%. Both estimates are significant at
the 95% level. However, such estimates are sensible to the number of knots in the
spline, the excluded range size L, and the estimation window. Varying the config-
uration of such parameters we obtain very different point estimates. Columns 5
to 9 in Table 4.4 present several configurations of an excluded range from L = 2 to
L = 7, 5 and 7 knots, and estimation windows of 10 and 20. For DM17 an estimate
of b between -90% and 43%; and for ASTHMA6 it is around 60% to 417%. Despite
such large differences, the null in Equation 4.22 is not rejected for ASTHMA6.
On the other hand, for DM17 the null is rejected in 3 out of 5 of the explored
specifications.
Given the results stated above, there is clear evidence that the upper limit
has an effect on practices, effort allocation for ASTHMA6, but this is not as clear
for DM17. Therefore the test is likely to be informative for the first but not the
second indicator. Table 4.4 also suggests that for indicators DM22,29 SMOKE330
29Based on having a record of glomerular filtration rate (GFR), which measures kidney function.
30Proportion of individuals affected by several chronic conditions who are referred to smoking
cessation advice.
4.5. Results 175
Figure 4.6: Testing for Bunching
A. McCrary Test
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Note: In sub-figure (a), the empirical densities to both sides of the threshold UL are smoothed using
a local linear regression within the given bandwidth of UL (vertical lines). These smoothed functions
are presented with a 95% CI. In sub-figure (b), the empirical density is fitted with a restricted cubic
spline based on 5 knots. Domain was restricted to a 10 pp. window around UL, and the excluded
range is [ULj,ULj + 5pp.]
and THYROI0231 there is no evidence of bunching. Table 4.9 in the appendix
presents definitions and graphs equivalent to Figures 4.6.A and 4.6.B for these
indicators.
31Record on thyroid function tests.
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Table 4.4: QOF indicators corner test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Indicator UL BS BW DC Test
w=10,
h=2,
k=5
w=10,
h=3,
k=5
w=10,
h=3,
k=7
w=20,
h=3,
k=5
w=20,
h=5,
k=5
AF03 90 0.06 6.38 1.82 ∗∗∗ 123.1 ∗∗∗ 242.4 ∗∗∗ 183.3 ∗∗∗ 176.9 ∗∗∗ 345.4 ∗∗∗
[30.72] [ 6.53] [10.96] [ 6.11] [ 9.34] [ 9.73]
AF04 90 0.19 10.00 2.50 ∗∗∗ 171.4 ∗∗∗ 184.7 ∗∗∗ 237.4 ∗∗∗ 137.1 ∗∗∗ 183.7 ∗∗∗
[26.28] [ 4.10] [ 3.88] [ 2.67] [ 3.82] [ 3.17]
ASTHMA03 80 0.11 10.00 1.76 ∗∗∗ 200.5 ∗∗∗ 154.5 89.1 150.4 ∗∗ 295.5 ∗∗∗
[20.65] [ 3.31] [ 1.41] [ 0.51] [ 2.13] [ 3.32]
ASTHMA06 70 0.13 6.05 0.92 ∗∗∗ 49.3 ∗∗∗ 107.4 ∗∗∗ 57.1 ∗∗∗ 125.4 ∗∗∗ 416.9 ∗∗∗
[12.28] [ 4.68] [ 9.33] [ 5.19] [ 6.36] [19.66]
ASTHMA08 80 0.14 10.00 1.93 ∗∗∗ 205.8 ∗∗∗ 254.8 ∗∗∗ 193.4 256.6 ∗∗∗ 492.7 ∗∗∗
[27.49] [ 4.98] [ 3.42] [ 1.59] [ 5.11] [ 8.02]
BP5 70 0.10 5.26 0.31 ∗∗∗ 13.9 ∗ 37.5 ∗∗∗ 42.5 ∗∗∗ 24.1 ∗∗∗ 18.8 ∗∗
[ 3.60] [ 1.92] [ 3.99] [ 2.83] [ 3.94] [ 2.32]
CANCER03 90 0.28 10.00 1.41 ∗∗∗ 160.2 ∗∗∗ 235.6 ∗∗∗ 195.5 ∗∗ 229.2 ∗∗∗ 352.1 ∗∗∗
[26.48] [ 3.36] [ 4.05] [ 2.44] [ 6.30] [ 5.83]
CHD08 70 0.10 6.59 0.30 ∗∗∗ 37.8 ∗∗∗ 39.1 ∗∗ 68.8 ∗∗ 14.7 -56.2 ∗∗∗
[ 2.59] [ 4.27] [ 2.10] [ 2.54] [ 0.85] [-2.91]
CHD09 90 0.05 4.57 1.20 ∗∗∗ 77.1 ∗∗∗ 136.2 ∗∗∗ 85.4 ∗∗∗ 57.7 ∗∗∗ 208.4 ∗∗∗
[18.55] [ 8.68] [11.54] [ 5.81] [ 5.48] [ 9.06]
CHD10 60 0.15 7.69 1.30 ∗∗∗ 91.9 ∗∗∗ 128.3 ∗∗∗ 112.7 ∗∗∗ 112.4 ∗∗∗ 237.5 ∗∗∗
[12.46] [ 7.18] [ 8.89] [ 4.60] [ 6.19] [ 9.17]
CHD12 90 0.08 4.82 1.21 ∗∗∗ 118.2 ∗∗∗ 222.2 ∗∗∗ 153.4 ∗∗∗ 161.5 ∗∗∗ 323.7 ∗∗∗
[22.56] [10.79] [20.70] [17.18] [16.06] [14.33]
CKD02 90 0.04 3.42 0.83 ∗∗∗ 289.9 ∗∗∗ 141.9 ∗∗∗ -1279.0 ∗∗∗ 398.2 ∗∗ -166.1 ∗∗
[ 3.52] [ 6.71] [ 2.83] [ 5.35] [ 2.30] [-2.02]
CKD03 70 0.13 7.73 0.69 ∗∗∗ 82.9 ∗∗∗ 136.9 ∗∗∗ 100.9 ∗∗∗ 164.0 ∗∗∗ 343.5 ∗∗∗
[16.24] [10.73] [11.64] [ 6.81] [11.02] [18.86]
CKD05 80 0.16 10.00 2.40 ∗∗∗ 466.9 ∗∗∗ 249.9 83.9 243.7 ∗ 413.4 ∗∗
[18.73] [ 3.21] [ 1.11] [ 0.29] [ 1.72] [ 2.48]
CKD06 80 0.22 8.89 0.85 ∗∗∗ 77.3 ∗∗∗ 113.6 ∗∗∗ 109.9 ∗∗∗ 109.8 ∗∗∗ 259.6 ∗∗∗
[16.84] [ 5.82] [ 5.70] [ 3.40] [ 5.11] [ 8.42]
CVD01 70 0.28 10.00 1.11 ∗∗∗ 164.8 ∗∗∗ 254.3 ∗∗ 200.1 179.7 ∗∗ 499.0 ∗∗∗
[13.83] [ 4.00] [ 2.32] [ 1.34] [ 2.01] [ 5.17]
CVD02 70 0.22 10.00 1.02 ∗∗∗ 97.4 ∗∗∗ 118.1 ∗∗ 97.6 79.6 ∗ 71.4
[10.77] [ 3.84] [ 2.50] [ 1.40] [ 1.78] [ 0.89]
DEM02 60 0.19 10.00 2.31 ∗∗∗ 366.9 ∗∗∗ 359.9 ∗∗∗ 717.4 ∗ 282.1 ∗∗ 338.2
[13.60] [ 4.56] [ 4.71] [ 1.92] [ 2.40] [ 1.30]
DM2 90 0.06 4.22 0.20 ∗∗ 4.9 -34.2 ∗∗∗ 39.3 ∗∗∗ -106.8 ∗∗∗ -141.5 ∗∗∗
[ 2.33] [ 0.53] [-3.78] [ 3.16] [-10.34] [-6.49]
DM10 90 0.12 4.98 0.74 ∗∗∗ 48.9 ∗∗∗ 108.5 ∗∗∗ 57.6 ∗∗∗ 58.9 ∗∗∗ 214.8 ∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 4.4: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Indicator UL BS BW DC Test
w=10,
h=2,
k=5
w=10,
h=3,
k=5
w=10,
h=3,
k=7
w=20,
h=3,
k=5
w=20,
h=5,
k=5
[13.74] [ 4.80] [ 9.03] [ 6.26] [ 5.46] [ 9.35]
DM13 90 0.14 4.95 0.75 ∗∗∗ 74.0 ∗∗∗ 175.6 ∗∗∗ 113.8 ∗∗∗ 159.1 ∗∗∗ 400.7 ∗∗∗
[16.51] [ 5.69] [11.93] [14.40] [12.83] [19.51]
DM15 80 0.13 10.00 1.45 ∗∗∗ 306.7 ∗∗∗ 223.7 ∗ 172.0 194.6 ∗∗ 262.3 ∗∗∗
[19.09] [ 4.69] [ 1.83] [ 0.84] [ 2.57] [ 2.70]
DM17 70 0.09 4.86 0.25 ∗ 0.0 42.4 ∗∗ 42.6 42.5 -93.2 ∗∗∗
[ 1.76] [ 0.49] [ 2.39] [ 1.60] [ 1.54] [-3.44]
DM18 85 0.09 5.60 0.46 ∗∗∗ 30.0 ∗∗∗ 27.7 ∗∗∗ 42.1 ∗∗∗ 14.5 ∗ 65.9 ∗∗∗
[ 6.41] [ 4.70] [ 3.08] [ 3.19] [ 1.90] [ 6.50]
DM21 90 0.12 5.30 1.07 ∗∗∗ 119.7 ∗∗∗ 222.1 ∗∗∗ 156.1 ∗∗∗ 186.2 ∗∗∗ 376.1 ∗∗∗
[22.39] [ 9.26] [17.40] [14.53] [15.90] [21.36]
DM22 90 0.05 4.21 0.27 ∗ 76.2 ∗∗∗ 34.1 601.1 ∗∗∗ -9.8 -143.7 ∗∗∗
[ 1.87] [ 5.44] [ 1.63] [ 5.28] [-0.32] [-2.82]
EPILEP06 90 0.11 8.54 1.38 ∗∗∗ 84.6 ∗∗∗ 66.9 ∗∗ 181.1 ∗∗∗ -3.9 -72.3 ∗
[19.48] [ 2.70] [ 1.99] [ 2.69] [-0.18] [-1.66]
EPILEP08 70 0.21 10.00 1.18 ∗∗∗ 145.7 ∗∗∗ 245.2 ∗∗∗ 208.6 ∗∗ 250.8 ∗∗∗ 288.7 ∗∗
[23.80] [ 4.44] [ 3.43] [ 2.15] [ 3.75] [ 2.33]
HF02 90 0.17 10.00 2.41 ∗∗∗ 222.9 ∗∗∗ 259.5 ∗∗∗ 257.5 ∗∗ 232.6 ∗∗∗ 336.4 ∗∗∗
[29.80] [ 3.90] [ 4.31] [ 2.65] [ 5.14] [ 6.12]
HF03 80 0.11 10.00 2.19 ∗∗∗ 399.7 ∗∗∗ 240.8 ∗ 246.3 221.1 ∗∗ 293.6 ∗∗
[21.12] [ 4.66] [ 1.72] [ 0.95] [ 2.40] [ 2.50]
HF04 60 0.19 10.00 2.51 ∗∗∗ 662.3 ∗∗∗ 675.1 ∗∗∗ -4475.9 ∗ 580.8 ∗∗ 274.0
[11.53] [ 3.67] [ 4.94] [ 1.92] [ 2.39] [ 0.68]
SMOKE03 90 0.04 3.15 0.14 -9.7 -91.0 ∗∗∗ 104.7 ∗∗∗ -165.7 ∗∗∗ -238.9 ∗∗∗
[ 1.17] [-0.58] [-6.60] [ 5.32] [-12.89] [-10.12]
SMOKE04 90 0.08 4.86 1.32 ∗∗∗ 132.9 ∗∗∗ 299.2 ∗∗∗ 165.9 ∗∗∗ 272.4 ∗∗∗ 662.6 ∗∗∗
[24.79] [ 9.08] [18.04] [14.88] [18.08] [26.30]
STROKE07 90 0.10 6.58 1.12 ∗∗∗ 98.1 ∗∗∗ 179.4 ∗∗∗ 125.2 ∗∗∗ 142.5 ∗∗∗ 308.2 ∗∗∗
[25.10] [ 6.41] [ 8.71] [ 4.76] [ 8.74] [11.01]
STROKE08 60 0.13 9.60 0.47 ∗∗∗ 89.9 ∗∗∗ 116.4 ∗∗∗ 114.5 114.5 ∗∗ 90.4
[ 4.25] [ 2.99] [ 2.85] [ 1.30] [ 2.49] [ 1.12]
STROKE10 85 0.11 7.79 0.98 ∗∗∗ 64.6 ∗∗∗ 103.9 ∗∗∗ 95.3 ∗∗∗ 113.3 ∗∗∗ 262.9 ∗∗∗
[17.87] [ 4.18] [ 5.84] [ 3.64] [ 7.16] [11.52]
STROKE12 90 0.07 5.96 1.51 ∗∗∗ 88.3 ∗∗∗ 155.6 ∗∗∗ 128.2 ∗∗∗ 84.2 ∗∗∗ 217.0 ∗∗∗
[24.03] [ 4.39] [ 5.91] [ 3.21] [ 3.75] [ 5.30]
STROKE13 80 0.19 10.00 2.32 ∗∗∗ 450.8 ∗∗∗ 267.3 ∗ 165.3 259.9 ∗∗ 455.9 ∗∗∗
[21.42] [ 5.27] [ 1.72] [ 0.68] [ 2.55] [ 3.52]
THYROI02 90 0.05 4.48 0.04 -20.3 ∗ -50.7 ∗∗∗ 33.8 -122.2 ∗∗∗ -144.6 ∗∗∗
[ 0.31] [-1.97] [-4.09] [ 1.35] [-10.19] [-5.84]
Continued on next page
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Table 4.4: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Indicator UL BS BW DC Test
w=10,
h=2,
k=5
w=10,
h=3,
k=5
w=10,
h=3,
k=7
w=20,
h=3,
k=5
w=20,
h=5,
k=5
Notes: Own calculations based on QOF data. McCrary test on the continuity of the density at the threshold.
Optimal bin sizes (BS) and bandwidths (BW) for each indicator are chosen following McCrary implementation
of the test. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 4.5 presents the second part in which we estimate regression (4.20),
where x1 refers to indicators whose rewards remained unchanged throughout the
three years that we consider (2009-2011). We exclude from the analysis those
indicators in which the test would not be not valid because bunching was not
detected. For each indicator (rows), the table reports the number of observations
above and below the threshold within a 5 pp. window to both sides of the UL
(Columns 1 and 2). Such is the selected sample for estimating the parameters of
regression (4.20): columns 3 to 5 of the table presents estimates for α1, α2, and α3.
In order to estimate the model, first differences with respect to time are obtained
for each GP practice between 2010 and 2011, and between 2009 and 2010. Such
a variable is the outcome of the equation. We also construct a binary variable
that indicates whether the practice was below the UL in years 2009 and 2010(
1(x1j,t−1 <ULj)
)
, and another that indicates whether we are observing data from
the variation 2010 to 2011 (1(t = 2011)). The sample is restricted to a window of
[UL− 5,UL + 5]. In particular, we are interested in the sign of α3. Given that we
observed a net reduction in the marginal benefit of alternative tasks, a negative
sign of αˆ3 indicates a positive cross-derivative
(
de1
da2
> 0
)
which indicates that the
analysed task are complementary to the tasks affected by the 2011 changes. This
does not mean that the task is a complement of all modified indicators, but that
overall, the net response is equivalent to complements. Another possibility is
that the task is a substitute only of those tasks for which the marginal reward
was increased instead of reduced. This is less likely as the majority of changes
correspond to a decrease, rather than an increase, but we cannot rule out such a
possibility.
We also note that, for some indicators, we might not be able to reject the
hypothesis thatα3 = 0 because of lack of power. In particular, there are some
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indicators that have a very small number of practices below the threshold. For
instance, for HF04 there are only 45 practices below UL in comparison with 669
above it.
We find that AF04,CKD06, DM10, DM13 and EPILEP08 are complements of
the overall modified indicators: effort was reduced in response to the net reduction
in incentives in other indicators. The first (AF04) is the percentage of patients
with atrial fibrillation (a rapid and irregular heartbeat) who had their diagnosis
confirmed by an specialist or with a specialised test. The second (CKD06) is the
percentage of patients with chronic kidney disease who have a record for a test that
checks their kidney status. The third (DM10) is on having records of neuropathy
testing (nerve disorders) and the fourth (DM13) is records of micro-albumuria
testing (kidney’s status) for diabetic patients. The last one, EPILEP08, is on having
records on the percentage of epileptic patients under drug treatment who have
been seizure free
Alternative estimation windows are considered in Table 4.6. In this table,
each cell presented is an estimate of α3 considering a sample of [UL− l,UL + k].
This table is restricted to those cases in which the hypothesis α3 = 0 is rejected at
least once. This means that Column 3 of Table 4.5 corresponds to the fifth column
(l = 5,k = 5) of Table 4.6. Estimates for AF04, CKD06 and DM13 are stable across
the different specifications. Table 4.10 in the appendix presents definitions and
graphs with the bunching test for these indicators.
The diabetes mellitus (DM) area suffered several changes. There were changes
in payments for keeping blood pressure of patients controlled and on records of
foot examination. Also, financial rewards for keeping records of plasma glucose
concentration, blood pressure and cholesterol were removed. Given that both
DM10 and DM13 are also records of recent tests, it seems plausible that such tasks
are complements.
Neither the chronic kidney disease nor the atrial fibrillation indicators were
modified in 2011. Nevertheless, AF04 and CKD06 are affected by other indicators’
changes. AF04 measures the proportion of individuals diagnosed with ECG or by
a specialist. CKD06 rewards keeping a record of albumin creatinine ratio, which
is a specific measure related to kidney disease.
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Table 4.5: QOF indicators results: Window of 5 pp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Descriptives Estim. Regression Coefficients Classif.
Indicator UL N N BELOW AFTER INTER
Below Above α1 α2 α3
AF03 90% 771 5747 0.027∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
AF04 90% 433 3001 0.039∗∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.015∗∗∗ Comp
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
ASTHMA03 80% 336 2505 0.031∗∗∗ −0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.003) (0.011)
ASTHMA06 70% 512 3214 0.032∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.005) (0.002) (0.007)
ASTHMA08 80% 436 3389 0.032∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.006) (0.002) (0.008)
BP5 70% 554 2122 0.021∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
CANCER03 90% 1098 2892 0.019∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.006
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
CHD08 70% 317 1255 0.028∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009)
CHD09 90% 711 5724 0.014∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
CHD10 60% 210 1621 0.038∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.012
(0.009) (0.003) (0.012)
CHD12 90% 1412 5769 0.016∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
CKD02 90% 95 1212 0.044∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.014
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009)
CKD03 70% 1688 3778 0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
CKD05 80% 243 1487 0.038∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.010) (0.005) (0.016)
CKD06 80% 1235 3387 0.027∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ Comp
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
CVD01 70% 548 1699 0.020 −0.014∗∗ −0.003
(0.013) (0.007) (0.017)
CVD02 70% 347 1458 0.029∗∗ 0.001 −0.023
(0.014) (0.006) (0.018)
DEM02 60% 79 1008 0.015 0.014∗∗ −0.000
(0.025) (0.007) (0.035)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Descriptives Estim. Regression Coefficients Classif.
Indicator UL N N BELOW AFTER INTER
Below Above α1 α2 α3
DM2 90% 700 4130 0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
DM10 90% 1585 5411 0.014∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.006∗ Comp
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
DM13 90% 2297 5154 0.011∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.005∗∗ Comp
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
DM15 80% 472 1988 0.024∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.007
(0.007) (0.003) (0.009)
DM18 85% 812 3437 0.014∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ 0.007
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
DM21 90% 1687 5417 0.010∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ 0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
EPILEP06 90% 639 3745 0.031∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.006
(0.004) (0.001) (0.006)
EPILEP08 70% 1254 3262 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.013∗ Comp
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
HF02 90% 620 3028 0.025∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
HF03 80% 271 2175 0.039∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.003) (0.012)
HF04 60% 45 669 0.054∗ 0.022∗∗ −0.050
(0.028) (0.009) (0.038)
SMOKE04 90% 1186 6007 0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
STROKE07 90% 1751 5483 0.010∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
STROKE08 60% 228 705 0.024∗∗∗ −0.007 0.005
(0.009) (0.006) (0.013)
STROKE10 85% 995 4049 0.014∗∗∗ −0.002 0.006
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
STROKE12 90% 839 5322 0.023∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
STROKE13 80% 290 2084 0.020∗ −0.006∗ −0.003
(0.011) (0.003) (0.014)
Notes: Own calculations based on QOF data. BELOW: To have attained below the respective upper thershold in the first
year of the variation (2009 for 2009-2010 and 2010 for 2010-2011). AFTER: 2010 to 2011 variation. AFTER: Interaction
between INTER and AFTER. Clustered at PCT-level standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 4.6: QOF indicators results: Multiple windows
Estimate of α3 under the sample in [UL− l,UL + k]
Presents only indicators for which α3 = 0 is rejected in at least one specification.
k=3 pp. above UL k=5 pp. above UL
Indicator l=2 l=5 l=8 l=2 l=5 l=8
AF04 −0.007 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
ASTHMA06 −0.007 −0.005 −0.007 −0.012 −0.009 −0.011∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
CHD08 −0.015 −0.017∗ −0.017∗∗ −0.010 −0.012 −0.013∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
CKD06 −0.008 −0.015∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
CVD02 0.005 −0.020 −0.025 0.001 −0.023 −0.028∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016)
DM10 −0.001 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 −0.006∗ −0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
DM13 −0.007∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
DM15 −0.018∗ −0.005 −0.007 −0.020∗∗ −0.007 −0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
DM18 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.008∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
EPILEP08 −0.000 −0.005 −0.002 −0.008 −0.013∗ −0.009
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
HF04 −0.112∗∗ −0.059 −0.055 −0.103∗∗ −0.050 −0.045
(0.044) (0.039) (0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.035)
STROKE10 0.011∗ 0.003 0.005 0.013∗∗ 0.006 0.007∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Notes: Own calculations based on QOF data. Clustered at PCT-level standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a test for complementarities/substitutions in the agent’s
cost function in a multitasking setting when there is a two-part linear contract.
It works by considering as a “control” group those agents who self-select into
levels of effort that corresponds to the “kink” in the reward function, that is, at
the threshold where there is a sudden change in the marginal benefit for exerting
effort in a given task. For these agents, there is a wedge between the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of effort, and hence, small changes in incentives will not
4.A. Model Examples 183
alter their effort allocation (and hence can be used as a control group). The test
consists of two steps: first, determining whether the kink produces “bunching” in
the distribution of achievement at the threshold, and if that is the case, a difference
in differences estimator identifies the desired characteristic of the cost function.
As a case of study we have analysed a pay for performance scheme for family
doctors in the UK, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). We have shown
that changes introduced in 2010/11, which we understand as a net price drop in a
set of modified indicators, revealed that several indicators are in fact complements.
This might be because most clinical indicators refer to chronic patients, who not
unusually have several co-morbidities.
4.A Model Examples
A simple cost function that captures both substitutability and complementar-
ity is presented in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005): C(e1, e2;θ = {z, c1, c2,δ}) =
1
z · ( 12 (c1e21 + c2e22) + δe1e2) under the assumption that δ <
√
c1c2, ci > 0∀i. As a
result we can characterize the second derivatives with each parameter Cii = 1z · ci
and Cij = 1z · δ, ∀i 6= j.
4.A.1 No uncertainty
Given our function φi(xi), for an optimal level of effort below UL1 , the optimal
levels of effort are given by
e∗1 = z ·
a1c2 − δa2
c1c2 − δ2 , e
∗
2 = z ·
a2c1 − δa1
c1c2 − δ2
Hence, Equation 4.6 becomes:
de1
da2
= z · −δ
c1c2 − δ2
Where it is clear that the sign of δ dominates the response to the incentives:
if it is negative, then the tasks are complements as the marginal cost of one of the
tasks is reduced when the effort of the other is increased (similar to the concept of
economies of scope). However, notice that if we are above the threshold UL1, two
options should be considered
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e∗1 = z ·
a˜1c2 − δa2
c1c2 − δ2 , e
∗
2 = z ·
a2c1
c1c2 − δ2 and e
∗
1 = UL1 , e
∗
2 =
z · a2 − δUL1
c2
As a result:
1) If δ > 0 (substitutes), at most, it is optimal to exert an effort level e1 = UL1,
so it is expected that de1da2 |e∗1≥UL1 = 0. Below that level, effort in task 1 it is decreasing
with respect to the other task price: de1da2 |e∗1≥UL1 ≤ 0
2) If δ< 0 (complements), below a cutoff a¯2 it is optimal to exert an effort level
e1 = UL1, but above such a price cutoff, de1da2 > 0.
The result is a three section supply of effort 1. For substitutes it is flat, and
then it decreases until it is optimal not to do any effort; and for complements it is
increasing, flat and then increasing.
Kink With our current restrictions, it is straightforward to obtain the density of
e∗1 . Here, H¯(e˜1) = G
[
e∗−11 (e˜1; a¯1, a2)
]
= G
[
e˜1 c1c2−δ
2
a¯1c2−δa2
]
. Then, h¯(e˜1) = g
[
e˜1 c1c2−δ
2
a¯1c2−δa2
]
·
c1c2−δ2
a¯1c2−δa2 and similarly h(e˜1) = g
[
e˜1 c1c2−δ
2
(a¯1+p1)·c2−δa2
]
· c1c2−δ2
(a¯1+p1)·c2−δa2 .
Let us consider the point eˆ = e˜1
(a¯1+p1)·c2−δa2
a¯1c2−δa2 . If we consider the density with-
out kink h(eˆ) = g
[
e˜1 c1c2−δ
2
a¯1c2−δa2
]
· c1c2−δ2
(a¯1+p1)·c2−δa2 . We can re-express it as g
[
e˜1 c1c2−δ
2
a¯1c2−δa2
]
=
h(eˆ) · (a¯1+p1)·c2−δa2c1c2−δ2 . Replacing this term in the density above UL, we can express
the density of e∗1 in terms of h(·), as shown below:
h(e˜1) =

h (e˜1) if e˜1 <UL
b if e˜1 = UL
h
(
e˜1
(a¯1+p1)·c2−δa2
a¯1c2−δa2
)
· (a¯1+p1)·c2−δa2a¯1c2−δa2 if e˜1 >UL
(4.24)
Notice that near UL, there is a discontinuity on the density even if we do not
consider the bunching mass at UL. Below UL the density is h (e˜1), but above it,
the density is larger for a constant h (e˜1). This is evident in the example of figure
4.3, where h (·) is a constant as g(·) is uniformly distributed.
Comparative Statics What can generate the distribution over e1? Let us consider
only interior solutions (a1c2 − δa2 > 0 and a2c1 − δa1 > 0) and let ∆T be the differ-
ence between the slopes of e∗1 with respect to a2 above and below a given point
T
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∆T =
de1
da2
|e∗1<T −
de1
da2
|e∗1≥T
Heterogeneity on c1 If the distribution on e1 is due to efficiency on task 1, the
sign of ∆ is informative about the sign of δ. The resulting sorting on e1 due to
variation in e1 is the same regardless of the nature of the cost function, while the
size of the e∗1 slope with respect to a2 depends on it.
∂e1
∂c1
∂2e1
∂a2∂c1
Below - Above (∆T)
− (a1c2 − δa2) · z−1 ·
(
c1c2 − δ2
)−2 c2 δ · z−1 · (c1c2 − δ2)−2 c2 −δz·(c¯1c2−δ2) − −δz·(c1c2−δ2)
First term is smaller in abs. val as its denominator is larger
δ < 0 (Complements) < 0 < 0 < 0
δ > 0 (Substitutes) < 0 > 0 > 0
Heterogeneity on c2 If the distribution on e1 is due to the efficiency on task 2,
the sign of ∆ is not informative about the sign of δ. In this case, both the sorting
and the size of the e∗1 slope with respect to a2 depend on the nature of the costs
function.
∂e1
∂c2
∂2e1
∂a2∂c2
Below - Above (∆T)
δ (a2c1 − a1δ) · z−1 ·
(
c1c2 − δ2
)−2
δ · z−1 · (c1c2 − δ2)−2 c1 Depends on δ
δ < 0 (Complements) < 0 < 0 < 0
δ > 0 (Substitutes) > 0 > 0 < 0 !!!!
Heterogeneity on δ If the distribution on e1 is due to the degree of comple-
mentarity/sustituibility, the sign of ∆ can only detect substitutes. Here, the size
of the e∗1 slope with respect to a2 depend on the nature of the costs function but
the sorting depends on the value of other parameters. If tasks are substitutes and
e∗1 >
a2
2δz2 , the sorting will be positive. In that case it is possible to say that the
tasks are substitutes by observing a positive ∆, but if this term is positive it is not
possible to deduce the sign of δ.
∂e1
∂δ
∂2e1
∂a2∂δ
Below - Above (∆T)
(−a2 (c1c2 − δ2)+ 2δ (a1c2 − δa2)) · z−1 · (c1c2 − δ2)−2 −(δ2 + c1c2) · z−1 · (c1c2 − δ2)−2 c1 Depends on δ(
−a2 + 2δz2 a1c2−δa2z(c1c2−δ2)
)
· z−1 · (c1c2 − δ2)−1(−a2 + 2δz2e∗1) · z−1 · (c1c2 − δ2)−1
δ < 0 (Complements) < 0 < 0 < 0
δ > 0 (Substitutes) If −a2
(
c1c2 − δ2
)
+ 2δ (a1c2 − δa2) > 0, then > 0 < 0 > 0
If −a2
(
c1c2 − δ2
)
+ 2δ (a1c2 − δa2) < 0, then < 0 <0 < 0 !!!!
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4.A.2 With uncertainty
Adding the functional form C = 1z · ( 12 (c1e21 + c2e22) + δe1e2). Also, assume ε1 ∼
N(0,σ1), which will allow us to work with the standard normal distribution. An
additional element is the inclusion of the penalty Ω for uncertainty. For instance,
this term will be equal to 12η(a
2
1σ
2
1 ) if we consider an exponential utility function
u(p) = −exp(−η · p), where ηis the absolute risk aversion coefficient.
FOC1 : = z ·
{
a1Φ
(
UL− e1
σ1
)
+
1
σ1
φ
(
UL− e1
σ1
)
· [(UL− e1) · a1 +Ω]
}
− c1e1 − δe2 = 0
FOC2 := z · a2 − c2e2 − δe1 = 0
And the equivalent of Equation 4.12
de1
da2
= z · −δ
c1c2 − δ2 + z · c2
{
1
σ2
φ′
(
UL−e1
σ1
)
· [(UL− e1) · a1 +Ω] + 2a1 1σφ
(
UL−e1
σ1
)}
Given that for the standard normal pdf it holds that φ′(x) = −xφ(x)
de1
da2
= z· −δ
c1c2 − δ2 + z · c2
{
− 1
σ3
φ
(
UL−e1
σ1
)
· [UL− e1] · [(UL− e1) · a1 +Ω] + 2a1 1σφ
(
UL−e1
σ1
)}
= z· −δ
c1c2 − δ2 + a1 · z · c2 · 1σ · φ
(
UL−e1
σ1
){
2− 1
σ2
· [UL− e1] ·
[
1
a1
Ω+UL− e1
]}
As in the general case, being far from UL implies a larger slope (in absolute
value). This is an effect that is attenuated by risk aversion below UL. Above such
cut-off, risk aversion makes the derivative larger in absolute value. In this partic-
ular case, being very far from UL implies that the derivative will be equivalent to
the non-uncertainty case.
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4.B QOF Payment
Equation 4.26 shows how ratio indicators are translated into income for a practice
i. Essentially, achievement xi of indicator j is translated into points, and such
points into yearly income. First, points are allocated according to a non-linear
tariff that depends on two indicator specific thresholds. Below the lower limit (LLj)
zero points are awarded, and above the upper limit (ULj) the maximum amount of
available points for indicator j is awarded (Equation 4.25). The resulting figure is
adjusted with respect to the relative size of the practice (contractor population index,
CPIi), and to the relative prevalence of the specific condition rewarded for clinical
indicators (PFij). The achievement factor is multiplied by the CPI index and the
prevalence factors, and by the price per point (Equation 4.26). The CPI captures
the size of the practice, and is calculated as the number of patients in the practice
relative to the figure 5891, which was the 2003 average list size.32 The prevalence
factor measures how commonly the condition is treated in indicator j, relative to
the national average.
xij =
Numeratorij
Denominatorij
AFij =

0 if xi ≤ LLj(
xi − LLj
) · Avail. PointsjULj−LLj if xi > LLj
Avail. Pointsj if xi ≥ULj
(4.25)
CPIi =
listi
5891
PFij =
denomij/listi|Xij
E[denom/list|X] , where X are specific conditions
Pij =
(
Value per point in Â£
)
· AFij · CPIi · PFij (4.26)
32Since 2013 this figure has been updated annually. More details are available from BMA (2013).
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4.C Additional Tables
Table 4.7: QOF indicators descriptives for 2010/11
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indicator UL Number E[xt] P[xt <UL] ρ(xt) E[xt − xt−1 E[xt − xt−1
|xt−1 <UL] |xt−1 >UL]
AF03 90% 8245 93.82 7.14 0.50 9.88 -0.55
AF04 90% 8245 95.28 6.43 0.51 26.20 -1.39
ASTHMA03 80% 8245 90.00 4.69 0.41 18.64 -0.76
ASTHMA06 70% 8245 79.58 5.29 0.54 11.03 -0.19
ASTHMA08 80% 8245 87.89 6.37 0.46 15.63 -0.98
BP5 70% 8245 79.68 5.17 0.64 5.87 -0.09
CANCER03 90% 8245 92.75 17.84 0.34 18.18 -2.69
CHD08 70% 8245 81.90 3.51 0.56 11.30 -0.41
CHD09 90% 8245 93.58 7.56 0.46 4.30 -0.66
CHD10 60% 8245 74.91 2.60 0.67 13.30 -0.70
CHD12 90% 8245 92.73 16.53 0.48 5.17 -0.31
CKD02 90% 8245 97.26 1.29 0.41 26.83 -0.37
CKD03 70% 8245 74.86 21.73 0.52 5.58 -1.72
CKD05 80% 8245 90.78 6.03 0.46 40.20 -2.70
CKD06 80% 8245 82.35 24.29 0.53 14.80 -1.33
CVD01 70% 8245 80.12 14.71 0.44 26.06 -5.50
CVD02 70% 8245 82.61 7.94 0.37 34.13 -5.68
DEM02 60% 8245 80.54 3.04 0.42 36.15 -0.92
DM2 90% 8245 94.87 7.00 0.54 4.47 -0.36
DM10 90% 8245 91.39 22.84 0.58 4.93 -0.69
DM13 90% 8245 88.80 37.48 0.65 3.38 -1.38
DM15 80% 8245 89.28 8.07 0.53 20.31 -1.66
DM17 70% 8245 82.73 2.43 0.60 8.70 -0.55
DM18 85% 8245 91.19 9.76 0.47 5.99 -0.17
DM21 90% 8245 91.08 24.33 0.52 5.46 -0.97
DM22 90% 8245 96.95 2.44 0.44 7.78 -0.02
EPILEP06 90% 8245 95.62 6.95 0.27 13.07 -0.64
EPILEP08 70% 8245 73.96 26.14 0.56 7.72 -3.09
HF02 90% 8245 95.46 8.02 0.51 17.25 -1.03
HF03 80% 8245 90.26 4.24 0.46 27.42 -1.10
HF04 60% 8245 83.15 3.26 0.47 41.65 -1.39
SMOKE03 90% 8245 95.61 2.66 0.52 5.69 0.00
SMOKE04 90% 8245 93.07 12.48 0.44 4.98 -0.72
STROKE07 90% 8245 91.49 23.91 0.43 5.01 -1.08
STROKE08 60% 8245 77.18 3.07 0.50 20.72 -0.57
STROKE10 85% 8245 90.09 13.45 0.40 8.97 -0.49
Continued on next page
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Table 4.7: (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Indicator UL Number E[xt] P[xt <UL] ρ(xt) E[xt − xt−1 E[xt − xt−1
|xt−1 <UL] |xt−1 >UL]
STROKE12 90% 8245 93.79 8.98 0.45 9.97 -0.93
STROKE13 80% 8245 88.90 7.51 0.58 25.92 -1.87
THYROI02 90% 8245 95.81 3.24 0.41 10.46 -0.11
Notes: Own calculations based on QOF data. Number: Number of GP practices, including those with 0 elegible
patients for the given indicator. E[xt] : Average achievement per indicator. P[xt < UL] : Proportion of practices
with an achivement below UL. ρ(xt) : Correlation between 2010 and 2009 achivement.
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Table 4.8: Detailed Changes in QOF 2011 clinical indicators with respect to 2009-2010
Status Description Affected Indicators Price
Interpretation
Points
Retirements These tasks are not rewarded anymore. Clinical
indicators are about having a recent record of
certain physical measures, or reviews.
CHD5, CHD7,
DM5, DM11,
DM16, EPILEPSY7,
MH7, STROKE5
Reduction 32
Points reduced Number of assigned points per indicator was
reduced.†
BP4, DEP1 Reduction 26 to 22
Upper Limit
Increased
Small increase from 70% to 71%. ♠ CHD6, STROKE6 Reduction 22
Replacement I For indicators PP01, MH04, MH05, the time for
accomplishing a given goal was reduced. For
CHD2, the optional specialist referral was made
compulsory.
PP01, MH04,
MH05, CHD2
Reduction 18
Replacement II Decrease in points and new wording is more
precise and requires actions at the moment of
diagnosis instead of treatment starting point.
DEP2, DEP3 Reduction 45 to 25
Replacement III Most of these indicators were replaced by
versions which are harder to accomplish. In a few
of them this was compensated with extra points,
but in some others there was a reduction as well:
• For CHD11/CHD14 there is an increase
from 7 to 10 points in exchange for
prescribing aspirin and statins on top of
an ACE inhibitor or alternative blood
pressure treatments.
• Requirements for DM9 were increased
from checking peripheral pulses to a more
comprehensive foot examination. It was
also increased from 3 to 4 points.
• Indicator DM12 was split into DM30 and
DM31, keeping the same number of
points. It asked for a percentage of
patients below a given blood pressure
target (145/85). It was replaced by two
targets, one slightly below the original
(140/80), and one notoriously above
(150/90).
• Indicator MH09 was split into MH11,
MH12, MH13, MH14, MH15 and MH16.
It moved from 23 to 27 points. The
original indicator was general and
imprecise (“routine health promotion and
prevention advice appropriate to their age
and health status”), while the
replacements ask for specific
measurements depending on age and
gender.
CHD11/CHD14,
DM9, DM12
(DM30,DM31),
MH09 (MH11,
MH12, MH13,
MH14, MH15 and
MH16)
Ambiguous 51 to 59
Replacement IV The cutoff was relaxed from last HbA1C to be 7%
or less, to HbA1C to be 7.5% or less
DM23/DM26 Increase 17
Replacement V Similar or the same wording, but the recoding
was done in order to highlight recent changes in
diagnostic procedures. For diabetes indicators the
wording is explicit about new measurement
standards.
COPD1/COPD14,
COPD12/COPD15,
MH6/MH10,
DM24/DM27,
DM25/DM28
- 32
New These are tasks that were not considered before.
Three new clinical indicators, on dementia,
epilepsy and learning disabilities.
DEM3, EPILEPSY
9, LD2
Increase 12
Unchanged No change on points, thresholds or wording - 454
Note: This corresponds to our interpretation based on NHS Employers public documents. † Does not include
indicators which wording was amended as DEP2 and DEP3. ♠ Does not include DM12/DM30, which is an
indicator that its wording was also amended.
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Table 4.9: Bunching tests for selected indicators I
DM22: The percentage of patients with
diabetes who have a record of estimated
glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) or
serum creatinine testing in the previous
15 months.
3 points. LL=40, UL=90.
SMOKE3: The percentage of patients
with any or any combination of the
following conditions: coronary heart
disease, stroke or TIA, hypertension,
diabetes, COPD, CKD, asthma,
schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder
or other psychoses whose notes record
smoking status in the previous 15
months (except those who have never
smoked where smoking status need
only be recorded once since diagnosis)
30 points. LL=40, UL=90.
THYROID2: The percentage of patients
with hypothyroidism with thyroid
function tests recorded in the previous
15 months
6 points. LL=40, UL=90.
192 Chapter 4. Identifying complementarities across tasks using two-part contracts
Table 4.10: Bunching tests for selected indicators II
AF04: The percentage of patients with
atrial fibrillation diagnosed after 1st
April 2008 with ECG or specialist
confirmed diagnosis.
10 points. LL=40, UL=90.
DM13: The percentage of patients with
diabetes who have a record of
micro-albuminuria testing in the
previous 15 months (exception reporting
for patients with proteinuria)
3 points. LL=40, UL=90.
CKD06: The percentage of patients on
the CKD register whose notes have a
record of an albumin:creatinine ratio (or
protein:creatinine ratio) value in the
previous 15 months
6 points. LL=40, UL=80.
Chapter 5
Conclusions, future work and policy
recommendations
This thesis has explored three broad topics in the area of the economics of health.
While each of them deals with different research questions, the common element
among them is the role of government policies in shaping health and, as a con-
sequence, individual choices. As a result, the conclusions of each chapter are
able enrich our understanding of how to design health-related policies in order to
improve the welfare of a society.
In chapter 2, behavioural responses to routine health checks were considered.
Specifically, as a result of being advised to visit a family doctor due to a potential
risk of suffering hypertension, I found an increase in the probability of being on
medication to lower blood pressure but also differences in lifestyle. Interestingly,
there were responses in opposite directions. For instance there was a reduction
in alcohol intake frequency but also an increase in the odds of being obese. This
adds to current evidence that suggests that information-based treatments should
consider behavioural responses in order to assess the full impact of these pro-
grams, and that more research is needed to understand which lifestyles are more
responsive and in which direction to such interventions.
As a policy lesson, this chapter tells us that health checks type of programmes
might work in identifying certain individuals who are at risk of developing chronic
diseases. The effect on medication use was substantial, especially for those indi-
viduals with a high risk of developing cardiovascular diseases, even if it was tem-
poral. However, it is important that this type of policy is also accompanied by a
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lifestyle follow-up in order to check whether this is deteriorating.
Chapter 3 presented a novel framework for assessing the value and the cost-
effectiveness of the adoption of a health intervention. It combines a health progres-
sion model with a standard life-cycle model with endogenous labour supply. As
a result, it is possible to construct counterfactual scenarios with diverse policies,
featuring not only health technology or social protection but also labour market
characteristics. This allows for determining a willingness-to-pay value that incor-
porates how households’ consumption and leisure is affected by the treatment.
With this too is also possible to improve standard cost-effectiveness calculations
by incorporating the gains on additional labour income, a potential source of re-
sources for the health system.
This chapter developed a tool that would be useful for institutions around the
world that have to decide whether to include certain treatments in a health insur-
ance contract. The general design of the model allows potential users to analyse
preventive care innovations in areas different to cardiovascular disease. For in-
stance, valuing innovations in mental health, cancer and disability benefits among
others are feasible applications. The sole requirements are to be able to map such
conditions into reported diagnoses, and to have information on markers that sig-
nal a higher risk of developing certain conditions. This tool can also introduce
a more general analysis of the heterogeneity in the value of a treatment, which
might also help to target some treatments to specific populations.
And last, in the context of contracting schemes where there are rewards for
specific tasks, in chapter 4 a novel test for complementarity/substitutability across
tasks was introduced. It takes advantage of two-piece linear tariffs such as the
Quality and Outcomes Framework clinical indicators. Essentially, for a given task,
agents - GP practices in our example - who self-select into the level of effort at
which the marginal benefits change become insensitive to small exogenous varia-
tions in the marginal benefit of alternative tasks. Effectively, those agents near the
threshold become a control group that allow us to understand how agents react to
such alternative task prices variations.
While this last chapter’s contribution is more technical than the previous ones,
it has direct implications for our understanding of financial incentive schemes. In
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this precise case, it shows that the UK primary care incentive programme does not
have tasks that are clear substitutes. It also suggests that these schemes should
include kink points in order to allow for a recurrent evaluation of changes in
their design. This is a sensible alternative when it is not possible to introduce
experimental variation.
As a general conclusion, this dissertation has shown that there is potential to
extend our knowledge of preventive care interventions both from the supply and
demand side. First, there is empirical evidence that certain interventions do affect
individuals’ decisions; however work on this topic is scarce and more detailed
evidence of the mechanisms behind is still required. In my research I found that
some lifestyles are improved while others deteriorate, but knowing more about
the heterogeneity in beliefs regarding the contribution of each input of the health
production function is still required. Understanding this would motivate a better
analysis on how individuals value medical innovations. In my research, rational
agents know perfectly the benefit of a drug and have beliefs about their future
health that match realised events for the previous generation. This is an assump-
tion that could be relaxed if my proposed framework were to be combined with
information that includes subjective beliefs about current and future health.
The previous recommendations, both in terms of policy and research, are
direct contributions from this dissertation. I hope that they could be implemented
in order to improve both welfare and knowledge.
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